Another nuclear deal ambush

A member of the US House of Representatives Howard L. Berman, a Democrat, has thrown yet another grenade aimed at blowing up the Indo-US nuclear agreement. On the eve of the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna on Thursday, the Congressman, who is Chairman of the powerful House Foreign Affairs Committee, has released confidential correspondence wherein the Bush Administration has given assurances that the US will not sell sensitive technologies relating to enrichment and reprocessing to India, and that it will terminate nuclear trade in the event of another Indian nuclear test. However, Indian officials who did not want to be quoted because of the upcoming NSG meeting said that the there was nothing new in Berman’s points. It appears that Berman is trying to influence the NSG meeting and hoping that it will insist on adding a clause to the draft waiver agreement that will be in line with the assurance that the Congress has got from the Administration. But if you look at the entire record-- the July 18, 2005 agreement, the Indo-US 123 Agreement, the India-specific IAEA safeguards, the position is much more nuanced.

The correspondence related to 45 highly technical questions that members of Congress posed about the deal before voting on the Hyde Act in 2006. The Administration has responded to the questions through a confidential letter on January 16, 2008 to Berman’s predecessor, Rep Tom Lantos who has since passed away. Berman, who has publicly opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal and declared that he will vote against it when it comes up again for an up or down vote if all the conditions set by the Congress at the time of passing the Hyde Act in 2006 are met.

A senior Indian official familiar with the deal said that the issues raised by Berman are a matter of interpretation. By the application of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, all cooperation between India and the US will come to an end should India test again because “the Hyde Act has provided a waiver for the tests conducted till May 13, 1998.” Actually the key operational clause of the Hyde Act was Section 104 which provided the US Administration the ability to overlook actions like the nuclear tests that had occurred before the July 18, 2005, the date in which the Indo-US nuclear agreement was signed by President George W Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington DC.

However, the 123 Agreement worked out by India and the US detailing the conditions for the nuclear trade, made it clear through its Article XIV that that the parties would consult with each other before terminating their cooperation and in the process they would “take into account” whether the reasons for seeking the termination were related to “a party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to a similar action by other states which could impact national security.” The wording very clearly relates to the eventuality that India is compelled to begin testing again in the wake of tests by other parties like China or Pakistan.

India has also repeatedly emphasized that it is bound by the 123 Agreement and not the Hyde Act and officials have been at pains to point out that by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, international agreements always take precedence over domestic legislation. In other words, the Indo-US 123 Agreement will trump the Hyde Act.

The second issue raised by Berman—that of the issue of the US export of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies—is actually bogus. Actually the 123 Agreement’s Article V Section 2 makes it clear that the US will not provide India with enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production technology. To acquire them India would have to seek an amendment of the 123 Agreement.

According to Indian officials, the reason why India agreed to this is that India already possesses all these technologies and is not seeking them. However, it is seeking components of these “sensitive” technologies, but this is a matter that has been left for further negotiation. Considering that the US does not give such technology to anyone, their decision to leave the matter for future negotiation was itself a gain for India.

New Delhi has taken the stand that the it is entering a civil nuclear agreement with the US and the NSG members. The key to the agreement is the acceptance by these countries of India’s military nuclear programme. The Indian policy in this is contained in a statement made by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in September 1998 at the United Nations General Assembly where he noted that “after concluding this limited testing program, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT.”

In an official statement released on Wednesday, the government says it will be bound only "by the terms of the bilateral agreement between India and the United States, the India-specific safeguards agreement (with the IAEA) and the clean waiver from the NSG, which we hope will be forthcoming ...."

The statement goes on to add that insofar as testing is concerned, " We have a unilateral moratorium on testing...."

