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Sunday, October 26, 2014

India dozes as China modernises military

Though it has been more than six decades since we attained Independence, securing our nation and its inhabitants remains an overwhelming concern. Security threats, external and internal, have dogged us through our history, and even though we are stronger than we have ever been - indeed a nuclear weapons power - the sense of insecurity remains.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Narendra Modi government has made it clear that when it comes to security, terrorism remains a major concern. Rejecting Pakistan's criticism of Modi's "proxy war" remarks during his visit to Ladakh, the Indian official spokesman said last Thursday that terrorism was not only a "core concern in our relations with Pakistan" but that it remained a "real and present danger" to the country.

Terrorism
We may not have had a major terror attack since 2008, but terrorism remains an issue that worries people. This was brought out by a Pew Global Attitudes poll earlier this year which revealed that while people were concerned about economic, political and corruption issues, nearly nine in 10 respondents, some 88 per cent, said that terrorism was a "very big problem," and that Pakistan (47 per cent) and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (20 per cent) posed the greatest threat to India. Nineteen per cent said the Maoists were a threat, but just six per cent chose China.
The low figure for China is a measure of the Indian complacency about not just the rise of China, but the growth of its military capabilities - some of which are aimed at us. Already Chinese influence is lapping on our shores in the form of Chinese trade, and aid in South Asia matching or exceeding that of India. In 2012, India's trade with SAARC countries was some $17 billion, and Chinese totalled $25 billion.
There is little India can do in the short term to prevent the growth of Chinese influence in its geopolitical backyard. But the Modi government has shown itself to be clearly aware of the dimensions of the challenge. Its initial measures will, hopefully, clear the political detritus that has accumulated over the years and set the stage for a phase of more rewarding and friendly ties in the coming years which will coincide with the revival of high, sustained Indian economic growth.
What is more worrisome, and somehow largely ignored, is the growth of Chinese military power and the consequences it can have for us. In the last 10 years or so, India has become more aware of this and activated new airfields, fast-tracked border defence construction and raised new military formations on the border with Tibet and Xinjiang. Slowly, but surely, India's strategic deterrent capability with regard to China is shaping up through the Agni V long-range missile and the Arihant nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine.

Narendra Modi with Chinese president Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Brazil.Narendra Modi with Chinese president Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Brazil.Nuclear forces
But these efforts pale into insignificance when placed against the massive and comprehensive modernisation being undertaken by China of both its conventional and nuclear forces. In this build up, it is benchmarking itself against the United States. But it is very obvious that the capabilities that the Chinese are building up for a possible conflict with the US, will have negative consequences for India.
Observers often tend to focus on specific Chinese achievements such as the J-20 fifth generation fighter, or the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or WU14 hypersonic vehicle. But the reality is that the Chinese developments have been comprehensive. In the naval area, for example it is not just the ASBM or the aircraft carrier, but cruise missiles, UAVs, submarines, destroyers, amphibious ships, patrol craft and so on.
More disturbing are reports on the Chinese strategic force modernisation. A report in the South China Morning Post in early August, sourced from official documents, indicated that China planned to increase its nuclear and conventional warheads held by its strategic force, known as the 2nd Artillery Command.

No first use
Most estimates of the Chinese nuclear arsenal place it at a "bare minimum" level of around 200-250 warheads, with land-based missiles as the primary delivery system. However, over the years, the Chinese have been modernising the landbased missiles, as well as developing their submarine-based arsenal. As of now their three Type 094 submarines do not have operational missiles, but these are being developed. An accidental release of information by a Chinese environment outfit has confirmed the reports of the existence of the DF-41 ICBM with sufficient range to target most of the United States from China. US intelligence sources say that these missiles could also have multiple warheads.
Like some Indians, the Chinese are also worried that their 'No First Use' pledge can leave them vulnerable to a surprise first strike. Chinese worries have centred around what the US calls "Prompt Global Strike" technologies - hypersonic vehicles, terminally guided ballistic missiles, reusable unmanned spacecraft and scramjets. The US says these are for use with conventional warheads, but they can also be armed with nuclear warheads, too, and so, the precision and speed of the strikes could have devastating consequences for global deterrence stability. To counter this, the Chinese have carried out ballistic missile defence tests in 2010, 2013 and in July this year. And in January this China surprised the world with its own test of the WU 14 hypersonic boost glide vehicle and experts say that they are just years behind the Americans in this area.
Such systems have huge implications for India because if China was concerned about US use of such technologies for a first strike, so does India have to worry that China, which is developing similar technologies, can pursue similar goals.
These are not technologies you can acquire off the shelf - they require an enormous amount of R&D effort, of the kind simply not visible in India. What is remarkable, however, is that no one seems to be even talking about these issues, leave alone doing something about them.
Mail Today August 18, 2014

