India Learned Valuable Lessons from 26/11. But So Have Terrorists Across the Border.

They say that human memory tends to shut out trauma. But the pain caused by the 26/11 attack on Mumbai will always be difficult to forget. What happened on November 26, 2008 was an act of pure terrorism: Defenceless civilians sought out and gunned down over three days in the glare of national television.

For this reason, the incident has been a watershed in India’s attitudes towards terrorism. It hardened the country’s attitude towards terrorists and militants of all stripes. Further, it has made any kind of a dialogue process with Islamabad difficult, given how the authorities there have dragged their feet in providing justice to the 157 killed and the 600 injured on those terrible days.

The fact that the attack was planned and executed by a Pakistan-based terrorist group is accepted even by the authorities in that country. The official narrative in Pakistan is that these were ‘non-state actors’. But given the wealth of evidence about the meticulous planning of 26/11, it is difficult to believe the attack did not have some kind of official sanction.

Also read: 26/11 and the Media: Where Were the Protocols?

Ten years on, India has learned some valuable lessons from 26/11, yet it is hard to be sanguine about the country’s ability to deal with future threats. For one, the terrorist groups operating on the other side of the border have also internalised 26/11 –and changed their modus operandi. Worse, the ruling ‘parivar’ is increasing the country’s vulnerability by attacking its social fabric.

A series of firm steps

Following Mumbai, the government of India came up with a slew of measures to deal with the new threat. The National Investigation Agency was created to investigate terrorism issues, four National Security Guard (NSG) hubs were set up for a rapid response to attacks. An amended Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was created to provide for the arrest and interrogation of terrorism suspects.

One of the first outcomes of 26/11 was to get the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), an intelligence agency clearinghouse, in motion. Subsidiary MACS at the state level came up next.

Counter-terrorism efforts ran up against India’s federal system on two important instances. In the first, opposition from the states prevented the emergence of a powerful new outfit called the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The second instance concerned a nationwide information-sharing system, the NATGRID.

The NCTC, which would have subsumed the MACs, was aimed at pre-empting, responding to and containing terrorist attacks. But several states blocked it, saying that it was improper and possibly illegal to give the Intelligence Bureau the charge of a body with investigation and arrest powers.

One of the major decisions of the government was to place the Indian Coast Guard under the Indian Navy, and make the latter the overall in-charge of maritime security, in coordination with the state government agencies and the marine police. A number of radars and automatic identification systems were later set up along the coast, as well as a command, control and coordination centre in New Delhi to monitor the operations.

But gaps galore

But this system is full of holes. Many of the coastal police stations have yet to become functional. Besides the infrastructure of jetties, police stations and vessels, there is a problem of imbuing the personnel with a maritime culture. Getting the largely land-oriented policing system to think in a maritime fashion has not been easy.

One of the major gaps in security relates to ports, especially the smaller ports and harbours of the country, most of which lack any kind of security cover. Even in the larger ports, little is being done to check the containers that pass through, as that requires specialised equipment.

Also read: Ten Years After 26/11, Coastal Police Stations Remain a Weak Link

Another major gap is in not being able to provide Automatic Identification Systems for all the fishing vessels in Indian waters. The scheme is being introduced for vessels 20 metres in length, but the bulk of the fishing fleet around India’s coasts consists of vessels smaller than that.

Policing as Achilles’ heel

Perhaps the biggest problem in counter-terrorism (CT) has been the country’s generally third-rate police system. The civil police are the first line of defence against terrorism, and often the first responder. But state police forces are grossly under-resourced and lack the organisation, leadership and culture to play an effective CT role. The MACs and AIS systems may be computerized, but the average police stations often lacks even the most basic of infrastructure. Instead of NSG hubs, the country would have been better off upgrading state police forces and creating SWAT teams to deal with Mumbai-like strikes.

