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Saturday, November 30, 2019

Pakistan May Not Be Able To Exit FATF Grey List, Post APG Action

Preliminary reports – that have not been officially confirmed yet – suggest that Pakistan has been ‘blacklisted’ by the 22nd Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), an affiliate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that concluded in Canberra on 23 August. This should send alarm bells ringing in Islamabad.
On the eve of the meeting held in Canberra, the Pakistani authorities were allowing it to be known that they would sail through, based on the mutual evaluation report (MER), related to the work they had done in ‘strengthening’ anti-money laundering (AML) exercises, and ‘countering’ financing terror (CFT).
Now, however, they are saying that the MER may not reflect the ‘real’ progress that they had made since October 2018.
The APG and FATF processes are separate, but they have an important bearing on each other.

Has Pakistan Flunked the Test?

As per the reports which have mainly played out in the Indian media without any official confirmation yet, Pakistan seems to have flunked the test royally: the APG reportedly found that Islamabad failed to meet its rules on 32 out of 40 special standards and benchmarks, relating to its legal and financial system, and 10 of 11 ‘effectiveness’ parameters relating to the enforcement of safeguards against terror financing (TF), money laundering, and have effectively ‘blacklisted’ Pakistan by awarding it its lowest “enhanced expedited follow-up” ranking.
The APG and FATF processes are separate, but they have an important bearing on each other. It is clear now that Islamabad will not only find it difficult to extract itself from the FATF’s grey list – also known as “jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies” – but actually have to confront being blacklisted.
Islamabad might find it tough to get going in the FATF meetings – first, a review meeting in Thailand in September, and then the crucial plenary on 18-23 October

FATF’s To-Do List for Pakistan

Pakistan was placed on the FATF grey list in June 2018. A press release  of the FATF at that time, noted that Pakistan had made a “high level political commitment” to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime, and “address its strategic counter-terrorist financing related deficiencies”.
  • First, to have Islamabad identify terrorism financing (TF) risks, and then assess and deal with them.
  • Second, to demonstrate that remedial actions are applied in the case of AML/CFT violations, and that they are complied with by financial institutions.
  • Third, to demonstrate that action is being taken against illegal money or value transfer services.
  • Fourth, to show that action is being taken to identify cash couriers, and enforcing controls on illicit movement of currency.
  • Fifth, improve coordination between the provinces and federal government.
  • Sixth, show that the authorities are identifying and investigating terror-financing (TF) activity, and TF investigations and prosecutions are hitting the right persons and entities.
  • Seventh, show that TF prosecutions are effective.
  • Eighth, demonstrate effective action against all terrorists in the UN’s 1267 and 1373 designation lists.
  • Ninth, demonstrate that designated persons are deprived of their resources.
In turn, Pakistan had given the FATF a 27-point Action Plan through which, it hoped, it could exit the grey list. A year later, in June 2019, the FATF said that Pakistan had failed to complete its action plan, and warned that Islamabad could face blacklisting if it did not meet its commitments by October.
Though Imran Khan has accused New Delhi of lobbying the FATF against Pakistan, the real push is coming from its members like UK, Germany, France and the US.

Real Pushback Against Pak from Western Countries

Earlier this month, Islamabad had given the FATF a 450-page compliance document outlining its actions against terror groups in the past 18 months, the changes it had made in laws dealing with terrorism, and so on. Pakistan claimed it had charged Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed with terror financing, and froze all the assets of the Jamaat-ud-dawa and other UN proscribed groups.
In view of the APG ruling, Pakistan’s chances of exiting the grey list look bleak. Indeed, Pakistan’s struggle now will be to stay out of the black list.
Clearly, the APG did not buy this and if its action is any guide, Islamabad is going to find it tough to get going in the FATF meetings – first, a review meeting in Thailand in September, and then the crucial plenary on 18-23 October.
India is a member of both the APG and the FATF, and though Imran Khan has accused New Delhi of lobbying the FATF against Pakistan, the real push is coming from its members like UK, Germany, France and the US, countries which play a key role in the global financial system and can impose restrictions and penalties on Pakistan.
It is more than likely that western countries are squeezing Pakistan where it hurts its pockets.

Potential Impact of Being Blacklisted

In view of the APG ruling, Pakistan’s chances of exiting the grey list look bleak. Indeed, Pakistan’s struggle now will be to stay out of the black list.
This would lead to a financial downgrade and restrictions on its markets. It would find it difficult to get more money from the IMF and other western countries or, for that matter, service its debts which take up a quarter of the government’s revenues currently. It is more than likely that western countries are squeezing Pakistan where it hurts its pockets.

