To be great China needs to uphold Tibet culture

After being overwhelmed by the People’s Liberation Army in 1950, the Tibetans have broken out in open revolt thrice —in 1959, 1989 and now in 2008. Considering the herculean efforts that have been made by China to control the Tibetans, this is remarkable, and ought to serve as a warning of sorts to Beijing. The Chinese have played a cynical game in Tibet. They claimed that they entered it to liberate its people from serfdom and to protect its special status, but in fact they split Tibet into several provinces and what we call Tibet today comprises just half its traditional territory. Despite professing atheism, the Chinese have blatantly interfered in the religious practices of Tibet, including taking decisions on who is an incarnate lama.
No country in the world supports an independent Tibet. Yet, among the people in democratic countries, Chinese sovereignty over Tibet is only reluctantly conceded. Most Indians, barring the Communists, believe that Tibet is a colonial possession of China, held down by the force of the People’s Liberation Army. The reality is, of course, partly true though more complex.

Suzerainty

Though the Lama rulers of Tibet accepted Chinese authority over their country, they were not vassals in the sense that Korea and Vietnam were. Indeed, the Tibetans emphasise that neither the 5th Dalai Lama in 1652 nor the 13th in 1908 performed the ceremony of kowtow when they met the Chinese emperor. On the other hand, it is clear that the Tibetans accepted what the British called “suzerainty” , a loose kind of Chinese overlordship with considerable autonomy. But between 1911 and 1951, Tibet was completely independent.
When the Communists took control of China in October 1949, one of the first items on their agenda was to assert Chinese control over Tibet. As in the case of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Mao Zedong’s declaration that there would be self-determination for the minorities in the People’s Republic turned out to be a cynical exercise in deception. The Chinese Communist Party insisted that the territorial limits of China were the same as those of the Qing dynasty that was overthrown in 1911. It is not as though the Tibetans welcomed the Chinese as liberators. Despite the enormous difference between the Chinese and Tibetan forces, the latter resisted the Chinese onslaught and only after some 30 major and minor battles did the Tibetans sue for peace. A 17-point agreement was signed that allowed for Tibet “national regional autonomy” and helped retain its political and cultural structures. However, the increasing pressure by the Chinese, as well as perhaps some American instigation, led to a revolt that brought the “one country two systems” effort to an end. In 1965 the Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) was constituted, but two years later, Tibetan culture and autonomy were devastated by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Since the late 1970s the Chinese have sought to promote the economic development of Tibet and opened it up to the outside world. This has been manifested by the growth of tourism, as well as the infrastructure in terms of a new railway and several new highways and other development projects.

Sovereignty

The ongoing Tibetan uprising is, or ought to be, a matter of great concern to India. Just a glance at the map will show why this large region, with which we share a 4,056-km border, is of such strategic importance for our country. Many of our principal rivers rise there, and since 1951 this historically undefended area of India has come under the administrative control and military occupation of China.
This development was resisted by India from the very outset. Advised by the British, India did not contest China’s decision to “liberate” Tibet. It deluded itself that it was merely recognising Chinese “suzerainty” , even while upholding its autonomy. However, when “suzerainty” turned out to be nothing but old-fashioned “sovereignty”, and that too, of the colonial variety, New Delhi could do little. In 1954, it tamely signed away all its special diplomatic privileges to the “Tibet Autonomous Region of China”. This was but the beginning of a phase that led to a humiliating defeat of the Indian army at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army in 1962 on the borderlands of Tibet.
So, today, India has had to reconcile itself to the situation in Tibet. Indeed, at almost every turn it has had to go out of its way to reassure China that it recognises its sovereignty over Tibet. This is how the last joint declaration during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to China in June 2003 reads: “The Indian side recognises that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.
The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about ‘independence of Tibet’.”
And this is how the April 2005 Joint Statement during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao reads: “The Indian side reiterated that it recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.”
All this is presumably seen by Beijing as expiation by India for its initial insistence that the Chinese respect Tibetan autonomy under their “suzerainty”, and for giving shelter to the Dalai Lama.
The Chinese are now playing a waiting game in Tibet, hoping that the passing of the 14th Dalai Lama, currently 73, will enable them to put in place a puppet. This is the procedure they have followed in the case of the Panchen Lama, the second great Lama of Tibet. The two Lamas are supposed to help determine each other’s reincarnation. When the previous Panchen Lama, who was a Chinese prisoner, passed away, the search committee headed by Chadrel Rimpoche found Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as his reincarnation and this was announced by the Dalai Lama. But the Chinese imprisoned Chadrel and got another search committee to come up with another name. No one is sure where Nyima is, and the substitute Panchen Lama has been installed in his place. It is this crass interference in Tibetan cultural and religious traditions that raise questions about China’s motives in Tibet.