No clear winner on Tsunami Tuesday

Tsunami Tuesday is over, and the picture of the US electoral scene after what was virtually a national referendum on who should represent their party for the presidential election later this year is mixed. The Republican frontrunner is clear — maverick Senator John McCain —whose candidacy came back from the dead to sweep aside challengers and confound the influential socially conservative wing of his party.
But he has not yet delivered the knock-out blow to his rivals Mitt Romney and Mike Huckabee. The situation in the Democratic camp is still hazy. If Hillary Clinton won voter and delegate rich New York, California, Massachusetts and New Jersey, Barack Obama swept up 13 of the 24 states that had their primaries on Tuesday. Both remain locked in a battle that may clarify by March 4 when the next big lot of primaries takes place, or actually go on to the party convention in Denver in August, for the final decision.

Convoluted

It is important to remember that this is not an election, but a nomination process. It is also run by the Republican and Democratic party state organisations and has all manner of rules that would bewilder an outsider. Thus, the Democratic national party has stripped Florida of all its delegates for having an early primary. The Republicans have halved their number for the same reason. California is even more complicated. First, both the Democrats and Republicans allow voters unaffiliated to either party to vote in the primary. Second, they allow them to cast absentee ballots by mail. As a result, some 4.1 million Californians had already cast their vote before February 5. These voters may have skewed the contest in favour of Clinton because the polls in the run-up to the Tsunami Tuesday showed Obama catching up. Even more complicated is the manner in which California distributes its delegates. 370 of the 441 delegates are allocated proportionally to presidential candidates; 241 of the 370 on basis of the votes cast in each of the state’s 53 Congressional constituencies. Then, 129 delegates are allotted to candidates based on the vote across the state. On May 18, the remaining 71 delegates will be selected from among party leaders and elected representatives.
Whatever be the outcome of the primaries in terms of the percentage of votes picked up, what matters is the number of delegates they have — as of now, the winning Democratic nominee needs 2025 out of a total of 4049 delegates and the Republican, 1191 of 2380. Tsunami Tuesday may have decided the way that 50 per cent or so delegates will vote, but none of the candidates are anywhere near their respective magic figures. As of now, Clinton leads the Democrats with 845 delegates, and Obama has 765 and on the Republican side we have McCain with 613, Romney 269, and Huckabee 190. As we have explained, so arcane are the Democratic rules in distributing delegates, that the true outcome of the primaries will take some time to emerge. The California vote may be in, but its delegates are yet to be allotted. But since the popular vote is available, the candidates will use the “bragging rights”— Hillary in Massachusetts and Obama in Missouri — to push on further for the next goal, the party presidential nomination.
The immediate consequence of Tsunami Tuesday will be that McCain has time on his side to rebuild his campaign and, more important, his rocky relationship with the conservative factions in his party. And while he will have time to consolidate his position, the Democrats could be slugging it out for some more months to come. The recent primaries show that they are now divided on race and gender lines and whoever wins will have to put in that much of a task of healing the rift. But the danger is that the fight could become so bitter that it could give McCain the needed opening when the actual presidential campaign gets under way in September.

India

But first McCain needs to not only clinch the nomination, but also heal the rift with the strong social conservative wing of his party. Just how he will square the circle on issues like abortion and immigration reform, where he has liberal views, with those of the conservatives is not clear. But in the end the latter have the choice of lumping it, or watching an even bigger enemy win the race — Hillary Clinton. Some fire-eaters say that they would rather see that happen than allow the GOP to lose its soul by having a McCain presidency.
As in many other countries of the world, there is an asymmetrically huge interest in India on the outcome of US electoral processes and polls. What do the current front runners signify for India ? A major issue of concern is the American non-proliferation policy and the place it occupies in America’s strategic calculations. While McCain, Clinton and Obama are broadly supportive of the Hyde Act that enabled the India-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, no one is taking a radical position, either for or against us. The Left will be glad to know that India does not occupy an important position in the strategic worldview of any of the leaders of the race at this time. Even Clinton who is co-chair of the Senate India caucus is cautious about committing support for a permanent seat for the country in the UN Security Council. Indeed, her stated commitment to pushing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will pose major problems for the hawks in New Delhi who want to negotiate their way into the treaty instead of being told what to do. Obama has also promised the same and he goes a step further in backing the “verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material.” We wonder how this would sound to those, many former Department of Atomic Energy officials, who oppose any kind of restraints on India’s nuclear programme in the context of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Obama has, somewhat uncomfortably retained that Democratic party agenda of pushing India and Pakistan to make peace on Kashmir. Clearly any one of these could emerge as obstacles in Indo-US relations in the coming years.