Significance of Action Taken by FATF & Affiliates

The FATF is really about naming and shaming, rather than actually directly fighting terrorism. After all, people like Hafiz Saeed, the Haqqani network, and Masood Azhar are known and already proscribed.
But the importance of the action lies in the fact that like all political parties, insurgencies and terrorist groups require money to function. Squeezing their money supply is sometimes  a more efficacious way of dealing with them, than sending in the police or the army. This is the logic that has confronted Pakistan since the  Financial Action Task Force got underway.
Quint August 24, 2018

India (re)discovers the Indian Ocean

Modern India cannot but have a sharp awareness of the importance of sea power. It is conscious of the country’s painful history when, beginning in the 16th century, traders from Europe rudely disrupted the stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), established trading stations on the Indian peninsula and then subsequently conquered and impoverished the subcontinent.

Independent India’s leaders have therefore devoted a great deal of thought to the country’s maritime past and future and have sought to recreate that world where the Indian Ocean is the source of everyone’s prosperity, and no one seeks hegemony over it. However, the lack of resources and developments beyond their control, have prevented them from giving full rein to their ideas and plans. Moreover, with its disputes with Pakistan and China, India’s strategic focus has been on its continental borders.

But as the country becomes one of the world’s leading economies, the centre of gravity of its strategic thinking is shifting towards the Indian Ocean, through whose sea lanes two thirds of the world’s oil, a third of the bulk cargo and half of all container traffic travel. India is conscious that its sea power will help preserve peace and stability in the Indian Ocean in the coming decades, something that it needs to undertake its economic transformation.

Sadly, in recent times, the Indian Ocean littoral has seen a great deal of conflict, especially in its most critical region, the Persian Gulf. It has also been afflicted by piracy in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa that has required fleets of the international community to safeguard the region. In the 1980s it saw a long-running terrorist insurgency in Sri Lanka requiring the commitment of an Indian military force for some years. Long running tensions between nuclear armed India and Pakistan have led to war in the past and pose an ever-present danger to the stability of the region.

The major priority for Indian strategic planning is protecting the sea lines of communications (SLOCs), since they are the channel through which 83 per cent of India’s crude oil comes. As it is 95 per cent of all Indian trade uses the oceanic sea lanes. The first task for India is, of course, to protect the mainland, recall the Mumbai attack of November 2008 and a brief brush with Sri Lanka based terrorism. Thereafter comes the importance of protecting its island territories in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and, finally, the 2.37 million square kms of the EEZ with important fishery resources, as well as the country’s most important domestic oil reserves.

History

Jutting 2000 km into the ocean, India has played a central role in the history of the Indian Ocean. The ocean, actually, its two huge bays—the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal– have carried commerce since the times of Sumer and Mohenjodaro. Uniquely, the ocean can be accessed only through its choke points at Cape of Good Hope, Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, Malacca, Mozambique channel, Sunda and Lombok Straits, which are often the fulcrum of military and pirate activity.

The Turk and Moghul conquerors of India who came across the mountain passes through Afghanistan, eventually assimilated into the body politic of the country. But they never quite understood the maritime imperative and as a result they were not able to deal with a succession of Europeans who came as traders and eventually established their hegemony over the ocean and its littoral. The British were the last great hegemons, and they used India as their base to maintain their control of the ocean and the littoral spread from East Africa, to West and South-east Asia for over a century till India became independent in 1947.

Independence

Freedom also brought partition of the subcontinent. One major consequence of the emergence of Pakistan was the loss of control over the land routes to Central and West Asia and beyond. Prolonged hostility of Pakistan and geographically difficult northern and eastern borders, has meant that India, in effect, has been an island and so that most of its overseas trade uses SLOCs.

Independent India decided that it would not take sides in the Cold War and became a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s. India began to assert itself to assume the responsibilities of protecting its coast as well as its seaborne trade in the event of war. To this end, given the experience of World War II, it was felt that India needed a “balanced” navy, one with a combination of aircraft carriers, surface combatants and submarines, along with shore-based aviation and support vessels. But India’s continental commitments—the ongoing conflicts with Pakistan and China—ensured that the Navy has had a low priority for resources.

Well into the mid-1960s, India remained dependent on UK for its naval requirements—frigates, destroyers, mine-sweepers and, in 1961, the aircraft carrier Vikrant (ex-Hercules). The break came in 1965 when it decided to induct ex-Soviet Foxtrot class submarines since the British expressed their unwillingness to provide any.

Cold War

The Cold War came to India in 1971 when the United States decided to support Pakistan against its rebel province East Pakistan. An extremely dangerous situation emerged and India intervened, leading to the the emergence of a new nation, Bangladesh. In the last phase of the 13 day war, the US ordered a carrier battle group, led by USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. A Soviet battle group, followed the Enterprise into the area. Fortunately, the war ended before any clash occurred.

