To say that Pakistan is in dire straits is to state the obvious. Extremists stalk the land and the writ of the state does not run on chunks of strategic territory in Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province.
While its army seems to be biding its time in the barracks, its civil society is in despair over the antics of its politicians who are unable to move forward from their historic achievement of having replaced a military dictator through largely peaceful means. But like all events that are too close to be viewed accurately, there is another side to this.
This is in the achievement of the Pakistani civil society and mainstream political parties in successfully replacing a brazen and mendacious military dictator through entirely peaceful means. Their pressure achieved the impossible — a coalition of rivals, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)— to form the government. Now they must ensure that these parties find some way of ensuring that their rivalry does not provide another opportunity for the army to intervene in the affairs of the country.
Narrative
Ever since General Pervez Musharraf seized power in 1999, we have been presented with two discourses — that the general is the best means of saving Pakistan from itself. Given the Taliban in Afghanistan and the undercurrents of jihadi violence in Pakistan, the only person who could deliver was the man who had the only functioning instrumentality — the army — under his control. In that sense he was good for the US, and from 2004 onwards he also became good for India. He was the man who preached “enlightened moderation” and had the guts to articulate a non-traditional solution for the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and the person who was able to order a ceasefire along the Line of Control.
The second discourse, the one that demanded the rule of law, accountability and democracy was seen as a dangerously unstable development that could lead to the mullahs gaining control of the country and its nuclear weapons. So it was not surprising that the US ignored Musharraf’s refusal to doff his uniform as promised in 2004 and remained unconvinced by the evidence that he was playing fast and loose with them in relation to the Taliban thereafter. The Americans more or less remained silent through 2007 when he dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan and later declared Emergency. They ignored the lawyers movement which captured the imagination of the country’s civil society. Musharraf remained their stable ally in the war against terror and their hope for a moderate Pakistan.
Now both those story lines have come to an end and a new one must be started. The only problem is that it refuses to get going. Yet its outline is visible. In the past six months the Pakistani civil society has created a massive movement that has managed to oust a mendacious dictator without a general breakdown or strife. This movement has been largely secular and one of its great achievements has been to marginalise the mullah parties of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal. At the end of the day, a nation’s character depends on the resolve of its citizens and Pakistanis have shown that they are as determined as any people to seize their destiny and shape it on their own future as a democratic and secular state.
This is the problem that Asif Zardari confronts as he makes his move to become the President of the country. The powerful upsurge that overthrew Musharraf was in great measure shaped by the civil society movement demanding the reinstatement of Chief Justice Ifthikar Muhammad Chaudhary. Without his reinstatement, the restoration of democracy will not be quite complete. Yet Zardari knows that he confronts a great hazard in reinstating a Chief Justice who may have been removed by Musharraf for his maverick ways, but whose removal has transformed the Pakistani judiciary and civil society and steeled their demand for a reinstatement of the rule of law and accountability.
Equations
The new equations shaping up in Pakistan seem to have excited a great deal of interest. The report that US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Richard Boucher has rebuked US Ambassador to the United Nations, the Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, is one manifestation of the situation. A day later comes the news that the White House has backed Mr. Khalilzad, who has had impressive credentials as a Bush administration insider.
Memories tend to be short and people have probably forgotten that the return of the Bhuttos to Pakistan was negotiated by the United States. This involved Musharraf invoking the National Reconciliation Ordinance through which the Zardari-Bhutto financial peccadilloes were overlooked. So with the departure of Musharraf, the US is no doubt hoping that the erstwhile consort of Benazir Bhutto will be their point man in the region.
The US needs to worry about the fate of its war in Afghanistan, just as India has to worry about Kashmir and the terrorist offensive emanating from forces within Pakistan. The elements in the equation are the same. Some call them rogue agents, others say they are within the Inter Services Intelligence itself. I would argue that they are what is today termed as the “deep establishment”— an informal network of military leaders, politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals. All of them are Pakistani patriots who see destabilising neighbours as a means of shaping and protecting their own country’s shaky identity.
Reconciliation
In all this, one figure stands out — Mr. Nawaz Sharif. His estrangement with the Army seems to be quite deep considering how close he came to the guillotine in 1999. His alienation from his erstwhile allies, the Jamaat-e-Islami, ensures that he is isolated in the present set-up. His present predicament does not brook easy answers. Having been outmaneuvered by Zardari who has his own man as governor in Punjab where the PML(N) runs a minority government, he does not have too many options at this juncture. On the other hand the PPP has managed to retain the loyalty of the Mohajir Quami Movement and Awami National Party which are supporting its presidential candidate Asif Zardari.