McCain

As a “traditional” Republican, McCain would be India’s best bet because he is unlikely to turn the non-proliferation screws on the country. Neither is he likely to get involved in one of those high-minded fits that periodically afflict the Democrats to resolve the problems of the world, and India and Pakistan in particular. McCain, a former POW and war veteran is a healthy realist, of the kind India can do business with. And speaking of business, he is the most forthright in dismissing concerns over outsourcing and efforts to undermine his country’s free trade posture.
Given the interest that merely the nomination process of American political parties is attracting across the world, we could demand that the US give a one-fourth of a vote to non-Americans to participate in the process. But more seriously, what it reveals is that, despite the profligacy of George W Bush, the US remains a pivotal global power. So it is a matter of great interest to everyone as to who will be the leader of the country.
What the campaign reveals till now is that while the failings of the Bush presidency have created an enormous yearning for change — the factor that Obama is tapping — worries about the economy could provide the decisive edge to a candidate. With foreclosures already upon them, and a recession around the corner, Americans would be keen to see experienced hands at the helm, rather than heed a soaring message calling for radical change.
This article appeared in Mail Today February 7, 2008

Grab this deal

This article appeared in Mail Today November 28, 2007

Today, the Lok Sabha will begin the long-anticipated debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Expect more sound than light, and a lot of smoke. The debate will be strictly partisan, and you will be none the wiser. This is a pity considering the vital national importance of the subject. Fortunately, from the outset, there has been nothing hidden about the deal. Officials on both sides have leaked details to the media, the legislative processes have been quite open, and the outcome— India’s separation plan, the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement are available for anyone to read and interpret. Perhaps because of the information overload, and some of it is technical-- both in the legislative and scientific sense—there is a lot of confusion surrounding the deal.
The deal is not exclusively about energy, neither is it about India and the United States.
But it is about India’s relationship with the entire developed world, shaped as they are to a considerable extent by the embargoes placed on India’s nuclear and space programmes because we are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All the action till now in New Delhi, Washington and Vienna will not operationalise the deal. Only the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group’s clean exemption on its rule barring trade with countries that have not signed the NPT will do so. In that sense the US is merely the chowkidar to the gates of the NSG, the cartel of nations with significant nuclear technology and materials.
You may ask why US ? The reason can be answered by another question: Why is US hosting the Annapolis Conference on Palestine, or why is the US concerned about North Korea’s nuclear reactor? The US is seen by its contemporaries-- and they are that since it has no real rivals-- as the world’s foremost power on whom rests a disproportionate responsibility to maintain the world order. George Bush may have single-handedly diminished US capital by his wanton ways, but the US still remains the default power on the world’s problem issues. Dealing with India’s nuclear status is one such issue and all NSG countries have decided that the US will be the nodal country on the subject.
With its moribund nuclear industry and plethora of rules, the US is unlikely to be the main commercial gainer from the nuclear deal. The first four reactors after the NSG go-ahead are likely to be Russian because the Koodankulam site has the necessary clearances for them and the reactor type has been certified by Indian regulators. The next would probably be a French reactor. As the chowkidar, the US may be entitled to a tip, 10 to 15 per cent, which could be the trade in components, computers and control systems it may export.
American gains will be political, and they are not inconsiderable. The deal is vital for the US goal of incorporating India in a global security architecture in the coming decades.
“Aha !” you may say, if you believe in conspiracy theories. “We told you so.” But that aim is less sinister than it sounds. First, there is nothing the US can do today to compel us to do anything against our own interests. Second, while India and the US both have national interests that may, on occasion, clash, on the whole they are much more congruent today than ever. To reject a policy option because we have matching interests would be perverse.
India and the US share common interests with China, Japan, EU and Russia and almost everyone, for a secure and stable environment. Given its global presence, the US must have a special place in our calculations. It is the only power that has the capability of intervening, militarily or diplomatically in countries of vital importance for us—Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and, to an extent, even China. Good relations with the US also have a dividend in the form of better relations with its close allies, principally Japan and the European Union.