But the entry of the Enterprise, its implied threat to India, shaped Indian thinking thereafter and leading to its first nuclear test in 1974. India began adopting a political position calling for all foreign navies to depart from the Indian Ocean, even while seeking to build a stronger navy with Soviet assistance. But by the end of the decade, there was another development which affected India—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, variously mooted as a Soviet thrust towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The Soviet era peaked in the 1980s even as the Soviets agreed to provide top-of-the-line equipment like their Kashin-class destroyers, the latest Kilo-class submarines and TU-142 M long range maritime patrol aircraft; they even leased a nuclear-propelled submarine to India.

The end of the Cold War

But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had already initiated a strategic shift in India, marked by the conscious decision to seek weapons systems from elsewhere, notably Europe. As part of this India acquired the HDW Class 209 diesel electric submarines and also planned to make them in India. Other acquisitions—the Jaguar strike aircraft optimized for maritime strike, the Dornier Do 228 surveillance aircraft—too signaled this trend as, indeed, did the acquisition of the second aircraft carrier, the INS VIraat (ex HMS Hermes of UK) equipped with Harrier V/STOL fighters.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major strategic setback for India as it was confronted with a major problem in maintaining its Soviet equipment. The nuclear propelled submarine’s lease was terminated. Fortunately, this also coincided with India reaching the point where it could construct large warships like the INS Delhi, which were Indian designed and fabricated, though they still required Soviet/Russian sensors and weapons.

From the mid 1980s, with the growing proximity to the US, India’s attitude towards Washington changed, and New Delhi accepted that the US played a general role as a stabiliser in the Indian Ocean region. The US supported Indian interventions in Sri Lanka in 1987 and Maldives in 1988. In turn, New Delhi was generally supportive of the US war against Iraq in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait in 1991.

The end of the Cold War also persuaded New Delhi to launch a new phase of diplomacy beginning 1991, that involved confidence building by holding naval exercises with foreign navies, notably with the US and India’s South-east Asian neighbours. The goal was to show that India was no Soviet puppet, but an independent actor. New Delhi also took the initiative, along with South Africa, to promote the inter-governmental Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 1997 to promote economic growth and security for the IOR.

A new element into India’s larger power calculations was added in May 1998 when the country carried out five nuclear weapons tests, with the situation becoming more complex when traditional rival Pakistan followed suit. After a break, in which India came under severe US sanctions, relations were renewed, and actually became stronger. The improved relations saw the Indian Navy assist the US war effort in Afghanistan by escorting US ships transiting the Straits of Malacca.

Another big shift began to occur in India’s perspectives from around 2008 or so. This coincided with a similar change in perceptions of the US and its allies. It was marked by what the US called its decision to “pivot” to Asia. On one hand, after assessing the developments, the Indian Navy issued its maritime doctrine in 2009 which said that “sea control is the central concept around which the IN is structured.” On the other, India took steps towards closer cooperation with the US Navy.

At the same time, however, New Delhi also took the initiative to maintain its IOR leadership role by the initiative to create the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2008. This links 24 IOR countries and 8 observer nations to promote cooperation among the maritime security agencies of the member countries through seminars, working groups and actual exercises.

China

This was around the period in which the PLA Navy made its first major foray in the Indian Ocean as part of the international mission to deal with piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the eastern coast of Somalia. Since then, even though piracy is over, China has maintained a task force in the region, dispatching its 31st task force to the region in June 2019.

Chinese economic growth, its dependence on trade and resources from abroad has made it conscious of the importance of its SLOCs going across the Indian Ocean. China has systematically emerged as the major, if not principal, trading partner of countries of the ASEAN, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the African countries of the IOR littoral. It also became a major importer of natural resources, mainly crude oil from the region. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has also become a major financer of infrastructure for many of the poorer countries of the region.

Besides developing closer political ties with India’s traditional friends Sri Lanka and Maldives, China has taken measures ranging from stepping up its naval activity in the Indian Ocean, to developing ports and pipelines to avoid what is often termed as its Malacca Dilemma because over 80 per cent of its oil imports go through these straits and waters dominated by India. Since 2014, Chinese naval presence has been a constant feature of the IOR. In 2017, it established its first overseas military base in Djibouti and there have been reports of a facility coming up on the Jiwani peninsula across the sea in Gwadar, Pakistan.

The Indo-Pacific

This has generated concerns in India which has a major dispute with China in relation to their land border and Beijing’s use of Pakistan as a foil to India in South Asia. The Indian reaction has been to draw closer to the United States which retains by far the strongest military position in the Indian Ocean. This process has been assisted by the Indo-US Nuclear Deal of 2005 and the subsequent Indian acquisition of American military equipment.