The task of the civilian set up is not easy. The 2008 election outcome in the National Assembly and the Provinces do not give much room to either the PPP or the PML(N). Even then, their political quarrels are only the side-show in a country which is in the throes of severe internal strife and is already witnessing a flight of capital and surging inflation.
In the 1990s, the PML and the PPP ran alternate governments. Both used the opportunity of being in power to undermine the other side. The net gainer from their conflict was the army which then kept them out of power from 1999 to February 2008.
The Pakistan Army is lying low because, first, they have lost a great deal of credibility with the people of the country. Second, they need to conserve their energies to deal with the challenges to Pakistan’s internal security, given what virtually seems to be a Pakhtun uprising on their western border. And third, they are aware that each time a general takes charge, it becomes that much more difficult to hold on to it. Like their South Asian cousins, the Indians, Pakistanis, too, seem to have developed a taste for democracy.
This article was first published by Mail Today August 28, 2008
Showing posts with label FATA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FATA. Show all posts
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Monday, May 26, 2008
The Americans are caught between a rock and a hard place in Pakistan
Islamabad: Even as mainstream political forces “liberated” by the recent elections seek to stabilise the polity, Pakistan lurches towards newer crises. Inflationary pressures, manifest in the skyrocketing prices of atta, and power shortages, could lead to mass protests. But the more fundamental problem seems to be arising in the relationship of the country with the United States and what is called the global war on terror.
Pakistan has been a lead partner of the US in that war. It has received massive military and economic aid, some $10.5 billion in the last seven years, that has helped its armed forces to modernise themselves. But the current problems arise out of the Pakistani decision to negotiate a settlement with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan — a loose conglomeration of tribal insurgents spread from Swat to South Waziristan — who have been fighting the government for the last couple of years.
Since the new government came to power in February, an informal ceasefire has been in place. There have been several reports of agreements between the Pakistani government officials, who run the Federally Administered Tribal Areas from Islamabad, and the local insurgents. Though the newly elected Awami National Party of Asfandyar Ali Khan is committed to negotiating a settlement with the insurgents, and is attempting to do so in Swat, reports suggest that they have been kept out of the negotiations in the FATA area. Even now the negotiations are precariously poised. While Rehman Malik, the internal security adviser to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, is close to a deal with the Mehsud tribesmen in North Waziristan, there are no signs as yet of any arrangement with the more problematic Baitullah Mehsud whose base in South Waziristan was overwhelmed by the Pakistan Army in January.
The situation in parts of the Bajaur Agency and Darra Adam Khel remains tense. Last week's US air strike at Damdola village led to the death of eleven people, some of them militants. Given the limited ground forces, the US and NATO tend to use air power which leads to a lot of collateral casualties, which in turn feeds into the already high-levels of anti-American feelings in the area.
After two months of uneasy silence, the US has finally spoken. In a written testimony to a US congressional panel on Tuesday, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte said that Islamabad had not consulted the US on the issue and Washington had learnt of them from the media and had as a consequence expressed concerns about the negotiations to the Pakistani leaders. On the same day, Afghan Foreign Minister Rangeen Dafadar Spanta criticised what he said was Pakistan's policy of “appeasing” the Taliban. Recalling the failed peace deal of 2006 that led to increased attacks across the border on Afghanistan, he said that Islamabad's current course was “wrong and dangerous policy”.
Failure
Depite claimed successes, in July 2007, the US National Intelligence Estimate on “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland” noted that the task of securing the FATA area, a key goal of the US intervention, had not been completed. Indeed, the Al Qaeda had actually “protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability”. All this had happened despite the fact that the US had supplied some $10.5 billion worth of security and economic aid to Pakistan as well as some $1 billion per annum as reimbursement that accounts for 96 per cent of the costs incurred by Islamabad in the FATA.
To top this, in April 2008, the US Government Accountability Office issued a report, “Combating terrorism”, which noted that the US still lacked a comprehensive plan to destroy the terrorist threat, especially its safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. The GAO pointed out that a comprehensive plan had been mooted by the US National Strategy to Combat Terrorism in 2003; it had been called for by the Nine Eleven Commission and the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 passed thereafter by the Congress. Yet, neither the National Security Council, nor the National Counterterrorism Center nor other branches of government “have a plan that includes all elements of national power — diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic and law enforcement support.”