Parties should move forward and leave old alliances be

Lord Krishna's main message to Arjuna at Kurukshetra was that there was no turning back. Events that had led to the Pandava and Kaurava armies being arrayed against each other could not be undone.
The only option before Arjuna was to move forward into the battle and discover his destiny.
In Kalyug, this is a lesson that remains unlearnt. Only that can explain the furious activity across the Gangetic plain to construct a "secular" alliance to counter the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Former deputy CM of Bihar Sushil Kumar Modi during a public meeting
Former deputy CM of Bihar Sushil Kumar Modi during a public meeting


At one level, of course, the Lalu-Nitish entente is desperate effort at self-preservation, but at another, it appears to be a pathetic effort to turn the clock back.
Now they are seeking to rope in Mulayam Singh Yadav of the Samajwadi party and Mayawati of the Bahujan Samaj Party into a "maha-alliance".
On Wednesday, the redoubtable Mayawati of the Bahujan Samaj Party rejected Samajwadi chief Mulayam Singh Yadav's call for a united front.
Indeed, she accused him of working with the BJP to stoke the communal fires in Uttar Pradesh. She said that there is no question of the BSP allying with anyone in Uttar Pradesh and will fight elections alone. 

Going back
The reasons why going back to the past will not help are evident from the outcome of the Lok Sabha polls of 2014. Details of voter behaviour have not yet been made public by pollsters, but the results made it clear that virtually all the forts were breached by the BJP's campaign.
Mighty Mulayam's SP, which had swept the state Assembly polls in 2012 by winning 224 of 403 seats, won just 5 seats out of 80. The BSP, which had 80 seats in the Assembly and arguably the most disciplined voter base, scored zero.
Likewise, the BJP and its ally the Lok Janshakti Party and the Rashtriya Lok Samta Party won 31 out of the state's 40 seats, leaving the OBC standard bearers - Nitish and Lalu - just six seats.
The idea of an alliance looks tempting from the point of view of arithmetic. In UP for example, the BJP won 71 seats with 42.30 per cent of the popular vote.
The combined vote of the BSP and SP was 41.80 per cent. But the figures hide the way that politics has been working.
This is evident from the fact that both the BSP and SP suffered a significant erosion of their vote share.
In the Vidhan Sabha election of 2012, the BSP had got 25.91 per cent of the vote, and the SP 29.15.
But in the Lok Sabha election earlier this year, BSP was down to 19.60 and the SP to 22.20, a rough 7 per cent decline by both.
We don't have actual studies based on polling voter preferences, but a preliminary analysis suggests that the BJP was able to win because its opponents were divided, but more important, using Narendra Modi's appeal they were able to reach out to erode important segments of the voters loyal to the SP and BSP.
In great measure this was done through a communal polarisation of the kind we are witnessing these days in the numerous incidents taking place across UP.

Support
But it was also an outcome of the party's ability to consolidate the support of the urban and semi-urban middle classes onto the Modi bandwagon that promised "achche din," in the form of better infrastructure, educational facilities and, more important, jobs and prospects.
Therefore, merely emphasising secularism will not be enough to stop the BJP. In any case, what Mulayam and Lalu and even the Congress grandees mean by secularism is quite different from its real meaning.
What the challengers of the BJP need is an entirely new political strategy, something they have not grasped as yet. 
 Mail Today August 13, 2014

India-Pakistan stand- off gets a new twist

India's decision to call off Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan because the latter insisted in going ahead with consultations with separatist leaders from Jammu & Kashmir, is a new twist in the old India-Pakistan standoff.
It is new because in the past Islamabad has routinely held such consultations on the eve of bilateral dialogues for no other reason than to show its constituencies back home that Kashmiri interests had a primacy in Pakistan's India policy.
Indeed, the Pakistan Foreign Office response noted that the meetings were "a longstanding practice" and were aimed at facilitating "meaningful discussions on the issue of Kashmir."

Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif during the latter's visit to India in May
Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif during the latter's visit to India in May


New Delhi went along with this fiction, knowing fully well that the separatists - Hurriyat leaders like Shabbir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Geelani or Yasin Malik - had little traction in the Valley.
But now, by insisting that any dialogue with the Hurriyat is tantamount to interference in India's internal affairs and, as such, unacceptable to India, the Modi government has upped the ante.
Maybe Pakistan was testing the new government, if so, they have got a clearer idea of what it is all about.
Narendra Modi has his own compulsions. He has come to power with a promise of taking a different and tougher approach towards Pakistan. So, it cannot be business as usual for him.
Why did Pakistan choose to make this provocative move towards the Hurriyat right now? The meetings may have been a longstanding practice, but that was not the only message coming out of Islamabad.
In the last two weeks, there have been almost continuous and egregious violations of the ceasefire. Taken together, it would suggest that there are forces in Pakistan that do not want any change in Pakistan's ties with India. It does not take a genius to figure out who those forces are.
The answer to this question probably lies in Pakistan's internal politics and turmoil. Nawaz Sharif, who defied hardliners to attend Modi's swearing in, had two goals in mind after sweeping the Pakistani elections to become prime minister in 2013.
First, to rein in the Army, and second, to pick up the threads of peace that were dropped in 1999 when he was overthrown by Musharraf.
In his present circumstances, where Islamabad is being besieged by Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the religious leader Tahir al Qadri, he has chosen to make a quick deal with the Army.
But New Delhi, having sent a tough message, will hopefully, be working along a coherent policy perspective. Relations with Pakistan are too important to be left hostage to knee-jerk reactions. 
Mail Today August 18, 2014

Re setting Indo-Nepal Relations

By all accounts Narendra Modi’s Nepal visit, the first by an Indian prime minister in 17 years, has been a success. He has struck the right notes, made the right moves and has put across the Indian case without overdoing things. In 1997, when Prime Minister Inder Gujral was in Kathmandu, he told the Nepalese that they had India’s “power of attorney” to rewrite their relationship with India with whatever words they wanted. Such a document was not Gujral’s to give and made little sense in the context of the civil war that was raging in the country at the time.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala during the signing ceremony at Chambers PMO, Singha Durbar in Kathmandhu, Nepal on Sunday. Pic/PTIPrime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala during the signing ceremony at Chambers PMO, Singha Durbar in Kathmandhu, Nepal on Sunday. Pic/PTI