Many of the failures of the CT system became apparent in the fiasco surrounding the Pathankot attack of January 2016. Despite advance knowledge of a possible terrorist strike, the response was, as in Mumbai, chaotic. First, reports of terrorists breaching the border and hijacking vehicles were ignored by the Punjab Police. Then, despite that information, the gunmen were able to penetrate the perimeter of the Pathankot Air Force Base. Instead of getting locally available army units to deal with them, the government insisted on flying in the NSG from New Delhi. Once again, it took three days to finally terminate the attack.

Coordination remains a problem

The Pathankot attack brought out another lesson not learnt from the Mumbai incidents. It had become clear in those excruciating days in November 2008 that no one was in charge of the counter-terrorist operation. At various times, various actors – the Mumbai Police, the Marine Commandos, the NSG – claimed to be coordinating the response. Because it was clear that in reality no one was.

Also read: Read: What the Maharashtra Government Promised to Do Based on 26/11 Inquiry

Something similar happened in Pathankot when NSA Ajit Doval took charge of the response from Delhi, while a variety of players – Air Commodore Dhamoon, the base commander at Pathankot, Maj Gen Dushyant Singh of the NSG, Home Secretary Rajiv Mehrishi, Air Marshal Anil Khosla, or the Air Officer Commanding in Chief of the Western Air Command S B Deo – seemed to be in charge.

A new MO from the Pakistani side

There was another angle to the Pathankot attack that the Indian side had not fully considered given the national preoccupation with the danger of more 26/11-type incidents.

Following the international outcry against the Mumbai strike and the wealth of evidence that became available on Pakistan’s official complicity in the attack, terrorist groups in Pakistan had, with the backing of their patrons in the military establishment there, turned towards a new strategy towards India. Instead of indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-combatants, strikes in the years after 26/11 began to focus on military and police targets between Jammu and Kathua along the National Highway.

Between September 2013 and July 2015, there were five attacks of a similar pattern. A small group of militants dressed in army fatigues crosses the international border which runs parallel to the National Highway, they hijack a bus or a car and head to a target, usually an army camp or police post. Many of these attacks were carefully timed to disrupt important meetings between Indian and Pakistani leaders.

The Pathankot attack came in the wake of Prime Minister Modi’s sudden visit to Lahore to wish his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif for his birthday. The Mumbai attack of 2008 came following efforts by India and Pakistan to push their dialogue to the level of military officers from both sides.

Engineering social strife only helps terrorists

There is, unfortunately, another lesson that is being steadily unlearnt since those terrible days of 2008.

From the 1980s onwards, terrorist attacks in India have been a largely Pakistani affair. They have been organized and aided by the Pakistani intelligence organisations and executed through proxies. The Pakistani effort has been as much to seek the breakup of India as to foster tension and divisions between Muslims and other communities in the country, presumably in order to incentivize the radicalization of young Muslims. These efforts have so far been a signal failure.

All told, in three decades, there cannot be more than 300 Indian Muslims who have been accused of being hard-core jihadists; the number convicted is much smaller than that. This, in a population of some 170 million Muslims, and in a period when the high tide of Islamist radicalism swept the world, is statistically negligible.

Despite terrible bomb blasts, orchestrated communal riots and mayhem, the social fabric of the country has held firm. In the past four years, however, Hindutva activists have unleashed verbal and physical attacks on the Muslim community using cow protection, Pakistan, or so-called ‘love jihad’ as proxies. Muslims in India have not responded the way the Sangh wants, so the Hindutva fanatics are redoubling their efforts. Their end goal is to push Indian Muslims to the wall so that a section becomes militant.

The Wire November 26, 2018

How India is caught in the crossfire of US-China trade tensions

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loon’s warning, that Asian nations may be forced to make a difficult choice between their ties with China and their relationship with the US, if tensions continue to grow between the two, is timely.

Mr Lee made the comments on Wednesday at the end of the annual East Asia Summit that was held in the island-nation this year.

