Sectarian politics is destroying India

Do you want to see how a nation builds itself? Look at the People’s Republic of China. From a tattered country, wracked by civil war and internal strife, in 1980, it has systematically pulled itself up to emerge as one of the leading powers of the world.
The Communist party there abandoned dogma to unleash its economic potential, and reformed itself to provide effective governance based on giving the levers of power to the best and the brightest in a systematic, time-bound manner.
In these years, it has sand-papered regional and linguistic variations by a national culture, built on a bedrock of a new network of road and railways, extending into the outermost reaches of the vast country. Its great metropolises like Shanghai and Beijing vie to become world centres of industry, finance and culture.
To see how a nation destroys itself, however, you do not have to go far. You only have to look at India.
In 1980, we were ahead of China in almost every department, except nuclear weapons. But over the years, we have fallen behind everywhere— in science, agriculture, manufacturing.
Our political system increasingly based on parties that seek to exclude or divide people on the basis of caste, creed, region or language seems determined to destroy the unified fabric of the country.


Hindutva

Our vaunted right of democratic protest has degenerated to a point where tearing up national communications networks like roads and railway tracks has now become the norm. Our great metropolis Mumbai has been blessed with leaders whose perspective does not extend beyond the state of Maharashtra.
In this process, the country’s leading political party, the Congress, has been the most complicit for its failures of omission, rather than commission. It has failed to provide the kind of national leadership that was expected of it. Instead, it has kowtowed to fundamentalists, fumbled before separatists and failed to keep the country’s tryst with destiny.
But perhaps the biggest immediate danger we confront is from the actions of the Bharatiya Janata Party which projects itself as a super-nationalist organisation, but seems determined to diminish the nation, and not just geographically. Recall, in the 1990s, it demanded that a Ram Mandir be established on the site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and unleashed a national movement that led to widespread rioting and mayhem in the country.
It’s double-barreled somewhat transparent aim was to humiliate the Muslim community whose demonisation has always been a part and parcel of its mobilisational strategy, and to gain the support of the majority Hindus who worship Lord Ram. That project as we know has only been partially successful. The Muslims have been humiliated to the point that some of them have turned to radicalism and even terrorism, but the Hindus have not rallied behind the party in the numbers that were expected.

Jammu & Kashmir

So in the past year or so, the party has experimented with a number of other issues like Sethusamudram, hoping that one of them will be the spark that sets off the prairie fire. But last month it believes it hit pay dirt when the issue of the transfer of land by the Jammu & Kashmir government to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board rocked the state. There is no doubt that the protests in the Valley had a communal colour, led as they were by the Mir Waiz Umar Farooq and Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Neither is there any question that it was mishandled by the previous governor Lt. Gen (retd) S.K. Sinha and the coalition government of the Congress and the People’s Democratic Party.
The counter-agitation may appear to be a spontaneous upsurge of Jammu-based Hindus angered by the communalism of the Valley leaders, but it is in fact a well organised campaign being directed by the Sangh Parivar which had, as recently as 2002, backed the idea of a separate Jammu state. The leaders of the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board Sangharsh Samiti are known Parivar men — Tilak Raj Sharma of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, VHP state president Ramakant Dubey and the BJP state chief Ashok Khajuria.
When militancy broke out in 1990, some administrators like Governor Jagmohan had suggested a scorched earth policy of destroying the financial support structure of the separatists by blockading the Valley and preventing any export of its fruit and handicraft products. Fortunately better sense prevailed and the Indian security forces were able to restore a great measure of authority of the state without having thrown the baby out with the bath-water.
But the Jammu agitation is trying to do precisely that by blockading the Valley and preventing the export of its apple produce. It is being assisted in the process by the Punjab government which is a coalition between the Akali Dal and the BJP. It does not take much imagination to see that the consequences of these actions will be to deepen the sense of alienation of the Kashmir Valley Muslims from the rest of the country. Since the other major route out of the Valley leads out of the Jhelum Valley to Pakistan, this will go a long way in promoting the Pakistani project in the state.
But these things do not matter much to the BJP. It has not hesitated to pursue a cynical and dangerous policy of alienating the 140 million Muslims and pushing them over the brink through actions like the Babri Masjid demolition and the Gujarat massacres of 2002.