Pakistan
The criticism is not that the state department, the Pentagon, the CIA or USAID don't have plans, but there is no comprehensive strategy in place. As of now it is not clear as to whether Pakistan has such a plan either, though it has fought the tribal uprising. But one thing is clear, Pakistan still views the situation through strategic and geopolitical lenses. They view terrorist groups operating against India as a useful instrument of prosecuting their subconventional war against India. These are the same calculations that make up Islamabad's strategy with regard to the Taliban. India's role in Afghanistan, the possibility of a US/NATO pullout from Afghanistan are issues that Islamabad is carefully weighing. This dual policy was, after all, shaped by Musharraf as commander-in-chief and President of the country.
Perhaps the most negative aspect of the US dependence on Musharraf has been the extent to which the US has lost the battle of hearts and minds in Pakistan itself. The US now confronts a paradoxical situation where civil society in Pakistan is keen to prosecute the battle against radicals at home, but do not see the US as an ally of any kind in the process. Indeed, they are profoundly suspicious of US motives and actions. As of now, the Pakistan army under Pervez Ashfaq Kayani has declared its intentions to steer clear from politics. Musharraf has lost a great deal of prestige and faces the real prospect of having his powers trimmed drastically.
There is a great desire in the Pakistani establishment to negotiate a settlement with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leaders. They hope that the process of dialogue will halt the relentless march of the fundamentalists who have expanded from their original base in South Waziristan up north beyond Bajaur into Swat. In the past five years, the very nature of the FATA leadership has changed. The old tribal leaders who functioned in an autonomous fashion have been replaced by a younger leadership that openly acknowledges its links to the Taliban. They have proved themselves to be adept fighters and tacticians. Since 2004, they have used the tactic of ceasefires to consolidate their own hold and expand the area of their operations. This is the issue which Afghanistan and the US are raising, especially after the experience of the previous ceasefire in 2006 that led to a spike in attacks in Afghanistan.
Ties
By May 2008, it was clear that the relationship is at a breakdown point with Pakistan and the US no longer on the same plane with regard to the war on terrorism. The US is particularly exercised about reports that the latest ceasefire between the Pakistani forces and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Baitullah Mehsud is no longer conditioned on the latter stopping attacks on Afghanistan, or ending the presence of foreigners — Uzbeks, Chechens or Arabs — in their midst. This would actually indicate an unraveling of US policy in Pakistan whose primary aim was to end the sanctuary that the Al Qaeda got in the region. According to reports, Owari Ghani, the governor of North-West Frontier Province, who is also Musharraf's representative for FATA, told US officials that “Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side”. He is being assisted in the process by Rehman Malik who is the internal security adviser to Prime Minister Gillani. The US is clearly caught between a rock and a hard place.
This article appeared first in Mail Today May 23, 2008
Pakistan has been a lead partner of the US in that war. It has received massive military and economic aid, some $10.5 billion in the last seven years, that has helped its armed forces to modernise themselves. But the current problems arise out of the Pakistani decision to negotiate a settlement with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan — a loose conglomeration of tribal insurgents spread from Swat to South Waziristan — who have been fighting the government for the last couple of years.
Since the new government came to power in February, an informal ceasefire has been in place. There have been several reports of agreements between the Pakistani government officials, who run the Federally Administered Tribal Areas from Islamabad, and the local insurgents. Though the newly elected Awami National Party of Asfandyar Ali Khan is committed to negotiating a settlement with the insurgents, and is attempting to do so in Swat, reports suggest that they have been kept out of the negotiations in the FATA area. Even now the negotiations are precariously poised. While Rehman Malik, the internal security adviser to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, is close to a deal with the Mehsud tribesmen in North Waziristan, there are no signs as yet of any arrangement with the more problematic Baitullah Mehsud whose base in South Waziristan was overwhelmed by the Pakistan Army in January.
The situation in parts of the Bajaur Agency and Darra Adam Khel remains tense. Last week's US air strike at Damdola village led to the death of eleven people, some of them militants. Given the limited ground forces, the US and NATO tend to use air power which leads to a lot of collateral casualties, which in turn feeds into the already high-levels of anti-American feelings in the area.