Lee’s remarks are a timely reminder of the fluid geopolitical situation in the region, where China has important economic links with the region that was once closely linked to the US. The region is feeling the geopolitical pull of China that has already succeeded in building deep ties several of its members like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

At the same time, Beijing has disputes with the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.

A balancing role: Modi with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. (Photo: Reuters)

Strategic competition

Trade tensions between the US and China have introduced their own dynamic into the situation, because many ASEAN nations have deep ties with China. Singapore, for example, is the biggest investor in China.

Issues between the US and China are not likely to be worked out quickly. Even if they work out a ceasefire of sorts on the trade issue, they still have lots to quarrel about, ranging from Taiwan, the South China Sea and economic relations not related to tariffs.

In fact, trade tensions are a manifestation of the strategic competition between the two countries. US steps to limit technology transfers to China through legislation, such as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act (FIRRMA), will set the tone for the relationship regardless of trade deals. There are two big geopolitical players in contention here, that of the US and China.

So we see a Chinese vision that is variously expressed as “China in the middle”, “China Dream” or sometimes as a “community of common destiny” which, some say, is derived from the Zhou dynasty model of tianxia or “all under the heaven”, where everyone lives harmoniously together under a good emperor.

Then, there is the American and Japanese vision, first manifested as the pivot, now expressed as the idea of a ‘Free and Open Asia Pacific’. Please note that “free” and “open” are important qualifiers that confer the benign geographic concept with political context. This is layered upon older American hub and spoke alliances where the US has bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. One of its more recent iterations has been the Quadrilateral Dialogue or the Quad, involving India, Japan, US and Australia.

Where does India figure in all this? (Reuters photo of Narendra Modi with Mike Pence)

ASEAN stance

But the ASEAN has insistently pushed its own security ideas.

These are in emphasising the centrality of the ASEAN work through institutions created by the grouping such as the East Asia Summit, the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), Asean Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM)-Plus format.

Formally at least China, India, the US all agree with the concept of the centrality of the ASEAN. They are participants in the ASEAN’s mechanisms. However, the body itself is divided and has not taken any clear-cut stand either in support of the FOIP or to criticise Chinese activity in the South China Sea.

ASEAN cannot stand still. It needs to continue to take steps that will make it an attractive investment destination. One step towards this is the removal of non-tariff barriers. And harmonising ASEAN’s approach toward services and labour mobility would cement the South-east Asian regional organisation, as well as taking political steps to hedge against longterm uncertainties such as the Sino-US competition, which is not going to go away soon.

Issues between the US and China are not likely to be worked out quickly. (Reuters photo of Mike Pence with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang)

India’s role

Where does India figure in all this?

ASEAN countries like Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia are happy to have India into a role of balancing China. That, indeed, is the logic of the American decision to not only christen the Asia-Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific, but also rename its Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command.

India has good ties with the ASEAN and last January, they were collectively the chief guests on Republic Day.

India has also held exercises with its ASEAN neighbours since 1995.

The 2018 iteration of this exercise, held in March 2018, had Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indo, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand and Vietnam. Separately, India has a coordinated patrol CORPAT with Indonesia and Thailand since 2002.

India also has bilateral exercises SIMBEX with Singapore since 1994, and this year, India has begun bilateral exercises Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Despite all this, the reality of ASEAN is best brought out by the recently concluded East Asia summit where US Vice President Mike Pence rubbed shoulders with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Its centrality to the Indo-Pacific is manifest. What is not clear is what it wants to do with this centrality.

Mail Today November 19, 2018

The waning of orthodoxy

When India and China undertook the Wuhan process earlier this year, it was seen as a tactical move by both countries to avoid distractions. Prime Minister Modi wanted to focus on the 2019 elections and rule out dangerous confrontations like the one at Doklam the year before. President Xi had his hands full with Trump’s aggressive trade posture and wanted to prevent New Delhi from cementing its ties with a clutch of American military allies in Asia Pacific.