Typhoon

Now it seems determined to push the scheme of trifurcating the state which was last attempted by the Jammu Mukti Morcha, an RSS-backed body, in the 2002 elections. It should be clear what trifurcation implies — the Valley, Doda, Poonch and Rajauri becoming 100 per cent Muslim and edging towards Pakistan, so that the rump of a Hindu Jammu and Ladakh remain with India.
The BJP leaders think that once they have consolidated their electoral majority in Parliament, they can douse the fires they have lit, or coerce the Muslim community into total submission. But given the experience of the consequences of Babri Masjid and Gujarat — the repeated acts of terrorism that we are witnessing in the last couple of years — it should be clear that they will be unleashing a typhoon which will destroy the nation as it is constituted.
This article appeared first in Mail Today August 7, 2008

The time is ripe for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to travel to Pakistan

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has achieved a lot in his four years as prime minister. The country has witnessed an average growth rate of 8.6 per cent, probably the highest in its post-independence history, his government has passed several landmark legislations—the Right to Information Act, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and the Forest Rights Act. He has negotiated a path-breaking international agreement that will end the technology and nuclear materials embargo on India. There has been no incidence of mass violence, such as that in Gujarat in 2002 during the rule of the NDA. Neither has there been any major security lapse like the Kargil incursion during its watch. With the massive loan waiver and pay commission handout, the UPA government at first signaled that it was set for general elections, but now is seems that they are likely to take place on schedule in 2009.
So, the PM has one full year in office remaining. What should he do? The legislative impulse has run dry, so he can dole out more sops, but with inflation around, that would be a Sisyphean labour. He can brood about the Indo-US nuclear deal and how the Left has blocked his efforts to further liberalise the economy. Or he can travel to Pakistan.
A visit by an Indian Prime Minister has been overdue by at least two years. This is a most opportune moment for such a visit. There is parliamentary majority, if not consensus at home, to ensure that any forward movement with Pakistan will not get gridlocked, as in the case of the nuclear deal. That the new elected government in Pakistan, too, is ready to do business with India from the point where President Pervez Musharraf left off, points to a significant measure of consensus there as well.
There is a new government and a new mood in Islamabad. It comes at the end of an intense phase of political turmoil, one in which India did not figure as a villain. The process has weakened the baleful influence of the Pakistan army in relation to India and shifted the equilibrium against fundamentalist forces in the country. Because of this, the government does not feel it necessary to tailor their political suit to the army's cloth. Time and again, civilian leaders felt compelled to adopt postures at the behest of the army, or with a view of keeping on the right side of the generals. The situation has now changed to the point where the civilians feel compelled to maintain a healthy distance from the army.

Sir Creek

But what really makes for a compelling case for a prime ministerial visit now is the remarkable fact that though Pakistan was wracked by intense political turmoil in the past year, the India-Pakistan peace process— begun in January 2004—maintained its momentum. Through last year the fourth round of the composite dialogue continued apace. There were important gains on the Sir Creek issue, forward movement in opening up air services between the two countries as well as cross-border movement of people and trade.Through traffic at Wagah has increased trade volumes enormously.In May, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee will go to Pakistan to wrap up the fourth round of dialogue and set the stage for the fifth.
The two sides now need a fresh impetus to resolve their larger problems. Such a push can only be accomplished at a summit level meeting. There are two issues that can reach closure almost immediately— Siachen and Sir Creek.
The tenth round of talks on Sir Creek were held in Islamabad in May 2007. They were based on a joint survey of the area that took place earlier that year. During the ninth round, in December 2006, Pakistan had already agreed to settle the maritime boundary using the internationally accepted “equidistance method”.
These are major developments, since it means that the two countries are now dealing with a common set of data which could make it easier to determine a mutually acceptable baseline point—the last point where the land boundary ends and the maritime boundary begins. This, in turn, will be the key to working out a mutually acceptable maritime boundary, the lack of which leads to hundreds of fishermen of either side being arrested by the authorities on both sides. But the issue has gained salience because there are expectations that the sea bed contains gas and oil reserves which neither side can exploit till the boundary is fixed. There is another reason why Sir Creek needs quick settlement. The UN Convention on Law of the Seas deadline ends in 2009, and if the two countries cannot submit a joint document certifying their maritime boundary, they will not get the opportunity to extend this boundary from the current 370 to 650 kms under a UN plan.