All major powers seek strategic autonomy, but India seems to be stuck with its 1970s obsession with autarky. While in the field of economic relations the idea has been thrown overboard, its its strategic avatar still holds some fascination for the Left and the RSS. In today’s globalised world, we must understand the difference between autarky and autonomy. The latter is desirable, the former self-defeating. One puts you in the league of North Korea and Cuba, the other with China and the European Union.
The striking aspect of the Left raising fears about New Delhi being subservient to Washington is that they are doing so at a time when India is the strongest it has been in 60 years—bulging foreign exchange reserves, sizzling economic growth, a vast nuclear armed military and a sophisticated industrial and intellectual infrastructure. India’s relations with its smaller neighbours are the best ever, as are those with old adversaries like China and Pakistan. The only answer for this deliberate fear-mongering is that the Left is not happy with this picture.
Coming to technical issues: There are some who claim that India will lose the right to test. Not true. In fact the US has been remarkably accommodating on this score. But by the same measure with which we have retained the right to test, the US, too, has the right to react. But this is a hypothetical proposition since the eventuality is not around the corner. There are some facile arguments about India placing its reactors under safeguards “in perpetuity” and not getting perpetual fuel guarantees. In fact the fuel guarantees are perhaps the most extensive one can find anywhere.

India tested on May 11 and 13 1998. The government’s statement after the May 13 test said we had "completed the planned series." India’s chief scientist, Dr. R. Chidambaram and the DRDO specialist K. Santhanam assured the government that there was no need for further tests. Having invited the world’s opprobrium, we could have gone on testing, but we didn’t. Most of the scientists who today claim we need more tests were not involved in the weapons programme, or had retired long before India’s nuclear weapons programme really got underway in the mid-1990s.
It is difficult to see what the BJP now wants by way of renegotiating the 123 Agreement. A document on the “evolution of India’s nuclear policy” was tabled in Parliament on May 27, 1998 noted “Subsequent to the tests Government has already stated that India will, now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. The basic obligation of the CTBT are thus met.” In the same statement it also indicated willingness to move towards “a de-jure formalization” of this declaration. The statement also expressed India’s desire to participate in the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). These commitments were reiterated by Prime Minister Vajpayee to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998:

Accordingly, after concluding this limited testing program, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT.

The Indo-US nuclear deal has the power to change India’s relationship with the US and the rest of the developed world. The agreements that shape it are not static documents, they are subject to change and modification. As it is, an international agreement is worth the piece of paper it is written on, unless there is a commitment and interest of both or all parties to uphold it. The process of meeting reciprocal obligations will build up trust, which generate higher levels of commitment. In other words, the minor flaws gaps that remain will also be addressed. But as is the way with life-- in the fullness of time and fitness of things.

Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi

The reason why Latin, a now extinct language, is still used in some form or the other, is because it has a remarkable facility for stating an issue in the most direct and coherent manner. That is why it is a favourite of lawyers and judges. The title of my previous blog, too, was a Latin phrase. Perhaps this is an effort to try and be as clear as possible on the vexed matter of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Because the deal involves an American statute (the Hyde Act), a technical agreement, the Indo-US 123 Agreement, safeguards and an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, it is easy to mislead the man-on-the-street. A number of politicians and commentators have taken recourse to selective reading of the text or giving an unconscionable spin to phrases and clauses. In some cases it is a case of suggestion of a falsehood leading to the suppression of truth (the meaning of the phrase we have cited).
To my mind two articles on the deal in The Hindu bring this out. The first was one by Brahma Chellaney, a commentator on strategic affairs and author of a study on the earlier Tarapur agreement. The second is a rejoinder by Kapil Sibal, a minister in the UPA government and a noted lawyer. Read both for yourself to understand what I am trying to get at.