On the other hand, Modi has gone out of his way to tell the Nepalese political community that India is committed to a policy of non-interference in the country’s political affairs, howsoever tangled they may be. “It is not our job to interfere in your internal affairs but to assist you in the path you have chosen,” he said in a well-received speech to Nepal’s Constituent Assembly. In addition, India, a traditional donor to Nepal’s development assistance programmes has offered $1 billion line of credit to build power plants and roads.
The agenda for Indo-Nepal relations is a vast one ranging from readjusting the foundational Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, to living up to the enormous potential offered by the joint development of the Ganga river basin.
The occasion of a prime ministerial visit is, of course, one where nice things are said and high principles and plans outlined. However, Nepal and India are deeply bound by strategic relations of the closest kind as much a function of geography as history. In the past, India has sheltered activists protesting the rule of the king and in turn, Nepal has been used by forces adverse to India. Differences between the two countries have led to a lot of heartburn and prevented the effective exploitation of the Ganga river basin, either for irrigation and flood control or hydropower.
But in recent years, both sides have learnt to respect each other’s red lines and also understood their respective limitations. Nepalese authorities have aided their Indian counterparts to check the activities of terrorists who have often sheltered in Nepal.
There is a clear sense that the Modi visit lead to a reset of Indo-Nepal relations. The statements of Nepalese leaders across the spectrum from the monarchists to the Maoists, suggest that the moment may be now. Even Prachanda, the leader of the Nepalese Maoists expressed his view that a new chapter appeared to be opening in Nepal-India relations as a result of the visit.
The key to good India-Nepal relations rest in overcoming the problem of asymmetry in their physical, economic and geographical circumstances. Nepal is a poor, agrarian, landlocked state, while India is a vast subcontinent with a great deal of poverty, but also significant pockets of affluence. Geography, in the form of the high Himalayas, lock Nepal into India. No matter how many roads and even railroads the Chinese build to link up to Nepal, its economic orientation will remain towards India. This has been a matter of concern and some resentment in Nepal.
It is true that India has at times in the past, been an overbearing neighbour. But some of it has been overstated by Nepalese politicians for their narrow ends, after all blaming another country for your ills always plays well in the political street theatre. But in recent years, after Nepal threw out the monarchy, the Nepalese public, too, has become more aware of the situation and is not easily swayed by India-baiters, as the Nepalese Maoists learnt to their cost.
The Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 has been a major target of the Nepalese ire. It is thought to symbolise Nepalese inferiority to India. Under Article 5, Nepal is committed to import its arms through India. Articles 6 and 7, provide same privileges to citizens of either country in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce and movement. This enables the Nepali and Indian citizens to move freely across the border without passport or visa, live and work in either country and own property or do trade or business in either country.
This is surely a unique relationship, not even equalled by that between the US and Canada. But it generates resentment in Nepal. While it is true that literally millions of Nepalis live and work in India, there are far fewer number of Indians doing the same in Nepal because of the economic environment there.
While Article 5 has become more or less redundant and India is not particularly keen to press Nepal to acquire its arms through its territory (and therefore exercise a degree of control over them), Articles 6 and 7 are important and benefit Nepal far more than they do India. Nepali leaders often speak of rewriting the 1950 treaty, but when push comes to shove, they back off.
For this reason, Prime Minister Modi reiterated India’s willingness to review and rewrite the treaty. “My doors are open, I invite you to bring any suggestions to review the 1950 treaty, if you so want,” he declared at a banquet hosted by Nepalese Prime Minister Sushil Koirala in Kathmandu on Sunday.
The new Indian approach to Nepal, and to the South Asian region, form a core of the Modi government’s foreign and security policy. The goal is to bind them closer to India through a web of economic relationships, one which ties India’s prosperity to their growth as well. But to implement this vision, Modi needs to offer not just economic carrots, but also untangle the political issues that have bedevilled relations between India and them.
Mid Day August 5, 2014
By all accounts Narendra Modi’s Nepal visit, the first by an Indian prime minister in 17 years, has been a success. He has struck the right notes, made the right moves and has put across the Indian case without overdoing things. In 1997, when Prime Minister Inder Gujral was in Kathmandu, he told the Nepalese that they had India’s “power of attorney” to rewrite their relationship with India with whatever words they wanted. Such a document was not Gujral’s to give and made little sense in the context of the civil war that was raging in the country at the time.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala during the signing ceremony at Chambers PMO, Singha Durbar in Kathmandhu, Nepal on Sunday. Pic/PTI
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala during the signing ceremony at Chambers PMO, Singha Durbar in Kathmandhu, Nepal on Sunday. Pic/PTI
On the other hand, Modi has gone out of his way to tell the Nepalese political community that India is committed to a policy of non-interference in the country’s political affairs, howsoever tangled they may be. “It is not our job to interfere in your internal affairs but to assist you in the path you have chosen,” he said in a well-received speech to Nepal’s Constituent Assembly. In addition, India, a traditional donor to Nepal’s development assistance programmes has offered $1 billion line of credit to build power plants and roads.
The agenda for Indo-Nepal relations is a vast one ranging from readjusting the foundational Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, to living up to the enormous potential offered by the joint development of the Ganga river basin.
The occasion of a prime ministerial visit is, of course, one where nice things are said and high principles and plans outlined. However, Nepal and India are deeply bound by strategic relations of the closest kind as much a function of geography as history. In the past, India has sheltered activists protesting the rule of the king and in turn, Nepal has been used by forces adverse to India. Differences between the two countries have led to a lot of heartburn and prevented the effective exploitation of the Ganga river basin, either for irrigation and flood control or hydropower.
But in recent years, both sides have learnt to respect each other’s red lines and also understood their respective limitations. Nepalese authorities have aided their Indian counterparts to check the activities of terrorists who have often sheltered in Nepal.
There is a clear sense that the Modi visit lead to a reset of Indo-Nepal relations. The statements of Nepalese leaders across the spectrum from the monarchists to the Maoists, suggest that the moment may be now. Even Prachanda, the leader of the Nepalese Maoists expressed his view that a new chapter appeared to be opening in Nepal-India relations as a result of the visit.
The key to good India-Nepal relations rest in overcoming the problem of asymmetry in their physical, economic and geographical circumstances. Nepal is a poor, agrarian, landlocked state, while India is a vast subcontinent with a great deal of poverty, but also significant pockets of affluence. Geography, in the form of the high Himalayas, lock Nepal into India. No matter how many roads and even railroads the Chinese build to link up to Nepal, its economic orientation will remain towards India. This has been a matter of concern and some resentment in Nepal.
It is true that India has at times in the past, been an overbearing neighbour. But some of it has been overstated by Nepalese politicians for their narrow ends, after all blaming another country for your ills always plays well in the political street theatre. But in recent years, after Nepal threw out the monarchy, the Nepalese public, too, has become more aware of the situation and is not easily swayed by India-baiters, as the Nepalese Maoists learnt to their cost.
The Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 has been a major target of the Nepalese ire. It is thought to symbolise Nepalese inferiority to India. Under Article 5, Nepal is committed to import its arms through India. Articles 6 and 7, provide same privileges to citizens of either country in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce and movement. This enables the Nepali and Indian citizens to move freely across the border without passport or visa, live and work in either country and own property or do trade or business in either country.
This is surely a unique relationship, not even equalled by that between the US and Canada. But it generates resentment in Nepal. While it is true that literally millions of Nepalis live and work in India, there are far fewer number of Indians doing the same in Nepal because of the economic environment there.
While Article 5 has become more or less redundant and India is not particularly keen to press Nepal to acquire its arms through its territory (and therefore exercise a degree of control over them), Articles 6 and 7 are important and benefit Nepal far more than they do India. Nepali leaders often speak of rewriting the 1950 treaty, but when push comes to shove, they back off.
For this reason, Prime Minister Modi reiterated India’s willingness to review and rewrite the treaty. “My doors are open, I invite you to bring any suggestions to review the 1950 treaty, if you so want,” he declared at a banquet hosted by Nepalese Prime Minister Sushil Koirala in Kathmandu on Sunday.
The new Indian approach to Nepal, and to the South Asian region, form a core of the Modi government’s foreign and security policy. The goal is to bind them closer to India through a web of economic relationships, one which ties India’s prosperity to their growth as well. But to implement this vision, Modi needs to offer not just economic carrots, but also untangle the political issues that have bedevilled relations between India and them.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/resetting-indo-nepal-relations/15505163#sthash.FwbDSGdg.dpuf