Both have succeeded in their limited objective. The Sino-Indian border is quiet, even though the Chinese have stepped up construction of facilities and infrastructure along its length. Speaking at the Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore earlier this year, Modi has made it clear that ‘Indo-Pacific’ to him was merely a geographic, not geopolitical construct. Despite a lot of breathless commentary, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving India, the US, Japan and Australia has remained a talking shop and its strategic framework is still unclear.

None of this means that things will not change. But the direction of the change is even now not clear. This is evident from the moves of all the principal players — China, India, Japan and the US. At the end of October, Japan had its Wuhan moment when, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the first official prime ministerial visit to China since 2011. At the end of the visit, he declared that Sino-Japanese relations would now move ‘from competition to coexistence’. In turn, President Xi Jinping called for closer relations between the two difficult East Asian neighbours at a time of growing global ‘instability  and uncertainties’.

More important, Japan announced its decision to participate in 50 infrastructure joint projects, an action tantamount to endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative in all but name. Next to China, Japan is a major infrastructure player in Southeast Asia and Africa and cooperation with China would provide the former with considerable expertise the Japanese have in this area. This is something the Chinese need in view of the many setbacks they are facing in unrolling their BRI. The Japanese and Chinese economies are closely intertwined and denser cooperation will be beneficial for Japanese companies as well and provide a hedge against the uncertainties of the Japan-US relationship, in the midst of a negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement.

As for India and China, conflict and competition has always gone hand in hand with cooperation. India may have been the first country to oppose the BRI, but it is one of the founder members of the Beijing-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Likewise, last year India became a full member of the Beijing-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Following the Wuhan summit at the end of April, the Indian side had also spoken of the need to ensure stability amidst ‘current global uncertainties’. Both sides had emphasised the importance of ‘strategic communications’, code word for high-level interaction, and they have followed this up by ministerial contacts through the year and already met twice since Wuhan. Their fourth meeting will take place on the sidelines of the G-20 later this month.

At Wuhan, the two sides also agreed to carry out joint economic projects in Afghanistan, something that could provide a template for the kind of third-country projects that Japan and China appeared to have agreed on. Formally, the two sides still remain committed to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor and this could be a future area of focus.

All this should also be seen in the context of signals that the US may be on the verge of some kind of a deal with China. Trump caused some consternation in his press conference of November 7 when he said ‘China got rid of their China 25 because I found it very insulting…’ This was an obvious reference to Made in China 2025, a major point of contention between China and the US. Most analysts discounted the remark and felt that maybe Trump misspoke. But it is possible that the Chinese have been discussing serious concessions in that area in their talks with the US.

Many of these developments are like straws in the wind of our uncertain times. Even as they talk of trade, the gulf between the US and China on issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan and China’s ill-treatment of religious minorities is only growing.

Even while Japan and China enhance cooperation with each other, so do Tokyo and New Delhi, and the US and India. Japan has played a significant role in enhancing connectivity in India and is now moving to third countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Africa.

Even though the India-Japan security partnership may be working below its potential, it is making important gains. The recent agreement to scale up their Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) cooperation and Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) has important implications for Indo-Pacific security.

All this really means that contrary to the idea that we are entering the era of a New Cold War, we are actually in an era where countries have a sharper idea of their national interest and are not restrained by any orthodoxy in pursuing them. So, relations between two countries can see conflict, cooperation and coexistence. It would be a dangerous fallacy to see relationships in purely binary frameworks that end up promoting false choices.

The Tribune November 13, 2018

Bus to Pakistan, From China Via PoK: Why is India Worked Up?

On 31 October, India formally protested the proposed launch of a bus service between China and Pakistan because the service would “operate between Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir” under the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’. The official spokesman noted India held the China-Pakistan boundary agreement of 1963 as “illegal and invalid” and views the service as a violation of India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

If all this sounds tough and uncompromising, it is. But it is hardly consistent and not especially helpful.

The Karakoram Highway over which the service will run has been around since the late 1960s and was opened to the public in 1979. The route, which is by no means an easy one, witnesses significant civilian traffic and, in fact, the first bus service on it was launched in 2006 between Gilgit and Kashgar.