In turn, the US has sought to use the closer alignment with India to offset the Chinese gravitational pull in East Asia. India’s Act East policy, aimed at playing a greater political and economic role in the South-east Asian region, fits well with what is now called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) mooted by the US and Japan in the region.

As a gesture signaling the seriousness of its intent, Washington renamed its Hawaii-headquartered Pacific Command as the “Indo-Pacific Command” and now looks at the region from the western shores of India to the western shores of the US as one politico-military region. This has been incapsulated in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean region enunciated at in January 26, 2015 on the occasion of President Obama’s visit to New Delhi.

Over the years, India has signed several “foundational” agreements aimed at lubricating military cooperation between the two countries. Among these are those which relate to sharing information and logistical facilities in the region. US-supplied P8I maritime surveillance aircraft and the soon to be acquired Sea Guardian drones form an increasingly important components of the networks to track Chinese naval movements.

However, there is an important difference in the way India views the Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Modi told the Shangrila Dialogue in 2018, that India viewed it as a geographical concept covering the western shores of the US to the eastern shores of Africa. Further, he said, it was not an exclusionary notion directed against China.

Differing visions of what Indo-Pacific is, limits Indo-US cooperation to the eastern Indian Ocean. The western part of the region which is of far greater importance to India, sees little or no interaction since it is looked after by other US geographic commands—the AFRICOM and the CENTCOM. Indeed, this is underscored by the June 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (ISPR) issued by the US Department of Defence.

The Blue Economy

Sea power does not depend on naval might alone. There are other elements —merchant marine, marine construction, maritime diplomacy– that provide the integrated whole of what constitutes sea power. Indeed, India is now seeking to integrate what it calls the ‘Blue’ oceanic economy into its larger economic planning.

One part of this is the Modi government’s Sagarmala project to build and upgrade ports and enhance their inland connectivity. This is aimed at promoting coastal trade and thereby reducing logistics costs and promoting coastal economic zones. The Modi government has articulated its support for the Blue Economy concept repeatedly by adopting the acronym SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region) as the liet motif of its Indian Ocean policy.

As for the Navy, it completed the first phase construction of a new base on the western coast at Karwar in 2005. Several years ago it also began to construct a new facility in the east coast at Rambilli, 50 km south-west of Vishakapatnam which will house India’s nuclear submarine assets. With its peninsular position and strong bases, Indian planners believe that they do not really need bases in other IOR countries, though they may seek repair and maintenance facilities there.

There needs to be interdependence between maritime commerce and naval capabilities, but India remains an anemic player in both areas. India’s foreign trade in 2017 was just $ 756 billion, as compared $ 3.95 trillion of China. Another measure—that of the merchant marine of the two brings out this as well. As of now, India has 1,719 commercial ships as compared to 4,600 of China. In other words, whether it is for raw materials or accessories and components, China’s dependence on secure oceans is great and is matched by the investments it is making in its navy, merchant marine, ports and facilities abroad. Presumably, India, which, too, seeks to follow the model of export-led growth, will likely to step up its naval and maritime investments as its dependence on overseas SLOCs grows.

The Indian Navy

India may draw closer to the US politically, it still sees itself as an strategically autonomous player. Its contemporary maritime strategy remains independent and involves four elements—sea control, power projection ashore, presence and strategic deterrence. The essence of sea control is to assure usage of the seas and deny it to the adversary; power projection is a subset of this ability. “Presence” is more about peacetime display of the interests of a nation through ship visits and exercises, as well as elements of coercive diplomacy. Strategic deterrence are the strategic capabilities of the country to keep similar capabilities of potential adversaries in check.

This is what provides its force mix comprising of aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, patrol vessel etc. India currently operates one aircraft carrier (ex Gorshkov) with a contingent of Mig-29 fighters. Most of the warships are Indian designed and made such as the 6 lead destroyers of the Kolkata and Delhi class. In addition, there are 13 frigates of which half have been made in Russia and 22 Indian made corvettes.

India has fabricated a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Arihant, with Russian assistance and operates a Russian made attack submarine (SSN) Chakra on lease. In addition, it has two French-designed but Indian made Kalvari class, 9 Russian made Kilo class and four German/Indian made Class 209 conventional submarines. India also has several amphibious warfare ships, such as the US-made Jalashwa (ex-Trenton), as well as several Landing Ship Tanks and Landing Craft mainly of Indian. But the Navy remains hampered by the lack of adequate helicopters, sonars and torpedoes.