After two months of uneasy silence, the US has finally spoken. In a written testimony to a US congressional panel on Tuesday, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte said that Islamabad had not consulted the US on the issue and Washington had learnt of them from the media and had as a consequence expressed concerns about the negotiations to the Pakistani leaders. On the same day, Afghan Foreign Minister Rangeen Dafadar Spanta criticised what he said was Pakistan's policy of “appeasing” the Taliban. Recalling the failed peace deal of 2006 that led to increased attacks across the border on Afghanistan, he said that Islamabad's current course was “wrong and dangerous policy”.
Failure
Depite claimed successes, in July 2007, the US National Intelligence Estimate on “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland” noted that the task of securing the FATA area, a key goal of the US intervention, had not been completed. Indeed, the Al Qaeda had actually “protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability”. All this had happened despite the fact that the US had supplied some $10.5 billion worth of security and economic aid to Pakistan as well as some $1 billion per annum as reimbursement that accounts for 96 per cent of the costs incurred by Islamabad in the FATA.
To top this, in April 2008, the US Government Accountability Office issued a report, “Combating terrorism”, which noted that the US still lacked a comprehensive plan to destroy the terrorist threat, especially its safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. The GAO pointed out that a comprehensive plan had been mooted by the US National Strategy to Combat Terrorism in 2003; it had been called for by the Nine Eleven Commission and the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 passed thereafter by the Congress. Yet, neither the National Security Council, nor the National Counterterrorism Center nor other branches of government “have a plan that includes all elements of national power — diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic and law enforcement support.”
Pakistan
The criticism is not that the state department, the Pentagon, the CIA or USAID don't have plans, but there is no comprehensive strategy in place. As of now it is not clear as to whether Pakistan has such a plan either, though it has fought the tribal uprising. But one thing is clear, Pakistan still views the situation through strategic and geopolitical lenses. They view terrorist groups operating against India as a useful instrument of prosecuting their subconventional war against India. These are the same calculations that make up Islamabad's strategy with regard to the Taliban. India's role in Afghanistan, the possibility of a US/NATO pullout from Afghanistan are issues that Islamabad is carefully weighing. This dual policy was, after all, shaped by Musharraf as commander-in-chief and President of the country.
Perhaps the most negative aspect of the US dependence on Musharraf has been the extent to which the US has lost the battle of hearts and minds in Pakistan itself. The US now confronts a paradoxical situation where civil society in Pakistan is keen to prosecute the battle against radicals at home, but do not see the US as an ally of any kind in the process. Indeed, they are profoundly suspicious of US motives and actions. As of now, the Pakistan army under Pervez Ashfaq Kayani has declared its intentions to steer clear from politics. Musharraf has lost a great deal of prestige and faces the real prospect of having his powers trimmed drastically.
There is a great desire in the Pakistani establishment to negotiate a settlement with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leaders. They hope that the process of dialogue will halt the relentless march of the fundamentalists who have expanded from their original base in South Waziristan up north beyond Bajaur into Swat. In the past five years, the very nature of the FATA leadership has changed. The old tribal leaders who functioned in an autonomous fashion have been replaced by a younger leadership that openly acknowledges its links to the Taliban. They have proved themselves to be adept fighters and tacticians. Since 2004, they have used the tactic of ceasefires to consolidate their own hold and expand the area of their operations. This is the issue which Afghanistan and the US are raising, especially after the experience of the previous ceasefire in 2006 that led to a spike in attacks in Afghanistan.
Ties
By May 2008, it was clear that the relationship is at a breakdown point with Pakistan and the US no longer on the same plane with regard to the war on terrorism. The US is particularly exercised about reports that the latest ceasefire between the Pakistani forces and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Baitullah Mehsud is no longer conditioned on the latter stopping attacks on Afghanistan, or ending the presence of foreigners — Uzbeks, Chechens or Arabs — in their midst. This would actually indicate an unraveling of US policy in Pakistan whose primary aim was to end the sanctuary that the Al Qaeda got in the region. According to reports, Owari Ghani, the governor of North-West Frontier Province, who is also Musharraf's representative for FATA, told US officials that “Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side”. He is being assisted in the process by Rehman Malik who is the internal security adviser to Prime Minister Gillani. The US is clearly caught between a rock and a hard place.
This article appeared first in Mail Today May 23, 2008
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