This has been in use in the main by traders and tourists. There is no record of an Indian protest at the time.

Also Read : Not aware of India's protest over China-Pakistan bus service: Beijing

Why is India Getting Worked Up Now?

Indeed, it’s not clear whether India protested the building of the road itself and the various phases in which it was upgraded.

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India had, of course, protested the China-Pakistan boundary agreement which was actually engineered by ZA Bhutto to torpedo the direct talks between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue that had been midwifed by the US and UK in 1963.

Presumably, this time around India is worked up because unlike the local traffic between Gilgit and Kashgar, the new service will be between Pakistan proper, viz Lahore, to Kashgar and back.

When it comes to the Kashmir dispute, there is an Indian strategy formulated by Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, evident from the very time that India accepted a ceasefire in December 1948 at a time when the military centre of gravity had shifted in its favour.

That strategy would essentially divide the state broadly along what then was the ceasefire line and is now the Line of Control. Given the fact that the country had largely gone along with the partition, there was nothing unusual in seeking to partition a state which bordered both of them.

The ceasefire line in the west divided the state in such a way that the Kashmiri-speaking areas remained in India and Pakistan kept control of a region which was populated by people who were ethnically closer to them. Further, Pakistan would be reassured that their Punjabi heartland would get some defence in depth from India.

But the Pakistanis have baulked at any such deal, demanding as Bhutto did in the 1963 talks that India cede the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir to them, barring the Kathua tehsil.

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Of course, the same Bhutto was somewhat chastened when he met Indira Gandhi in Simla in 1972 in the wake of the Bangladesh war. Desperate to get back the 90,000 POWs in Indian hands, Bhutto agreed to change the nomenclature of the ceasefire line to the LoC, implying that it was no longer created by war but through acquiescence.

Further, as Indian accounts have it, he told Indira Gandhi that he would work towards converting the LoC into an international border. But this commitment was verbal and the Pakistanis have since denied that any such commitment was ever made.

Another manifestation of the Indian strategy vis-à-vis the so-called POK, came in 2006-7 when New Delhi engaged Islamabad in a backchannel dialogue that saw the emergence of a four point formula which would leave borders where they were, but seek to soften them to the point of irrelevance.

Since this plan collapsed along with Pervez Musharraf’s presidency, it’s not possible to gauge whether or not it would have been successful.

But  what it does tell us, as indeed the decisions of Indira Gandhi and Nehru, is that India remains willing to live with a partitioned Jammu & Kashmir. So, to make a big fuss about a bus service in a part that India is not particularly attached to is formalistically correct, but its tantamount to missing the woods for the trees.

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Whether it is the Sino-Indian border, or the border in J&K, it is highly unlikely that they are going to change dramatically in the coming decades. War to recover claims, be they Indian, Chinese or Pakistani, is unlikely because of the nuclear factor. A negotiated settlement is the way out and it will result in a reduction of massive expenditures to defend the border. Further it would promote a level of trans-border trade which could bring prosperity to the local people.

Chinese Position Highly Nuanced

In all this, the Chinese position is highly nuanced. Article 6 of the 1963 China- Pakistan agreement says that the agreement was subject to being replaced by another final version “after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India”.

As for CPEC, India has made a big issue of it because it goes through Gilgit and Baltistan. The Chinese deny that it is a change of status quo. In September 2017, their spokesman said that the CPEC “has nothing to do with territorial sovereignty disputes and will not affect China’s position on the Kashmir issue.”

Given India’s belief that Pakistan is in illegal occupation of a part of Jammu & Kashmir, there is nothing surprising in the remarks of the official spokesman. It is, of course, quite another thing to ask whether it’s worth insistently reiterating India’s claim every time a bus or convoy crosses the border from Pakistan to China and vice versa. India could, through some smart diplomacy, instead, leverage this to get the Chinese to open up border trade across the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh.

