In a
recent op-ed, former Japanese defence minister Yoriko Koike said that the one
man who could, perhaps unwittingly, endanger world peace, is not Vladimir
Putin, but United States President Barack Obama.
According
to Koike, by his ‘scholarly inertia’, Obama appeared to be unconcerned over the
“fate of smaller faraway countries.” What she charges Obama with is the willful
neglect of the world order which was created by the United States in the wake
of World War II.
This
system was based on a willingness of the US, the recognised global hegemon, to
take the tough policies and implement rules and norms that ensured a generally
stable global environment.
It is
easy to understand the Japanese angst. The Russian seizure of Crimea could
presage a similar Chinese move to snatch the Senkaku islands of Japan which
Beijing claims. It was one thing for Putin to reclaim Russian-majority Crimea
which had been detached from Russia in 1959.
But now,
as it foments separatism in eastern Ukraine and talks of reconstituting the
Soviet Empire, the US seems paralysed. Actually the tremors of America’s
passivity are being felt across the globe. In the Persian Gulf, historic allies
of the US Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms wonder whether the US intends to
upend the regional order and place its bets once again on Iran. Or worse, end
up doing neither moving to Iran, or backing its allies.
In
Southeast Asia, there are few signs of an American Asian pivot. The ‘pivot’
idea is attributed to a 2011 essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Her
basic thrust was that as the Iraq war winds down and the Americans begin to
pull out of Afghanistan, the US will be at a pivot point.
At this
stage, Asia was not mentioned, but soon it became clear that the American
pivot, later rechristened ‘rebalance’, would be to Asia. The pivot became part
of a larger plan to refocus the US military deployments in the Asia-Pacific
region after their diversion to the Middle-East and South Asia in the 2001-2011
period.
The
obvious urgency for the pivot/rebalance was to counter the rising power of
China, and reassure US allies like Japan and the Philippines, who were locked
in territorial disputes with Beijing.
Almost
immediately, the Asian pivot was overwhelmed by the Arab Spring following
revolts in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt in quick succession. But while the
situation was manageable in these countries, the revolts in Syria and Ukraine
have taken a different turn and brought out the limits of American power. It
was also significant that this was the point at which the muscular Clinton was
replaced by John Kerry as Secretary of State.
The
United States has gone through two harrowing wars and Obama’s main goal is to
retrench and recuperate. But when you are the global hegemon, and one that is
naturally keen to maintain its primacy for as long as it can, Obama and the US
do not have the option of taking their ball and going back home.
It would
be wrong to blame Obama alone for this situation. For example, his allies, such
as Germany could have done more to control the Russians. But his bigger problem
is the US Congress and the American public.
While he
is trying to follow a policy of engagement and deterrence, his hands are tied
by the Congress, which has pushed the blunt instrument of sequestration to
control the budget.
So
bitterly divided is the US these days that last year, because of the lockdown
of the government, Obama was unable to attend the APEC Summit in Bali, leaving
the floor to China’s leader Xi Jinping. America’s long and fruitless wars have
been a major drain on its economy.
Its
defence spending averaged 4 per cent between 1990-2012 but now, under the
sequestration policy of the US Congress, the spending will fall steadily from
4.3 per cent of the GDP in 2012 to 2.8 by 2023.
The
consequences of the shift is apparent from the comment of a senior Pentagon
official in March that the Pentagon’s plans to pivot to Asia ‘can’t happen’ due
to cuts to the defence budget. However, she later clarified that the US
Department of Defence would “adapt and innovate” but still make the pivot
happen.
Obama has
finally made his Asian visit last week, which has included the first visit by a
US president to Malaysia since Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1966. But there is not
much to show for it.
There has
been little or no movement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement through
which the US hopes to slow down, if not halt, the Chinese economic juggernaut.
He has signed a 10-year defence agreement with the Philippines, but he has left
unanswered the more important questions about the reliability of the United
States as an ally.
The big
paradox that the US confronts is the need to confront China and Russia at the
same time. Clearly, even the mighty US does not have the energy and resources
to do that. Beijing is, of course, quite self-confident because it is locked
into the western economies and is, in that sense, sanctions proof.
But a
wounded Russia will only rush into the arms of the Chinese. This would serve
China well because it would now have access to Russian resources, as well as
its military tech which it cannot obtain from elsewhere in any case.
Mid Day
April 29, 2014
No comments:
Post a Comment