India was saved by Pokhran nuclear tests

The United Progressive Alliance government did not celebrate the 10th anniversary of India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests. May I on behalf of the people of the country, then, raise two cheers for the occasion in this column? Only two, because testing weapons of mass destruction was a dreadful necessity, rather than an occasion for celebration. Just how necessary it was has become apparent in this past week when it has been revealed that Pakistan had by then — with the help of the Chinese — developed a sophisticated and compact nuclear weapon, based on a proven Chinese design that was tested in 1966.

The subsidence crater at the site of the Taj Mahal shaft where India's tactical fission bomb was tested. The crater appears to be about 80 m across and 15 m deep.

Whether the National Democratic Alliance government had some secret information of this, or whether it was what it inferred from the test of the Ghauri missile on April 8, 1998, it is now clear that we had very little time to lose and fortunately we had a government that acted. Going by the reaction of the Congress and the Left at the time, and their behaviour since, you can be sure that had the UPA government been confronted with the situation today, it would have dithered, and its Left allies would have ensured that India did not become a nuclear weapons state.
Now the deed is done. India’s nuclear arsenal is nothing to write home about, and its missile programme moves at a glacial pace, but as far as deterrence goes, a couple of bombs and missiles are fine, and the political consensus for it is so strong that the Left cannot roll it back.

A.Q. Khan


The news that is of such significance came through a somewhat curious Abdul Qadeer Khan network source. In May, Swiss President Pascale Couchepin had announced that under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, his government had shredded thousands of documents relating to construction plans for nuclear weapons, for gas ultracentrifuges to enrich weapons-grade uranium as well as for guided missile delivery systems which were linked to the AQ Khan network’s Swiss connection. The network was exposed in 2003 and Khan was put under house arrest in Islamabad in early 2004.
But last month, taking advantage of Musharraf’s eclipse and the ongoing political turmoil in Pakistan, he was released and began speaking to the media about how he had been wrongfully confined and that the western parties were themselves guilty of what he had been charged with. In retaliation, as it were, news leaks in the US alerted us to an even more curious point: The documents shredded contained detailed digitised drawings of sophisticated nuclear weapons which were of the type tested by Pakistan in 1998. In other words, Pakistan was actually selling its nuclear weapons design to third countries.
Pokhran II was therefore important from the Indian point of view because while Pakistan had had access to a tried and tested Chinese nuclear weapon design, all that Indian designers had to go by was a single nuclear explosive test of 1974. The test was also important because it signified that India had taken abundant precautions against the Pakistani and Chinese tendency towards irresponsible, and even reckless, behaviour. China’s use of missiles in the Taiwan straits crisis of 1996 is one case in point. Another is the planning of the 1999 Kargil venture with full knowledge of the fact that it could lead to a nuclear war. But the extent of the recklessness became apparent only after the Khan network was unraveled in 2004.
The network was created in the 1970s to acquire enrichment technology from across the world by its founder A.Q. Khan, who had stolen the design from the company he had worked for in the Netherlands. In the 1980s, Khan began to use this network which had an elaborate chain of suppliers and shipping agents in Europe, South Africa, Dubai, Malaysia and Thailand. It then transpired that even while offering complete drawings and components for gas centrifuges, Khan was also offering the design of a nuclear weapon.
In the early 1980s, US intelligence had got information that China had transferred nuclear materials and a nuclear weapon design to Pakistan. The latter was of a proven Chinese warhead tested in 1966. This information was confirmed after a ship carrying equipment for a centrifuge for Libya was detained in October 2003. As a result of this the country came clean and admitted to its clandestine activities and turned over all the material and documentation to the IAEA. US intelligence which whisked away some of the key documents were in for a shock when they discovered the blueprints of a nuclear bomb in a plastic shop bag of the tailor Khan patronised in Islamabad. The bomb was the one tested by the Chinese in 1966 and the documents included detailed, dated handwritten notes in English taken during lectures given by Chinese weapons experts who were named by the note-takers — obviously Pakistani nuclear scientists — and some of the annotation was in Chinese.

Network

As part of the investigations in 2004, Swiss investigators seized computer files and documents from three of its nationals — Friedrich Tinner and his two sons Marco and Urs. They contained over 1,000 megabytes of information which were encrypted. After considerable difficulty, the Swiss decrypted the information. Though they realised that it related to nuclear weapons, they lacked the expertise to assess its importance and so called the IAEA and the US for help. The IAEA which had been involved in the investigation of the Khan network soon realised that they were the design of the nuclear weapon that had been tested by Pakistan in 1998. It was a compact version of the 1966 design and far more sophisticated because of the electronics. The 1966 design could fit a DF-2 kind of a missile, much heavier than anything Pakistan has. Since the heaviest Pakistani missile at the time was the Ghauri, acquired from the North Koreans by the Khan network, a new design was necessary. This used less uranium, but had a greater explosive force. This design, according to sources cited by The New York Times, could also fit missiles like the Iranian Shahab. Alarmingly, the bomb data was in digitised form, complete with information coded for manufacturing components on an industrial scale.