The Quint November 12, 2018

A US-China Trade Deal Is Likely, but Will Not Resolve a Deteriorating Relationship

The outcome of the US mid-terms is unlikely to have any impact on Sino-US relations. For one thing, Donald Trump has already declared that it was a great victory for him, never mind that the Democrats seized the House of Representatives and flipped a number of key elections for state governors. The Democrats are also likely to be as tough on China as the Trump administration. Most Americans shrugged off the impact of the tariff war, which was not an election issue.

Fortunately, there are signs that China and the US may be working towards a settlement of their trade and related disputes. Trump termed his November 1 telephone conversation with Chinese premier Xi Jinping as “long and very good”. The dialogue came ahead of the planned meeting at the G-20 in Argentina later this month. The Chinese readout of the conversation had Jinping telling Trump that the essence of Sino-US relations were “mutual benefit and win-win”, emphasising the resolution of their trade and economic disputeThe possibility of a late November deal is now increasing. But this could well be a ceasefire in their trade war along with negotiations to create a new framework of trade relations. But this would be limited to trade and economic issues alone. There are many issues – South China Sea, Taiwan, alleged Chinese influence on operations in the US and technology theft – dividing the two nations.

2+2 talks held

On November 9, the two sides had their 2+2 talks involving the US secretaries of state and defense and their Chinese counterparts. The meeting was originally scheduled last month but was postponed after the US imposed sanctions on Chinese officials for purchasing Russian Su-35 aircraft and the S-300 missile system.

Secretary of state Mike Pompeo and defense secretary James Mattis represented the US, while the Chinese side comprised of Yang Jichei, who is a politburo member and the director of the office of foreign affairs in the Chinese Communist Party, and the minister of national defence, Wei Fenghe. On top of the agenda were issues relating to North Korea and the recent dangerous encounters between US and Chinese ships in the South China Sea.

According to media reports, the event brought out the continuing and serious differences on issues relating to the South China Sea, Taiwan, religious freedom and trade. In a subsequent press meet, the Chinese insisted that the US should not send its vessels to the “Chinese territory” in the South China Sea, while the US reiterated its position that it will “continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.” The Chinese were critical of US trade policy and for walking out of the Iran nuclear deal.

On the other hand, the Americans also expressed concerns over China’s treatment of its religious minorities. The two sides also traded barbs over each other’s perspectives on Taiwan. This indicates that the gap between the two countries is, if anything, becoming wider.

‘Cooperation over confrontation’

Earlier this week, the Bloomberg New Economy Forum threw light into the murky dynamics of Sino-US relations. It was forced to relocate to Singapore after permission was denied for it to be held in Beijing. In his remarks as keynote speaker, China’s vice president Wang Qishan said that China was ready for trade talks and both sides stood to gain by choosing cooperation over confrontation. Wang is one of Jinping’s closest aides and is virtually seen as the eighth member of the standing committee of the CPC politburoAfter several rounds of negotiations and tariffs, the two sides may now be getting down to do real business. The Chinese, especially, now have a sharper appreciation of the other side’s position. Clearly laying out what the countries are seeking and the concessions they can offer or those they cannot will help.

So, even as the Trump administration seeks to balance its trade, it’s not clear what other objective it wishes to achieve. But the inexorable unfolding of events has ensured that the US high-tech sector has become steadily hostile to China and now, even academia is becoming chary of the Chinese connection. Recently, the Johns Hopkins Medical school barred foreign scientists because of concerns of intellectual property rights issues. The move affects all foreign nationals, but the primary target is China.

Secrecy over Chinese scientists

Besides charging Chinese intelligence officers and hackers, the US has begun focusing on Chinese students studying STEM (Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics) subjects in the US. Of particular focus is the Chinese Thousand Talents Programme, launched in 2008 to attract foreign-educated Chinese scientists. More than 7,000 researchers, mainly from the US, have been persuaded to return to China. Many of these, the US believes, are channels for stealing US intellectual property. One part of the programme is also open to non-Chinese researchers who are offered lucrative research grants and salaries to shift to China. 

