The events that led to the outbreak
of war between India and Pakistan on September 6, 1965 are well known — the
Kutch incursion of April 24, Operation Gibraltar of August 5, followed by Grand
Slam on September 1. Each of them took New Delhi by surprise and were the
reason that the government decided to constitute the Research & Analysis
Wing subsequently.
This was a period of great change
across the world, some were visible, others subterranean. The Cold War had
peaked in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the first signs of the
Sino-Soviet rift were appearing. By 1964, the US was set on its fateful course
in Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. In South Asia,
India was licking its wounds after the humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian
war of 1962 and America’s most allied ally, Pakistan, was establishing close
ties with China, and working out a détente with the USSR.
India’s situation was none too good.
Its economy was stagnant and it had staved off famine by importing 17 million
tonnes of food from the US between 1960-64 and the 1965 monsoon had failed. It
sought to maintain an even keel in its relations with the US and USSR, even
while the US struggled to manage its alliance ties with Pakistan and its newer
proximity to India after the 1962 war.
The most important development for
Indians, undoubtedly, was the passing of Pandit Nehru on May 27, 1964. He was
the leader of our freedom struggle, prime minister for the first 17 years of
our nation’s life and the man who shaped the India we know.
After his stroke on 7 January 1964
in Bhubaneshwar, Nehru got Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had been ‘Kamarajed’ out of
the government, back into the Cabinet as a minister without a portfolio.
Panditji’s death on May 27th was not unexpected, but it was sudden. Four days
later, on 31 May, Morarji Desai was persuaded to withdraw his candidature, and
Shastri was chosen PM by the Congress Working Committee.
The powerful men of the CWC hoped
that the diminutive Shastri would be their puppet, but he turned out to be a
man of firm views, and decisive to boot.
This was evident from his handling
of the crisis over the theft of the Hazratbal holy relic that had occurred on
27 December 1963. Though it had reappeared after a week, it had given rise to a
popular movement led by an action committee of people we would today call
separatists. Besides the release of Sheikh Abdullah, they demanded a special
deedar or viewing ceremony by experts to certify its authenticity. New Delhi
was not inclined to agree, but on February 3, Shastri overruled the Home
Secretary and ordered the deedar and this committee certified that it was
indeed the genuine article. This helped calm things somewhat.
One fallout of the Hazratbal crisis
was Nehru’s decision to release Sheikh Abdullah, who had been in jail since
1953, but for a brief period in 1958. The Sheikh travelled to Srinagar to an
ecstatic reception. Later, after holding intensive talks with Nehru as his
house guest in New Delhi, he travelled to Pakistan to discuss a possible
resolution of the Kashmir issue with Ayub Khan. He had with him a formula that
had been worked out after intensive consultations between Nehru and a committee
of advisers. This probably involved the creation of some kind of a
confederation or condominium between India, Pakistan with regard to J&K.
However it was during this visit that Nehru passed away on May 27, 1964.
Not much attention has been paid by
scholars to the far-reaching possibilities that could have emerged. Nehru’s
initiatives were not welcomed by either the Left or the Right, or even members
of his own party. Yet, his stature was such that if anyone could have sold a
settlement in India of the nature that was being contemplated, it was Nehru.
The Kashmir initiative died with
Nehru. Stung by the Hazratbal agitation, the Union government took the steps to
integrate J&K closer into the Union by extending Article 356 and 357 of the
Constitution allowing for the extension of President’s rule to J&K on
December 31, 1964. The nomenclature of the head of the J&K government was
changed from Prime Minister to “chief minister”. Another, equally significant
development was the merger, in June 1965, of the J&K National Conference
with the Congress.
Viewed from Pakistan, it appeared
that the window of opportunity in Jammu & Kashmir was closing. In 1964, the
UN had also more or less shelved discussion on the issue and earlier, in 1963,
six rounds of bilateral negotiations with India had failed to come up with a
solution on Kashmir. The Indian rearmament, which was proceeding apace, would
soon blunt the edge the Pakistan Army had over India in terms of its
US-supplied arsenal.
In March 1965, Sheikh went on a
pilgrimage to Mecca via the UK and returned via Algiers, where he met Zhou
Enlai. What they discussed was not revealed but on his return he was arrested.
A senior CIA contact of the Sheikh has revealed in a memoir published in the
1990s that Abdullah was aware of the planning for Op Gibraltar, the covert
invasion of Jammu & Kashmir by 30,000 armed Pakistani irregulars that began
on August 5. When this invasion failed to trigger an uprising in the state,
Pakistan sent in its 6th armoured division to cut off the Jammu-Poonch road.
Till then, the international
community seemed to be unconcerned; the Pakistanis thought that like 1947,
India will confine the conflict to Jammu & Kashmir. But the unassuming man
who succeeded Nehru surprised them and the world. He ordered the Indian army to
invade Pakistan and threaten Lahore and Sialkot and that touched off the second
Indo-Pakistan war.
Mid Day September 1, 2015
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