Under the latest version of the Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan, the Indian Navy will have some 200-ship and 500 aircraft force by 2027. Currently Indian Navy has 137 ships. Even though the Indian Navy it remains a “balanced navy” with aerial, surface and sub-surface capabilities, it suffers from a number of problems that begin with the fact that it continues to get a short shrift in terms of resources. In terms of naval construction, India has reached a stage where it has 100 per cent “float” capacity of building all the hulls it needs. But in areas like “move” which involves engines and transmission, it is still at around 50 per cent and when it comes to “fight”, that is sensors, radars, sonars, missiles, and torpedoes, it still has some way to go. But, not only is the overall budget of the Indian military declining as a proportion of the GDP, the share of the Navy, too has been going down from 18.2 per cent in 2012-2013 to 13.11 per cent in 2018-2019.

This has an impact on naval plans. There is an overall slowdown in the construction of warships. With the first domestically built aircraft carrier yet to be commissioned, there is little news of follow on carriers. Because of the slow output of its yards, it is seeking to obtain 3 frigates off-the-shelf from Russia. The Navy also has an in-principle approval for the construction of 6 nuclear powered attack submarines which could be built with Russian assistance. At the same time, relations with the US have helped India acquire powerful surveillance capabilities through US-made P8I maritime surveillance and attack aircraft. A deal for acquiring Sea Guardian drones is in the offing. The resource issue may see the Indian Navy shifting its priorities towards developing a fleet of nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs) in the place of large carriers.

The Mumbai attack of 2008 led to crash project to enhance surveillance capabilities along the coast. A new Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) has been set up near New Delhi to network sensors and optelectronic devices linking 51 nodes along India’s coast. This has been linked to the Navy’s National Maritime Domain Awareness system which links coastal surveillance radars in Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Oman, Maldives and Sri Lanka with naval surveillance platforms. India is in talks with other nations on the Indian ocean littoral to expand the system.

India maintains a vigorous “presence” across the Indo-Pacific. Its naval ships are frequent visitors to ports in Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Besides the multilateral exercises like MILAN and Malabar, it is also undertakes coordinated patrol Corpat exercises with the Myanmar, Indonesian and Bangladesh Navies and bilateral exercises with the Singapore, Oman, Russia, Sri Lanka, UK, and South Africa. It has logistics exchange agreements with the US and France and its navy has access to Singapore and Duqm ports. India is developing the Chah Bahar port in Iran to enhance access to Central Asia and Afghanistan and it has also undertaken the Sittwe port project in Myanmar as part of its effort to promote connectivity to its North-east.

Future

India may have large ambitions for its ocean. But the Indian Navy’s current force holdings are relatively modest for the tasks that the country confronts. The future of Indian seapower depends on many inter-related developments. First, and most important, is whether India can get on to the path of high and sustained economic growth so as to generate the resources to fulfil its seapower ambitions. This is linked, too, to whether it can manage to moderate competition and conflict with China and Pakistan, and thereby shift its politico-military priorities in the oceanic direction.

The Chinese have developed important interests in the Indian Ocean region. In the coming decades, the PLAN is likely to boost its presence in the IOR significantly, with one or even maybe two aircraft carrier battle groups and even more bases. But it is highly unlikely that they will have the ability to challenge India in the Indian Ocean. Their interest will be in the protection of their SLOCs and their economic and trading interests in the region.

This, of course, does not preclude competition to gain the diplomatic upper hand in this or that section of the IOR littoral or even military or covert intervention. India is particularly sensitive to activities in Sri Lanka and the Maldives because both of them are proximate to its key sea lanes, which also happen to be some of the most important sea lanes in the world.

Aligning with a powerful actor like the US, has been enormously beneficial to India not only in direct military terms, but in aiding New Delhi to develop important ties with American allies like Japan, Australia, Singapore and Saudi Arabia. But there is also risk in this association of India being entangled in periodic US ventures which, in the recent past in Iraq and Afghanistan, have proved to be uncommonly destructive, expensive and destabilising.

India’s primary interest remains in a peaceful and stable Indian Ocean which will enable it to achieve its primary goal of the economic transformation of the huge, but poor country. What India would prefer is an autonomous role, have friendly and even close ties with the dominant force, the US Navy towards maintaining peace, stability and SLOC security in the region and providing humanitarian aid and relief, wherever it is needed. It would like to undertake issue-based cooperation with other Navies such as that of China, Japan, Australia, and of course, the ASEAN. At the same time, it could mark out an area related to its primary goals of homeland security and strategic deterrence where it would seek to maintain capabilities that do not require any third party assistance.
Limes: Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica  August 22, 2019