Siachen

Agreements in 1989 and 1992 would have created a zone of disengagement in the Siachen region. But the process has been stuck because Pakistan does not want to authenticate the positions their forces occupy. Afraid of a Kargil-like move where Pakistanis disputed the Line of Control in Kashmir— even though its coordinates were jointly determined by surveyors of both sides— India has been balking. The Pakistanis can be persuaded to accept the Sir Creek model and accept a joint survey to authenticate the positions of the two sides. The Pakistanis were not willing to authenticate the positions earlier because contrary to their claims, their army held no positions on the glacier. With the architect of Kargil in the dog-house, India can move to settle the Siachen issue without fear of Pakistan reneging.

Kashmir

On the Mother of all Issues—Kashmir—too, there has been movement, albeit more subtle.The recent visit and meetings of Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah with the new Pakistani leadership indicates how times have changed. Equally significant have been the remarks of PPP leader Asif Zardari that the issue could perhaps be placed on the back burner. Kashmir no longer sells well in domestic Pakistani politics.
Yet, this should not lull India into any sense of complacency. New Delhi needs to continue a serious and substantive engagement with Pakistan and the Kashmiri parties to resolve the problem once and for all. Though the UPA government has done a lot in this area, much more needs to be done to reach a closure on this debilitating issue. Unfortunately, when negotiations with Islamabad slowed down in 2007, New Delhi perceptibly slackened its efforts towards a settlement with the Kashmiri parties. This was needless and short-sighted.
The bottom line today is that the India-Pakistan situation offers a tailor-made opportunity for a breakthrough. One that will not be based on some quick calculation of electoral gain or any personal "place in the history books" syndrome, but solid and patient diplomacy going back four years and an earnest desire for peace on both sides of the border.

This article was first published in Mail Today April 10, 2008

Seven things we should not do to help the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

The general elections may be around the corner, but Pakistan continues to careen dangerously out of control. Specific incidents and events are not the issue, but the totality of developments that have been taking place, beginning last year.
A convenient date would be March 9, 2007, the fateful day on which President Pervez Musharraf began his ill-advised campaign to edge out Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry from the country’s Supreme Court. This enraged the community of lawyers, who have since led the civil protest movement against Musharraf.
Parallel to this, the general also managed to botch up the Lal Masjid situation. The mosque, located near the ISI headquarters in Islamabad, had a reputation for radicalism since the time of Zia ul Haq. It had links with the North West Frontier Province because it drew a number of its students from there. The mosque was used by radicals who railed against Musharraf’s US policy and even called for his assassination, yet he failed to act against it. In early 2007, students of the mosque’s two madarsas — one for men and the other for women — began to enforce a puritanical law in parts of Islamabad. They shut down video shops and assaulted people they said were involved in immoral activities.
Finally in July 2007, Musharraf sent in the army. A bitter clash took place, leaving scores dead. While the senior imam of the mosque was captured, his younger brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed. The army action led to the breakdown of a truce between the Pakistan army and anti-government tribesmen in North and South Waziristan, and a spate of suicide bombings aimed at Pakistani army personnel, and even the ISI.
Musharraf’s meltdown has led to a great deal of nervousness across the world. Concerns over the safety of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal have been voiced in the US and India. But New Delhi has few options beyond tailing the US. For the present the Pakistan army remains a strong force and is unlikely to take kindly to any Indian intervention. Yet there are things that India can do to help Pakistan. But first New Delhi must understand that there are things it must not do to help Islamabad.