Identity

Yet if the experience of the world is anything to go by, Chinese actions will not help in curbing Tibetans’s desire to assert their cultural and religious identity. This is the lesson from the current uprising that has spread not just across TAR, but Gansu, Sichuan and other areas that are part of traditional Tibet.
India cannot turn the clock back on Tibet and undo the policy track it adopted in 1950. But what it can, and should do, is to insist that China not use the cover of national sovereignty to deny Tibetans their human rights, which most importantly include the right to practise and uphold their culture. At the same time, New Delhi must make it clear to the Tibetans and the world community, that such a goal cannot be achieved through militancy. In fact militant confrontation only aids the Chinese to split the Dalai Lama from the younger generation of Tibetans. The Dalai Lama has taken a most reasonable position on negotiations with China and publicly opposed a boycott of the Olympics. Tibetan rights will not be obtained by humiliating Beijing, but by persuading it that in today’s world, great nations are identified by the rights enjoyed by their minorities. No matter what the CPC theorists may be telling the old men in Zhongnanhai, there simply will never be anything called “democracy with Chinese characteristics.”
This article appeared in Mail Today March 26, 2008

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The last lap

(This has been revised in the past 12 hours)

As readers of this blog know, I have been, and remain, a strong supporter of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Many of my articles of the past two years can be found in this blog archive. I was 100 per cent sure that the US will concede all the major issues—right to reprocess nuclear fuel, accepting the concept of perpetual supply of fuel for reactors in exchange for our placing our civilian reactors under perpetual safeguards, linked to this ensuring that the deal is not automatically held hostage to the consequences of another Indian nuclear test, and the issue of fallback safeguards that would be needed if the IAEA failed to carry out it's duties.

My reasoning is that the US is not motivated by a desire to get a slice of the Indian nuclear power industry pie, or on capping India’s nuclear weapons programme. It based on a strategic calculation that requires a friendly India. This is not because we are ‘good’ and ‘deserving’ or even a democracy, but because our size, economic potential and location makes us just about the only large country that can offset the powerful gravitational pull being exerted by China. Our political ethos, not dissimilar to that of the US and the western world is a bonus. The problem for the US was that not only was India was subject to a host of US technology restrictions, but that most of the history of Indo-US relations was one of the Americans seeking to contain India, in alliance with Pakistan and even China. (see the previous post) You cannot befriend a country you also embargo and contain.

An awareness of the need to change this made the many US concessions possible. As for India, it sees the deal as a huge “confidence building measure” on the part of the Americans, or a token of atonement of the many wrongs they have inflicted on us in the past. India's new breed of realpolitik leaders don't want ritual apologies, they prefer to follow the Chinese style of extracting what you can when the situation is in your favour.

Now India has nothing to complain about the nuclear deal, and everything to celebrate. It's not surprising that on Wednesday, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs and the Cabinet Committee on Security met jointly and quickly approved of the draft agreement. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherji declared that all of India's concerns had been met in the recent round of talks in Washington DC.

Now, the world's sole super-power, one is willing to loosen the tight nuclear embargo it had placed on the civil part of our nuclear programme. The effect of the Indo-US nuclear agreement will be that while India remains a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the US has agreed to resume nuclear cooperation in trade in the civil nuclear side, even while giving a specific commitment that it will not hamper India's weapons' programme. It has agreed to actively work to persuade the rest of it's cartel, the Nuclear Suppliers Group to do the same.

"It's too good to be true," said a senior official involved in the negotiations who spoke on background to this blogger earlier this week. The US decision has rescued the Indian civil nuclear programme as well, because India lacks natural uranium and its three-stage programme aiming at self-sufficiency through using the Thorium-Uranium cycle was in serious jeopardy. As it is, the American-led embargo had seriously crippled the programme both in terms of size and technology.

Because, say officials who went for the talks, the deal was wide open on all the three counts listed above when the team led by Indian National Security Adviser Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon went to Washington on July 17. There, in addition to the official-level talks, the Indian team leaders held parallel discussions with top US officials, Cheney, Hadley and Rice. By all accounts the talks were extended for a fourth and fifth day because of these discussions and in the end we have a “frozen text”—a draft agreement which, though already approved formally by India, must now be approved by the the US system.

The political push so vital for the agreement came from the very top-- President George W. Bush in the US and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in India. Note the key role played by US Vice-President Dick Cheney and US National Security Adviser Steve Hadley and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in breaking the log-jam in Washington.

The latest report by one of the agreement’s more knowledgeable and balanced critics Siddharth Varadarajan of The Hindu indicates that the ‘frozen text’ now with the Indian and US governments has met all the many requirements that were set for it and more.
Already two nuclear scientists, Placid Rodrigues and M.R. Srinivasan who attacked the July 18 Agreement have come out to declare it a success. See this report.

A senior official involved in the negotiations says that the deal meets India's goals because:

1. It places no hindrance on our strategic or military programme. 2. It does not hinder our cherished indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme and finally 3. It is in consonance with all the assurances given by Prime Minister Singh in Parliament.

The senior official says that the agreement now contains “specific language” declaring that the aim of the agreement is not to hinder any “unsafeguarded nuclear activity” on the part of India-- in other words the military part of our programme. In fact he says the deal has ‘no language on nuclear tests’ . While the US is required by it’s law to halt all cooperation with countries that conduct nuclear tests, the Hyde Act has given an exemption that covers the May 1998 tests. While India is aware that another test will have consequences, the Indo-US 123 agreement remains silent on the issue, a fact that tells it's own story.