India must clarify what it wants from ties with the US

There is a great deal of rhetoric flying around when it comes to India-US relations.
In November 2010, addressing a joint session of Parliament, President Barack Obama described the US-India relationship as "one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century."
Earlier this week, speaking to an American think-tank, Secretary of State John Kerry declared that the US and India should be "indispensable partners for the 21st century."
The Indians haven't been slouches either. It was, after all Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who termed India and the US as "natural allies."
The issue in Indo-American relations, however, has been the ability and will to translate rhetoric into policy and practice. 

Trust
Most observers blame a "trust deficit" for the current state of Indo-US relations.
Actually, the idea of a "trust deficit" is merely a cover for the real problem – the lack of political will on either side to take the relationship between the two countries to the stage that the rhetoricians have been promising.
Blame must be shared by both sides. India did let down the US when it passed a self-defeating nuclear liability law which undermined the very basis on which the Indo-US nuclear deal was sold to the US public – the possibility of India acquiring significant US civil nuclear technology.


For its part, the Obama Administration, caught up in domestic turbulence and developments in East Asia and the Arab world, simply let the Indian ball drop.
New Delhi was not worth the time, they felt, especially when it appeared that India had lost its economic oomph and its growth plummeted after 2010.

One of the big problems in the US-India relationships is the asymmetry between the two would-be partners.
One is clearly the richest and most powerful nation in the world, the other a large and poor country whose performance in keeping its people healthy and free from hunger has little to commend it.
An associated problem is that while the US is quite clear on what it wants from India, New Delhi is not so clear. 

Strong ties: India's PM Narendra Modi is keen to re-assert Indian interests in South Asia, and a strong relationship with the US could help him do this, writes Manoj Joshi
Strong ties: India's PM Narendra Modi is keen to re-assert Indian interests in South Asia, and a strong relationship with the US could help him do this


You can blame the asymmetry for this, but there is also the problem of the lack of an institutional approach from the Indian side which would knit together a clear-cut national strategy.
We do have today the first government since 1984 to have a majority of its own, but as is well known the party that forms that Government, has a plethora of views on the common issues of the day as evidenced by the activities of the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, and the Bhartiya Kisan Sangh.
The Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh will also have its say one of these days.
Beyond consensus within the party, is the problem of building a unified policy platform across the nation. 