Trump and Kashmir: If It Sounds Like Mediation, It Is Mediation


Donald Trump’s latest remarks at the White House are the surest sign that the US president has no intention of backing off from his offer to mediate between India and Pakistan. But then the signs were already there, all around us.
Last Friday, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan spoke to US President Donald Trump for 12 minutes about the situation in Kashmir, in the wake of India’s decision to withdraw J&K’s special status under Article 370.
Three days later, on Monday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to Trump and in a 30-minute conversation, complained about his Pakistani counterpart’s incendiary rhetoric which was destabilising the region. The day before, on Sunday, Khan had termed the Modi government as “fascist” and said they were a threat to Pakistan and Indian minorities.
Thereafter, Trump picked up the phone and dialed Khan, and told him that there was a need for him to tone down his rhetoric and reduce tensions. In his conversation, according to a White House readout, Trump “reaffirmed the need to avoid escalation of the situation and urged restraint” on both sides.
Thereafter, Trump tweeted: “Spoke to my two good friends, Prime Minister Modi of India, and Prime Minister Khan of Pakistan… to work towards reducing tensions in Kashmir. A tough situation, but good conversations.”

Now, if this does not sound like mediation, what does? All we have at present are readouts and press releases of the conversations, but you can be sure that given the rhetoric from New Delhi and Islamabad, there must be more happening in the deep recesses of the State Department and the Pentagon.
It stands to reason that the longer the situation takes to return to normality, the more India will be opening itself up to US involvement in the Jammu and Kashmir issue. As for Pakistan, it would be more than happy if the US gets involved. As of now, the situation in the Valley is certainly not normal, especially since thousands of persons, mainly political leaders and activists are detained and communications restricted.
And no one knows exactly how things will unfold in the Valley, not just in the coming days, but also in the weeks and months ahead. You can safely dismiss the propaganda that everything is normal and that there is widespread support for the Centre’s move in the Valley.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Not only has the Union government’s action added another layer of grievance to those already weighing down the Kashmiris, but it has egregiously also alienated those political elements and parties that had upheld the Indian flag through the thick and thin in the Valley.
We need not take either Pakistan or China’s crocodile tears over the changes in the legal relationship between the state and the Centre seriously.  The step is certainly legally and politically infirm, but neither Islamabad nor Beijing have a legal or moral right to complain. Pakistan had dealt whimsically with the areas of the state that it controls and has never given them even a fraction of the autonomy that J&K had prior to the Article 370 decision. As for China, “autonomous” has, and will always be, a fiction when it comes to its political system.
Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and US President Donald Trump at Washington on July 22, when Trump said Modi had asked him to mediate on Kashmir. Photo: Twitter/@pid_gov
It is difficult to determine what the government has in mind for the future. The government is deluding itself if it thinks investment and development will now pour into the region and take away the sting of recent events. Just why the population should tamely accept a political demotion for their state is not clear. J&K was never backward by Indian standards and the narrative that Article 370 or 35A were some kind of a hindrance is overblown. Investment could head to the Jammu region, but nothing is likely to go beyond Ramban and Nowshera. By itself, development has never moderated separatism, else we would not have the continuing Basque and Scottish separatism.
Since we are talking of another layer of grievance upon an already ongoing situation, the government has no doubt readied to double down on the “all-out” strategy it initiated in 2016. We are likely to see more repression, police action, arrests, not just of militants, but also their supporters.
We are now in for a longer haul in Kashmir than before the poorly thought-through actions of the Modi government. Pakistan retains the ability to make things difficult in the Valley. With New Delhi egregiously roiling the situation, Islamabad has an opportunity to encourage an escalatory cycle of violence.
Southern Kashmir was a tinderbox before August 5, and you can be sure it will remain one in the coming period. In recent years, Pakistan had scaled down its support for militancy in the Valley, but it may now shift gears again. Given New Delhi’s signal that it will not tolerate this, the possibility of a wider conflict has increased.
And this is where the US comes in. Violence and prolonged disturbances, aided and abetted by Pakistan will paradoxically bring more, not less interference. India successfully foiled US efforts to get involved in the mid-1990s, when things were far worse in the Valley by showing an improvement in the ground situation. Now through acts of commission, it has provided an opening for the US to enter.
Like all countries, the US will act along what it considers are its national interests. Foremost among these, at present, is to prevent the two South Asian neighbours getting involved in a nuclear war and poisoning the global atmosphere. Then comes the need to balance relations with Pakistan, a country that is not only nuclear-armed, but occupies a strategic location in relation to its two-and-a-half adversaries – China, Russia and Iran – and holds the key to peace in Afghanistan.
India is important as a market and also a key to offsetting Chinese power in the Western Pacific, but that only underscores the importance to the US to maintain friendly ties with both India and Pakistan and seeking to mediate between them. This, in fact, has been the leitmotif of US policy to the region since the time of Eisenhower.
The Wire August 21, 2019