The Left's Chimera

We have maintained from the very outset, that the Left alone has opposed the nuclear deal based on a coherent principle, though wrong-headed. However their opposition is so wrong-headed and blinkered that they are seriously endangering our national interest. The Left sees US as a major negative force in global politics and have hence opposed the nuclear deal because it will help bring India and the US closer together. The politburo statement of August 18 and the Left parties statement of August 7 make that clear.

Serving Chinese interests

This does not mean that the statement and the positions are well reasoned, they are not. They are a mishmash of blinkered ideological rants and cynically argued half-baked positions, some are not even based on fact. One lamentable conclusion does come through—the CPI(M) is not really concerned by India’s national interest, its idea of national interest is so distorted that it usually ends up serving China’s national interest. This is the Chinese take on the nuclear deal:

“Judging from the (Indo-US 123 Agreement) text, however, the US has made big concessions and met almost all Indian requests, including full supply of nuclear fuel to India and allowing it to dispose nuclear waste. India's right to continue conducting nuclear testing will depend on "circumstances". According to the text, if India can satisfactorily justify its nuclear testing, the US would acquiesce. That is, Washington has actually acknowledged India's right to retain nuclear testing......

....It is quite obvious that the US generosity in helping India develop nuclear energy is partly due to its hegemony idea, which made it regardless of others' opinions, and partly due to the intention of drawing India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern.” (“Prospects of Indian-US nuclear cooperation misty,” People’s Daily Online August 14, 2007)

So even the Chinese concede we have a good deal, even though they are clear that they don't like it.

Hyde Act Red Herring

Critics in the Left and the right are making a deliberate attempt to insinuate the Hyde Act into the deal. This act is US domestic legislation and binds the US Administration. The Bush team believes that the 123 Agreement it negotiated with India meets all the requirements of the act. There is a simple principle of international law, enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, that an international agreement always trumps domestic legislation. Article 16 (4) of the Indo-US 123 Agreement notes, “This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.” While the US and India have not ratified that convention, both have operationally abided by it because it codifies customary international law. International diplomacy would become infructous if states began to cite domestic law to overwhelm their international commitments. Article 27 of the treaty notes, " A party may not invoke an internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. "

Misreading the documents

August 7 statement: “Serious concern had been expressed by the Left Parties about various conditions inserted into the Hyde Act passed by the US Congress. A number of them pertain to areas outside nuclear co-operation and are attempts to coerce India to accept the strategic goals of the United States. These issues are:

· Annual certification and reporting to the US Congress by the President on a variety of foreign policy issues such as India’s foreign policy being “congruent to that of the United States” and more specifically India joining US efforts in isolating and even sanctioning Iran [Section 104g(2) E(i)]

· Indian participation and formal declaration of support for the US’ highly controversial Proliferation Security Initiative including the illegal policy of interdiction of vessels in international waters [Section 104g(2) K]

· India conforming to various bilateral/multilateral agreements to which India is not currently a signatory such as the US’ Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group etc [Section 104c E,F,G]”

Are the US strategic goals towards India merely those ? All that one can see here is an effort to serve the Iranian and North Korean national interest, as well as that of any country that wishes to make missiles, chemical and nuclear weapons.

August 7 statement: “The termination clause is wide ranging and does not limit itself to only violation of the agreement as a basis for cessation or termination of the contract. Therefore, these extraneous provisions of the Hyde Act could be used in the future to terminate the 123 Agreement. In such an eventuality, India would be back to complete nuclear isolation, while accepting IAEA safeguards in perpetuity. Therefore, the argument that provisions of the Hyde Act do not matter and only 123 clauses do, are misplaced.”

My reading is that the termination issues are just two 1. a unilateral resumption of Indian nuclear tests (which incidentally is only implied and not mentioned in the Indo-US 123) and 2. As per the 123 Agreement’s Article XIV Section 3 which says the agreement will be at an end if India materially breaches the IAEA safeguards agreement. The article goes on to note that what constitutes the material breach will not be decided by the US, but the IAEA Board of Governors. What could be fairer and more reasonable ?