The ghost of Tarapur

In the frozen agreement according to the senior official, the US has agreed to give India “prior consent” to reprocess US-origin nuclear fuel. This is an issue that had bedeviled the past couple of rounds of talks because, first, the US did not understand India’s need for reprocessing (this is linked to making plutonium to fuel fast-breeder reactors for stage II of India’s power programme). The US prior consent is conditional on India creating a dedicated national facility for reprocessing fuel which will be safeguarded by the IAEA to it’s declared standards on reprocessing, storage, safety and security.

Such a consent was available for the US-supplied Tarapur reactors as well. But when India called for consultations on the issue of reprocessing in the 1970s, the US simply refused to sit down and talk and the result was that India has had to bear the cost of storing the US-origin spent fuel.
To ensure this does not happen the current agreement has a provision which requires consultations to begin within 6 months of the Indian request, and within a year an agreement will be reached.

Cessation of cooperation

Any agreement worth it’s salt must have some way of coping with a breakdown. In this case, the guiding star is again the Tarapur agreement. The US Atomic Energy Act insists that should this happen, it should get back all the equipment and materials supplied. This seems logical, but is impractical. Uprooting a nuclear power plant is simply not possible. The only option is to entomb it. As for materials, especially spent fuel, most suppliers would rather not have it back because of problems of storage.

The current agreement contains an elaborate schema for any “cessation of cooperation” situation. According to the senior official, it will have a “many-layered” process of consultation after the cessation. This will focus on safety and compensation, with US commitment to the “continuous operation of the reactor” of US origin. In other words, the US government will not seek to uproot or halt its’ operation. It could demand the return of US-origin fuel, but only after India was satisfied that it had made up the deficit from alternate sources. Here again the process would not be interminable. The US would be committed to stating what it wants back within a year and compensating India for the return.

What the draft agreement has not given us

The “frozen agreement” does not as yet enable trade in enrichment and reprocessing(ENR) technologies. The US prohibits their export to all countries, but says the senior official, India already has these technologies. What India wants, however, are components but this can only happen through an amendment to the current agreement. Parliament is also bound to question the “prior consent” framework for reprocessing saying that there is always a chance that the US may renege at the last moment. Officials say that the issue will really come up after a decade and more because this presumed that India will, first, have to buy a US reactor, then use it for several years and accumulate sufficient spent fuel for reprocessing. At the same time it would have to build the dedicated facility for reprocessing it. So why hold the agreement hostage to speculative possibility, namely that India will indeed buy a US reactor ?

The Real Prize

India now needs to work out an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and get the approval of the 43-member Nuclear Suppliers Group cartel. This should happen by October or November. Then the draft agreement, the IAEA India-specific Additional Protocol and the NSG's new rules on nuclear trade with India would be together sent to the US Congress and the 123 Agreement would be subjected to an "up or down" vote. This means that there will be no discussion or amendment, simply a vote on whether the Congress approves or disapproves of the agreement.

The NSG is the real prize. The Indo-US Agreement is merely the key that will unlock the global embargo on our programme. When the embargo is lifted, India will have the option of nuclear trade with several countries who are not as finicky as the US on nuclear issues. It is not that they are less committed to non-proliferation and will not insist on stringent safeguards on us, only that they will not have onerous rules of the type listed in the US Atomic Energy Act. Further, and perhaps more important, they have more advanced nuclear power technology-- Russian reactors are cheaper and the French more sophisticated.

Could the US use the NSG to pin India down on issues it has conceded in the ‘123 Agreement’?
Unlikely, say Indian officials, they have tried in the past but failed. Indeed, they are actually obligated by the July 18, 2005 agreement to push India’s case in the NSG. The US will give it in writing to India that it will not press the NSG to cut off cooperation with India, should the Indo-US agreement be terminated in some future date for some unspecified reason.

Domestic fallout

“Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan”. You will soon be reading about those who played a sterling role in working out the Indo-US nuclear deal. The actual fact is that barring Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself, no senior political figure backed the deal openly, though External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherji played a key behind-the-scenes role in promoting it. One reason was that many in the ruling coalition did not understand the deal and its implications and some didn’t bother to think about it. Among political parties only Left understood what it meant—the route to closer Indo-US ties—and so opposed it vehemently.

The BJP’s hostile stance is part of its addled post-2004 politics. The opposition of the “retired nuclear scientist” lobby ranged from senility to xenophobia. Many of those involved forgot their own record of incompetence and disservice to the Indian nuclear programme whose true history remains to be written. The mendacity of some of them has been truly astonishing.

And as for our bomb programme....

Those who claim that the deal will undermine our minimum credible deterrent should read the article here written by K. Santhanam, the DRDO scientist who steered the Indian nuclear weapons programme through the 1990s. He says "The accumulated weapons-grade plutonium in about 40 years of operating the CIRUS reactor (40MWt) and the relatively new Dhruv reactor (100MWt) has been estimated to be sufficient for the MCD (Minimum Credible Deterrent)."