Making of the CDS

The Prime Minister’s announcement that the country’s military will soon have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has generated a great deal of excitement and speculation. Modi has referred to the fact that the broad recommendation for the appointment came from past expert commissions and the strategic community. But he gave no indication as to how things will now unfold.
The recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2001 and the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security 2012 are broadly similar. A CDS, or a permanent chairman, chiefs of staff committee, lay at the heart of any effort to reform and restructure the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). As the experience of the GoM report revealed, that while many reform measures were implemented, minus the CDS, they did not give the required synergy to the military.
Experience of other major countries should tell us that the process is not easy and that it requires constant political attention. In the US, the effort goes back to 1947 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff was first established. Over the decades, the weaknesses of the system led to reform under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the senior-most officer in the US military, and individually, the principal military adviser to the President. By law he does not exercise military command over the armed forces, but he is the intermediary, transmitting orders between the Secretary of Defense and Commanders of Combatant Commands. The Chairman JCS also prepares a unified command plan (UCP) which forms the basic guidance for the combatant commanders, establishes their mission, responsibilities and force structure, outlines the geographic area of responsibility and working responsibilities of the functional commanders.
The chiefs of army, navy and air force, commandant of the Marine Corps and the chief of the National Guards Bureau are members of the JCS, but their primary job is to ‘organize, equip and train’ their forces for the use by the combatant commanders. All this is laid out in legislation and has the force of law in the American system.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was specific that the chain of combatant command went from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then to the combatant commanders who may operate in different geographies or look after specific functions. There are six regional commands spanning the globe from the Northern Command looking after North America, to the Indo-Pacific Command. The four functional commands are the Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, Transportation Command and Cyber Command, with Space Command soon to emerge as the fifth.
In the Chinese system, the chain of command traditionally went downward from the Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC), who, more often than not, was the general secretary of the Communist Party of China and the President of the People’s Republic. Reforms announced in 2013 led to the overhaul of the all powerful CMC into a flatter three-level command structure—CMC-theatres-forces. The CMC created 15 departments ranging from the General Office to the Joint Staff, Logistics Support, and Equipment Development which provide strategic planning and macro-management, R&D and so on.
The old military regions were replaced by five geographical joint theatre commands linked to the  central Joint Operations Command Center. In 2016, Xi Jinping was revealed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Operations Command Center which he visited wearing a military uniform.
A new army chief, along with his air force and navy counterparts, was made responsible for the training, provisioning of troops, and detached from operational responsibilities.
A new functional command—the Strategic Support Force—was created to meld the PLA capabilities relating to space, cyber and electronic warfare.  The Second Artillery force was promoted to the status of a full-fledged Strategic Rocket Force. A new Joint Logistics Support Force was established as well to unify logistics forces at the strategic level to support the five new joint theatre commands.
The Chinese system is unique to China, born out of the history of the PLA being the armed wing of the Communist Party of China, rather than the People’s Republic. In other words, it is a system where the party runs the show and there is no pretense about separation of powers.
On the other hand, countries like the US and India have worried about making the military too powerful. This is what gave rise to the US system where the system has deliberately separated the function of military advice and operations. The former has been the task assigned to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and the latter is the work of the combatant and functional commands.
This is the system India is likely to follow. The CDS will be the principal military adviser to the government while the theatre and functional commands which will evolve will be directly under the Minister of Defence who may exercise his authority through the CDS.
A major problem is the non-expert bureaucracy of the system. There is urgent need to correct this by introducing specialisation for bureaucrats and inserting uniformed officers in the MoD hierarchy. Equally important is the need to alter transaction of business rules to empower the uniformed personnel in the system, instead of keeping them out of it. The integration of the civilian MoD and the higher command of the military is as important a task as the integration of the three services.
Tribune August 20, 2019

Why Rajnath Singh’s Nuclear Policy Rejig is Not That Surprising

Pakistan seems to have become the principal focus of the Narendra Modi government’s foreign policy. On a day when the United Nations Security Council held a rare closed door meeting to discuss Jammu & Kashmir, Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh weighed in on nuclear doctrine.
The UNSC move is not expected to go beyond formalities. As for Singh’s declaration, we need to see if they are fleshed out in some way in the coming months.
At first sight, Singh’s statement that, “Till today, our nuclear policy is ‘No first use’ (NFU). What happens in future depends on circumstances”, seemed like so much bombast.
But the timing of the statement, and the place where it was made, suggested that it may be part of a deeper messaging exercise of the government. A message that was being sent to Islamabad in a period of heightened tensions between the two countries.
But on nuclear matters, Pakistan is not our only interlocutor. Any policy shift has implications for our posture in relation to China.
Singh, though a member of the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is not a principal actor when it comes to nuclear decision-making. That responsibility belongs to the prime minister. As for articulating policy, again, it is not the Ministry of Defence that is a player, but the National Security Adviser who chairs the Executive Council of the NCA.