What it is all about

Why beat about the bush (pun unintended) and deconstruct a confused and confusing argument. Let’s ask the straightforward question : Does the US have an agenda in pushing the nuclear deal? Of course it does.

But that’s not quite the same thing as accepting that India will slavishly serve that agenda. What it will do, is what it has always done-- utilize the opportunity to move its own agenda forward. India has its own agenda and sees in the present global conjuncture an opportunity to strengthen its own position relative to the major powers.

What is remarkable about the Left’s self-view of India is as to how weak they think the country is. India with its nuclear-tipped armed forces, 8 per cent plus growth rate and burgeoning foreign exchange reserves has never been stronger than before. It has beaten back the challenge of US-led containment, as well as its most dangerous internal insurgencies. India may have been amenable to US tuition thrice in its history—when we became free and were reeling from the effects of partition, in 1962 when our forces were defeated by the Chinese and in 1991 when our economy crashed. But a glance back at all the instances will show that the Americans did not display and particular interest in “taking over” India. An India run from Washington is a chimera of the Left’s creation.

The only loophole I can see for the continuation of the Left's support for the United Progressive Alliance government is the paragraph four of the August 18 statement which notes,

“Till all the objections are considered and the implications of the Hyde Act evaluated, the government should not take the next step with regard to negotiating a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

If the CPI(M) is willing to go through the motions of having these considered, it could raise its objections. The government has no doubt considered the implications of the Hyde Act. To suggest otherwise is to believe that the Manmohan Singh government, its negotiators and top nuclear scientists like Anil Kakodkar are working as agents of the US. But given the Left’s demonology anything is possible.

Incidentally, whose game is the CPI(M) playing by insisting that the deal be stopped before going to its logical stage? That is the point we will get an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Once that happens, India will be able to make deals with countries like France and Russia who will not insist on the kind of conditionalities that are there in the Indo-US 123 Agreement. Again, incidentally, the US will give us in writing that it will not insist on a Right of Return clause in any NSG agreement.

It is a Big Deal

We must recognise that the US has done us a favour in lifting the nuclear embargo on India.We are desperately short of natural uranium and technology and the negotiation with the US is the only way in which the doors of the Nuclear Suppliers Group cartel, which have been shut to us, will open.

If anyone has alternate suggestions, I will welcome them.

This article was published in Hindustan Times December 13, 2006

Critics of the Indo-US nuclear deal are playing the game with loaded dice, weighted heavily with their anti-Americanism. The condemnation, some positively bilious, has been based on a selective reading of the new US nuclear cooperation law. Any analysis of the deal made, with the US depicted as an ‘enemy’ or ‘hostile’ actor, means that every word or phrase of the new US law can be seen as the imposition of an onerous condition or a hidden trap.

So, efforts by the US to ensure that civil technology is used for the purpose claimed, are viewed as a sinister effort to spy on India’s nuclear technology. Say this much for the Left, they do know their politics well and clearly understand that the key American aim in giving India the extraordinary concession — of ending their 30-year-old successful embargo of our nuclear establishment — is to do with befriending India. And everyone knows that the Left does not want India and the US to be friends.

For 30 years, US laws, accepted by 45 other countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, banned the export of even a light bulb to any Indian nuclear establishment. An agreement that enables India to access nuclear raw material and technology from around the world is, therefore, not an every day event. More so, because it does so without any obligation on India to give up or restrict its nuclear weapons capability.

As for the issue of spies who may come in the guise of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors: the military and civil parts of the nuclear establishment will be physically separated. The military parts will operate out of the Kalpakkam and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (Barc) complexes.

The obligations the US seeks are quite legitimate. These are rules and regulations that will assure the US and the NSG that the opening of civil nuclear trade to India will not, in anyway, aid India’s nuclear weapons capability. Considering India defied the world community and tested nuclear weapons in 1998, this is not an unreasonable expectation. Since our hearts are pure and military facilities will be in separate enclaves, there is no reason why we should worry about the intrusiveness of inspections.