Pathology

This brings us to the ruckus over Mr. L.K. Advani’s participation in a function to release a book on Benazir Bhutto. The book merely repeats well known truths about Pakistan’s nuclear programme. You can question Shyam Bhatia on the need to put out some revelations of Benazir’s personal life, but his revelation that she carried nuclear weapons data in CDs in her pocket fits in well with the fact that the Swiss files were digitised and thus available for storage in such media. Benazir’s autobiography acknowledges that she did play a crucial role in acquiring missile technology from North Korea, though she insists that the deal was against cash.
Perhaps Benazir was trying to prove that she was one of the boys when it came to Pakistan’s security interests. Or that Pakistan’s insecurity with regard to India is so intense that everyone from politician to general is ready to go that extra mile. But it does provide us with the dangerous pathology of a country that is second only to the People’s Republic of China when it comes to proliferating nuclear weapons technology.
Only the future can tell us about the true implications of Khan’s activities for the future security of the country and the region. In the meantime we should be grateful that Pokhran II has at least provided us a shield of sorts.
This article first appeared in Mail Today June 19, 2008

Pakistan elections

We must take the outcome of the poll in Pakistan in the context of its inauspicious beginnings, principally the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. In that perspective, the outcome of the elections in Pakistan has been a pleasant surprise. There were no horrific suicide attacks, considering the situation, the polling was peaceful, there were no visible signs of rigging. Voter turnout was low, but that was to be expected given the fear of violence, and, more important, the past experience of vote fraud. The big surprise of the election was that it defied prognostications that it would be rigged against the opposition. One major factor was the heroic role of the Pakistani media especially the visual media which showed its clout and value for the first time in this election.

I disagree with people who think that the verdict was a major blow to Musharraf. After all, given the events of the past year, he would have to be remarkably sanguine to think he could actually pull off a victory. Indeed, given the circumstances, the King’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) has done remarkably well. Indeed, the outcome as it is—requiring the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) to cobble together a coalition is the best Musharraf could have hoped, and he has got it. PPP as the largest party will lead the coalition anyway, but also because it is the only party to have a presence in all of Pakistan’s provinces.

Musharraf’s great advantage will be that the control of the PPP rests in the hands of the somewhat shady Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of Benazir Bhutto. In his first and rambling press conference, Zardari has signaled that his agenda is not the removal of the general.

According to Dawn, “Mr Zardari parried several questions on issues like reinstatement of deposed judges, possible impeachment of President Musharraf and the party’s nominee for the office of the prime minister.”

After all, don't forget that Benazir had returned to Pakistan as part of a deal through which she would provide legitimacy to the general's crumbling regime, in exchange for the waiver of corruption charges against her and Zardari. Benazir may be gone, but the deal remains. My hunch is that even though large sections of his party men are deeply suspicious of the general’s inability to protect their beloved leader, Zardari will carry the day.

Though his performance has been spectacular, considering where he has come from, Nawaz Sharif lacks the numbers. But he has a clear agenda, one that understands that the election outcome is only the beginning of the battle for democracy in Pakistan. He wants the restoration of the 60-odd judges who were forced out of office by Musharraf in November. He is also seeking the removal of a amendments that make a mockery of the country’s 1973 constitution. Above all, Sharif who has clearly matured in his exile, also understands that the country needs to set clear limits for its army. It is too late to make the army apolitical as in India. But there could be mutually agreed institutional arrangements such as the ones that obtain in Turkey. Nawaz, too, has come back through some kind of a deal. Though not a direct one, but one operating through the Saudis.

The showing of the Awami National Party in the North West Frontier Province has been outstanding . They have bearded the mullahs in their own dens. They have given the lie to the belief that all Pakhtuns want is war. As Afsandyar Wali Khan, the leader of the party has pointed out, the Pakhtuns want “talim” or education, and everything else associated with development. The victory of the party could begin the process of getting back the allegiance of those who have been misguided into thinking that jehad is the only answer to their problems.

The outcomes in Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP suggest that governments there will have to be in the form of coalitions. This is not a bad thing, because it will help kick-start the process of reconciliation. The PPP, as the party which has a presence in all three states will have special responsibility since it will also run the national government.

That other stakeholder

This said, we need to point out that the elections only related part of the stakeholders of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. There is another part, some say the larger, that wields power that was not up for arbitration through an election. In the coming months, the attitude of this party, the Pakistan army, will be the key to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. At present, the army has adopted a low profile because its reputation has sunk along with its erstwhile chief Pervez Musharraf. But though the army has delinked itself from Musharraf, it is unlikely to allow the politicians to bully him either. All said and done he is one of theirs and everything he did had the sanction of the Corps Commanders Conference, Pakistan's other parliament.

There are some habits which will take time and effort to overcome. In some areas—nuclear weapons and support to terrorism—only the attitude of the Pakistan army matters. There is an abundant record to show that civilian prime ministers and presidents were denied any information on these issues, even when they formally held power.

So, all said and done, Pakistan has made a good beginning, but it still has a long way to go before it becomes a “normal” state.