Articulation of NFU Was a Political Decision

Questions about India’s NFU are not new. The articulation of the policy was a political decision aimed at mitigating the concerns of the international community in the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear weapons tests.
Initially, the government sought to rope in Pakistan in a bilateral NFU. But Islamabad did not bite. On 4 August 1998, speaking on a debate on foreign policy in the Lok Sabha, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was more or less unequivocal by offering a universal no-first-use pledge – that India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and not be the first to use them against the nuclear weapons states.
But the only official version of the pledge comes from the press statement of 4 January 2003, following a Cabinet Committee on Security discussion.
It says that India would adopt a posture of “no first use” and that nuclear weapons would “only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” 
However, it expands the exception by adding that even if Indian forces were attacked “ by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.”

Pak’s Nuclear Threats Enough for India to Stay Committed to NFU

Questions about India’s commitment to NFU began to pour in following the development of Pakistani theatre nuclear weapons (TNWs) and its repeated statements that it would not hesitate to use such weapons first in the event India crossed its red lines, which were themselves suitably ambiguous.
This threat of nuclear retaliation has been sufficient to prevent India from responding effectively against grave Pakistani provocations, be the terrorist attack on Parliament House in December 2001, or the repeated terrorist outrages in Mumbai, culminating in the horrific attack of November 2008, or the continuing proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir.

The First Challenges to NFU

Amongst those who began raising their voices against NFU were people like former defence minister Jaswant Singh, who was once an ardent advocate of NFU. The former deputy to the National Security Adviser Satish Chandra, too, noted that the Pakistani development of TNWs was one of the principal reasons for the need to revisit the NFU commitment.
In June 2014, the former Strategic Forces Commander Lieutenant General (retd) Balraj Nagal declared in an article that NFU was virtually tantamount to inviting “large scale destruction in own country.”
He urged a doctrine of ambiguity, covering a range of areas from “first use, to launch on warning, launch on launch and NFU.”
However, the government did not feel any compelling need for change. On 24 April 2013, in a lecture to the Subbu Forum (named after K Subrahmanyam) Shyam Saran, chairman of the non-official National Security Advisory Board of the National Security Council, provided a succinct portrait of the Indian deterrent, committed to NFU, which he said was developing a triad “at a measured pace”.
As part of this, India had created a rugged and EMP-proof (electromagnetic pulse) command and control infrastructure that could survive a first strike. As an aside, he noted that the Indian system, too, worked on a two-person rule for access to armaments and delivery systems.
Reiterating the NFU pledge, he said that even with the complexity arising from the Pakistan-China nexus, India would continue to insist on the "central tenet" of its nuclear doctrine – that any nuclear attack, tactical or strategic, will be met with "nuclear retaliation which will be massive... "

BJP’s Shifting Stance on NFU

But this debate had another fallout, the BJP manifesto for the 2014 election contained a pledge to study “in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and “revise and update it to make it relevant to challenges of current times”.
Some BJP leaders and experts close to the party suggested that a re-look at the NFU may be in order. But PM candidate Modi himself scotched all the speculation, declaring in an interview in April 2014 that "No first use was a great initiative of Atal Bihari Vajpayee – there is no compromise on that. We are very clear. No first use is a reflection of our cultural inheritance."
Little or nothing has happened in the intervening period on the NFU issue. In his 2016 book, ‘Choices’, former NSA Shivshankar Menon said that there was “a potential gray area” where India could breach its NFU pledge.
This was against a country which had a first-use policy and which appeared to be making preparations for a strike. “India’s present public nuclear doctrine is silent on this scenario.” But, he did not say what the classified doctrine had to say.
In July 2018, the then Union Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had said that India should pledge to use its nuclear weapons “responsibly” and not necessarily give an NFU commitment. He also declared that this was his personal view and did not reflect government policy.
Modi, too, changed his tone earlier this year, especially during the Lok Sabha election campaign. In April, he said that India had called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff in striking at Balakot.
Later, he declared that India’s nuclear weapons were ‘not for Diwali’. India, he said, was not scared of Pakistan’s threat on account of nuclear weapons.
At the bottom of it all is whether our adversaries believe that we will truly adhere to NFU under all circumstances. China, with hugely superior forces, has the luxury of accepting our pledges, but not Pakistan – with all its neuroses relating to India.
And, if one nuclear armed country does not accept the integrity of the pledge, there is need to modify our posture suitably if we want to deter that country from any misadventure.
Quint August 17, 2019