What the red and saffron filter does not reveal is that the US has come more than half-way to accommodate India. Leave alone dropping the insistence that India “cap and roll back” its nuclear weapons programme, the US has actually laid the groundwork for intensive collaboration with India in the civil nuclear sphere. For example, much is being made of the fact that the Hyde Act does not mention the issue of reprocessing US-supplied nuclear fuel in India. As of today, the US prohibits this, regardless of the country. But, say officials, the very fact that it has not been mentioned in the legislation is the loophole that a subsequent technical ‘123 Agreement’ can be used to enable this. A clause in the Bill makes India the only country in the world that can have US reprocessing and enrichment technology, albeit conditionally.

Much has been made of annual certificates needed to continue cooperation. Actually on Indian insistence, “certification” has been changed to “assessment”, the difference being that negative reports will not lead to cessation of cooperation. Another claim of US’s bad faith is that it had the NSG inspection laws tightened to target India. G. Balachandran, a long-time analyst of the issue, says that the change in the rules were mooted in the NSG in mid-2004, a year before the Indo-US nuclear deal, and approved by the outfit’s plenary in June 2005.

The opponents of the Indo-US nuclear deal need to answer how they propose to meet the deficit of natural uranium that afflicts India’s civil nuclear power programme?

The shortage is not a matter of speculation. The mid-term appraisal document of the Tenth Five Year Plan states this. In July 2005, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, A. Gopalakrishnan, now a vocal critic of the deal, wrote in the Economic and Political Weekly: “at present the DAE (department of atomic energy) is beginning to face a serious shortage of natural uranium, even to fuel the 18 pwhr (pressurised heavy water reactors) currently under operation or construction.”

This is a good place to examine the attitude of some of our retired scientists who are criticising the deal. All of them know how the US-led embargo crippled the Indian nuclear programme. They seem to be inspired by a sense of technological vengeance in insisting that India go it alone and prove its three-stage nuclear plan. This could well be technological hubris. Balachandran says India has just about enough natural uranium to run a 10,000 MW programme, sufficient to trigger the fast-breeder reactor programme using a plutonium-rich fuel to breed more plutonium. “If there are no imports, then everything hangs on the fast breeder reactor,” he says. “If, for some reason, this technology does not perform, we will be stuck at that level.”

The only deal that will satisfy our scientists is one in which the US not only unconditionally gives in to all Indian demands, but also rewrites the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to accommodate India as a nuclear weapons State. This attitude can only be born out of dotage, or a wrenching awareness that their world will be changed forever. Instead of the cloistered institutions they ran with little accountability, India, in the changed circumstances, could well have a vast nuclear establishment with many new actors, including probably private sector companies, both Indian and foreign. Nuclear power research, today, is a cooperative affair, involving several countries and institutions — both private and public — primarily because of the costs associated, as well as a desire to spread the technological risks.

There is one last thought that needs to be addressed. In international relations, all State-to-State relations are between equals. When Prime Ministers and Presidents make joint statements and declarations, this principle operates. The reality is, however, that while all nations are sovereign equals, in the real world, geographic location, economic and military power, and resilience of political institutions create differentials.

It is on this template that we need to examine the Indo-US deal. So, while the July 18, 2005, statement and the PM’s statements in Parliament work on the belief that it is an agreement between sovereign equals, the practical procedures that the two countries work out cannot avoid reflecting the real differential. The US, the world’s largest economy and military power, is also a recognised nuclear weapons State under the NPT; India is a pariah State when it comes to nuclear weapons and technology, as well as a poor country in desperate need of energy.

The US, the lead State in maintaining a global embargo against States that have not signed the NPT, has been remarkably generous with India. Not only has it tacitly accepted India as a nuclear weapons State, it has explicitly agreed to lift its embargo against India’s civil nuclear programme in exchange for assurances that there are no leakages from India’s civil programme to the military. To see this as sinister or demeaning is either obtuse or perverse, or perhaps, a combination of both.