In the
past week, the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the Asia-Pacific Roundtable
in Kuala Lumpur have focused on the future geopolitics of the Asia Pacific.
Not
surprisingly, the key discussions have centered on the rising tensions between
Asia’s has-been power, Japan, and rising power China. This is a rivalry
poisoned by history, and it is threatening the peace of a region which is the
engine of the world’s economic growth.
In the
past five years, China has been flexing its muscles in the South and East China
Seas raising the hackles of its neighbours. Not only is Beijing undertaking a
massive military build up, but the Communist Party of China under the
leadership, of Xi Jinping, is taking an active role in promoting a proactive
national security posture.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said that when Indian PM Narendra Modi visits Japan, the two sides will work to make the Japan-India cooperation peaceful and prosperous. Pic/AFP
A
consequence of this has been the US decision to ‘rebalance’ itself towards Asia
to reassure key allies like South Korea, Japan and the Philippines. But perhaps
more dramatic, and in its own way worrisome, has been the ‘return’ of Japan to
the high-stakes table.
This has
been evident in the platform of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the foundations of
whose policy is an economic revival of Japan based on the ‘three arrows’ of
Abenomics: A bold monetary policy with a view of easing monetary conditions to
encourage an inflation rate of 2 per cent; a flexible fiscal policy which includes
an economic stimulus package and fiscal consolidation; and finally a growth
strategy dependent on promoting private investment, targeting new markets and
working out new trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Equally
significant has been Japan’s new diplomacy which has sought to, first and
foremost, strengthen the US-Japan alliance. A subset of this is the push to
work out a modus vivendi with South Korea which retains historical suspicions
of Japan.
The
second pillar of Japanese diplomacy involves promoting links with the ASEAN,
Australia and India. The third is to deepen ties with EU and Russia and
finally, take a more active role in global issues such as climate change,
millennium development goals etc.
But the
most dramatic changes are likely to show up in Tokyo’s security policy, which
is based on deep reform of its security infrastructure. In December 2013 Japan
set up a National Security Council and within weeks, came up with a new
National Security Strategy which sees Japan as a ‘proactive contributor to
peace based on the principle of international cooperation’.
This
means redefining what self-defence is all about and enhancing the Japanese
contribution to it, through stronger ties with the US, strengthening the
Japanese military and sharpening its technological edge. The Abe government
wants to re-interpret self-defence to mean the ability of Japanese forces to
come to the aid of allies, even if Japan itself is not attacked. This is
opposed by China, South Korea and by some in Japan.
They are
afraid that it could put Japan back on the path of militarisation that led to
the catastrophe of World War II. India has been the beneficiary of China-Japan
tensions. Prior to the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005, Tokyo
largely ignored New Delhi. China was the foremost recipient of Japanese
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in the 1980 and 1990s. By 2000, Japan had
provided China with some $25 billion in soft loans and grants which went a long
way in developing China’s infrastructure. In the 1958-2000 period, Japan’s ODA
to India was around $7 billion.
Since
then, India has become its largest recipient for successive years and since
2000, it has got some $30 billion worth of ODA. In addition, Japan’s private
sector, long leery of India has begun hedging its Chinese bets by investing in
India. Among the Japanese projects are long-range ones like the Delhi-Mumbai
freight corridor along which there are plans to build new cities and economic
zones.
India
could also benefit from Tokyo’s shifting stance on exports relating to defence
equipment. In April, Japan tweaked its export policy by coming up with a new
set of ‘Three Principles’ on defence equipment transfer. But, already, it has
offered New Delhi the ShinMaywa US 2 amphibian aircraft for use by the Coast
Guard and other non-military agencies.
The rise,
if you want to call it that, of another Asian power on the flanks of China, one
which also has difficulties with Beijing, is to India’s advantage. New Delhi is
not unaware of the geopolitical benefits. For this reason, Abe was the chief
guest at the Republic Day parade this year. India and Japan began bilateral
naval exercises in 2012, and during the Abe visit, it was announced that Japan
would join this year’s Malabar Exercise involving India and the US again.
In his
speech at the Shangri-La dialogue, Abe had hailed Modi’s election as Prime
Minister and said that when the Indian PM visited Japan, the two sides would
confirm that “Japan-India cooperation, as well as trilateral cooperation
including our two countries, will make the ‘confluence of the two seas’, that
is the Pacific and Indian Oceans, peaceful and more prosperous.” These are
public declarations, deliberately couched in generalities, but containing
within a host of geopolitical possibilities.
Mid Day June 10, 2014
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