First, see Pakistan as a basket case. It is easy when you are up in South Asia, to see the other as down and out. It was just the other day, in the early 1990s, when in their arrogance of having helped the US win the jehad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Islamabad thought India could be brought low by supporting separatist movements. In the wake of the 1989 elections, India was indeed in bad shape, its polity shot to hell, separatist movements taking roots in key states like Punjab and its economy in a shambles. The ISI could have been excused for thinking that one more push would have India come apart. But it did not. So, let’s be clear that Pakistan is not about to keel over, just as India was not at that time.

Second, New Delhi must not delay its internal negotiations with Kashmiri parties on the issue of autonomy or whatever. In the past year, while Musharraf has grappled with the judiciary and the mullahs, the India-Pakistan talks have maintained their formal continuity. But there has been little forward movement. But there is one element in which India does not need to involve Pakistan — the issue of internal democracy in Jammu & Kashmir. Addressing the second round table meet on Kashmir in May 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had said that the first task was to see “what are those political institutions and arrangements which can strengthen the relationship between the Centre and the state.” In line with this he had set up a working group under former Justice Saghir Ahmad to come up with a report on the issue of autonomy or self-rule. Though four other working groups on issues relating to economy and cross-border trade have finished their reports, little or nothing has been heard about the workings of the autonomy group.

Third, India must not demand that the US and other countries accept Indian primacy in South Asia. This is a mug’s game. Indian primacy cannot be got by request or grant. It is an existential fact. Anyone who tries to deny it — like Pakistan has in the past 60 years — has had his head buried firmly in the sand.

Fourth, India must not pander to Pakistan's sense of entitlement on Kashmir or Afghanistan. Islamabad has no locus standi in J&K and we must deal with it as such. There are issues that have arisen in the wake of the Pakistan-engineered tribal invasion in 1947 — the creation of Azad Kashmir, the UN resolutions and the no-man's land status of the Northern Areas — that need to be worked out through negotiations, but not the status of the state.
In normal times — and you can count the period 1947-1979 as “normal” in the context of Pakistan-Afghanistan affairs — the relationship between the two was positively chilly. New Delhi need not insert itself into the equation to deny Pakistan what it did not have in the first place — a pliant Afghanistan. Pakistan’s ability to “manage” Afghanistan of the Taliban era was strictly limited. Islamabad is learning now that the seemingly barbarian Taliban were shrewder than the ISI thought. Instead of Pakistan getting strategic depth, it is the Taliban which has obtained it in the NWFP, Balochistan and Swat at the expense of the Pakistani central authority.

Fifth, we must not encourage fissiparous trends in Pakistan. In other words, do unto Islamabad what Islamabad has been doing to us. As long as Pakistan remains together even in a tattered form, there is hope that it can be repaired. But if it falls apart like Yugoslavia, there will be little chance of putting it back together again. To say that such a development would be counter-productive would be to make an understatement.

Sixth, New Delhi must not privilege the Pakistan Army over the mainstream political parties and civil society in the country. It is one thing to deal with the army when it wields power, it is quite another thing to be happy about it. India's strategic position must always be that the final settlement on anything will have to be with a democratically elected government. India’s relations with Musharraf have been quite proper, and they should continue to be so as long as he is the head of the government. But New Delhi needs to clearly put across the message that while it deals with the army, it does so at sufferance, and not because it thinks that the army is the only viable political institution in the country, because it is not. Fortunately, Musharraf’s own actions have brought this message home to Pakistan far more effectively than through anything that India could have done.

Seventh, we must not give up on Pakistan. It is tempting to say “The hell with you”, redouble the border fence, strengthen the army and maintain bare minimum relations with our western neighbour. This is not an option. While we need not worry about millions streaming across the border from a failed state, we need to understand that “shining” or “incredible” India will not be going anywhere if its neighbours, in this case Pakistan, do not go with it. A Great Power does not have the option of turning its back on failing neighbours.

In the meantime, the new army chief in Pakistan can take six steps to set things right: Get the president to resign, restore the Supreme Court and higher judiciary, set up a neutral caretaker government, get all-party consent for a neutral commission and then hold the elections.

The article was published in Mail Today February 12, 2008