As a result of US pressure, the Chinese have started hiding the identities of top scientific recruits, playing down the importance of the programmeThe bottom line is therefore quite stark. The US and China may work out a trade deal, but it will be a limited affair. It cannot resolve the issues that are leading to a steadily deteriorating US-China relationship, these include not just Taiwan and the South China Sea, but the basic lack of trust in the relationship that is acting as a dampener across the board.

It is not clear just what the US views the endpoint of the policy measures it is taking today. But for the Chinese, even a limited ceasefire would be a means of limiting US pressure on a range of areas, at least for a period of time, so as to enable China to build up its own capabilities in the economic, technological and military field to better offset US power.

The Wire November 10, 2018

Midterm Toxins & Tonic: Trump could end up being the unwitting vehicle of a very American revolution

Whether the blue (Democratic) electoral wave was stopped by a red (Republican) wall, or if there was a wave at all, remains a matter of contention in the United States. President Donald Trump responded as though he had won a re-election, took the opportunity to fire his attorney general and, in a lengthy, angry press conference, attacked the media.

To go by the metrics, Democrats captured the House of Representatives and made portentous gains in state legislatures and with other elected officials like state governors and attorneys general. Republicans, though, not only kept the upper house, the Senate, but they also picked up three seats there. With a divided legislature, Trump will now take credit for success and blame Democrats for his failures.

But with Democrats in charge of the House, Trump will, for the first time, face real Congressional oversight. Unlike in India, American parliamentary committees have real teeth which they often use in exercise of their investigation and oversight powers.  But with Trump threatening counterattack, nothing will be straightforward.

In essence, the election was about America’s dangerously divided polity and the outcome only underscores that the immediate future will remain toxic. Differences between the two parties have now reached epic proportions. These relate to social issues like abortion and same sex marriage, immigration and race, healthcare and environmental policy. Democrats have the support of larger numbers of women, minorities and the young, while the Republican core support comes from men, mainly white, and rural folk.

An electoral map shows the periphery of the country as blue, while the vast hinterland remains red. The US is increasingly becoming suburban and urban and less rural, and the polls show that Democratic strength derives from suburban women, younger voters, and non-Europeans. Time is running out for today’s Republican Party and in many instances they are clinging on to power through gerrymandering constituencies, preventing the minorities and the poor from voting, and toxic politics.

For Trump, the ideal American economy lies in the 1970s with workers in assembly lines churning out cars, trucks and locomotives. In the social sphere he goes back one more decade to an America where blacks were kept in their place and non-European immigrants didn’t exist. The old elite wants to turn the clock back to recreate an American economy that is no longer viable, or a society where white patriarchal dominance is unquestioned.

In all this, foreign affairs are furthest away from the minds of Americans. Those in China who had hoped that the outcome would help moderate Trump will be disappointed. Trump has helped change American attitudes towards them and the process has been bipartisan. Russians probably did not expect much. As for India, it doesn’t really count in America’s global calculus. For that we need a much larger economy, or a capacity to do mischief to the detriment of the US. As of now we have neither.

Trump’s narrow definition of American nationalism, attitudes towards race and immigration, international treaties, law and even basic decency and norms go against the grain, and, indeed, the real interests of his own country. Despite its obvious flaws and acts of commission, the US has been “the city on the hill” – a country that set global standards, whether in academia, fashion, lifestyle or entertainment, and one which welcomed immigrants who, in turn, enriched it.

Even so, Trump could end up being the unwitting vehicle of a very American revolution. One significant outcome has been the election of an unprecedented number of women legislators, triggered by the Trump misogyny and non-white voter turnout has soared to historic levels. By trampling on his allies and trashing norms, Trump could also end up changing global politics, in a manner that he never intended. But the struggle for the soul of the US is not likely to end soon. Indeed, things could well get worse before they get any better.

Times of India November 10, 2018