Unhappiness
From the point of view of the US, there are a range of issues that are being raised by Kerry in the strategic dialogue that is underway, beginning with the unhappiness at India's stand on the issue of food subsidies at the WTO.
The US is also looking to India to accommodate American commercial interests in pharmaceuticals, retail and financial services.
In a subset of this, come concerns relating to the nuclear liability act and India's persistent refusal to sign end user agreements that limit the sale of American military hardware to India.
For its part, India would certainly like US investment and technology and to open itself up to Indian service professionals. But many of these are not in the hands of the US Government.
On the other hand, China and Japan have money and technology on offer. The Japanese have put in $10billion for the North-South industrial and freight corridor.
Even the UK is willing to step into the Bangalore-Chennai corridor. In the case of the US, we do not have an easily recognisable commitment.
In the past, whether it was in boosting Indian education or in transforming our agriculture, the US played a stellar role. Something similar is needed to put substance into the ties between two dissimilar partners.
There is a great deal of business the two countries need to do in the field of foreign and security policy.
Many Indians believe the US is in it only to get India to balance off the rising power of China.

Balance
But we, too, need the US for the same reason – to balance China.
It would be nice to believe that we can somehow be neutral in the emerging stand-off between China the US and Japan. But we cannot forget that we have a serious problems with China relating to our border and its policy of arming Pakistan.
Worse, the military power deficit between China and India is growing, in some measure due to the dysfunctional nature of India's national security machinery.
Unlike the US, with whom we have recently had problems on Bangladesh and Maldives, China follows a policy of displacing us in South Asia.
The Modi Government has shown foresight in seeking to re-establish Indian primacy in the region, and in this venture US help would be useful.


It is only on the basis of a strong South Asian anchor that India can play a significant extra-regional role.
Barring the issue of Pakistan, we do not have serious differences with the US, and Washington has, in the past decade, been willing to accept South Asia as being part of India's sphere of influence.
But our most important task is to determine and prioritise what we need from the US. Then we should evolve a strategy to get what we want.
If we can do this, offering a trade concession here, or compromising on a point there, will be easier. No matter what the rhetoric is, at the end of the day, relations between nations are primarily transactional.
Mail Today July 31, 2014

Sunday, August 31, 2014

China's interest in India's infrastructure is both an opportunity and a challenge

The Brics decision to give all its members an equal stake in the New Development Bank should be welcomed. But let's not have any illusion about what this means. China remains far ahead of all its Brics peers. The size of its economy is larger than that of all the other Brics members combined, and it continues to grow at a healthy clop.
At over $14.5 trillion in purchasing power parity terms, the Chinese economy is more than two and a half times larger than India's. In 1990, we were roughly equal. Such disparities with, say, Japan or Germany may not matter. But China is not only a neighbour with whom our border is disputed, but also one who contests our primacy in South Asia and seeks to displace the US as the dominant Asia-Pacific power.
In the past two years, we have been witnessing a new Chinese policy towards India. One manifestation of this has been calls by Chinese leaders like President Xi Jinping and foreign minister Wang Yi to declare that they want a border settlement "as soon as possible". What they haven't indicated is the nature of the solution.
Most people would assume that this could be a straightforward swap of claims, such as the one Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping proposed in 1960 and 1981. But officials say that since 1986-87, China has made a settlement contingent on Indian concessions in the eastern sector, which they have indicated means the Tawang tract.
The other is the enhanced Chinese interest in economic engagement with India. Since the 2000s, China has been wooing India's South Asian neighbours with aid focusing on infrastructure development. Now China says it wants to significantly step up infrastructure investment in India. This is both an opportunity and a challenge for us.
It would, at one level, facilitate the increased integration of the South Asian economies. On another level, it would provide India the wherewithal to replace Beijing as the largest trading power in the region.
This is the baseline position with which the Modi government must conduct its foreign policy towards China. So what should be the features of a new China policy?
First, a need to reinforce India's periphery. The government decision to go easy on environmental concerns on issues relating to national security is a good augury for India's border infrastructure construction.
Our northern border is facing considerable pressure from China. The events in Pakistan and Afghanistan are creating an uncertain environment that could be exploited by Beijing.
The raising of the two new divisions, the mountain strike corps and its ancillary formations, will mean little if there is no infrastructure in place. The importance of border road construction can't be underestimated. Plans made in the 1960s remain unfulfilled. Daulat Beg Oldi, for instance, close to the Depsang Plains, still requires a march of several days to reach and is supplied by air.
The second challenge is in shoring up our positions with our neighbours. In the last few years, India has shown in Nepal that it can draw a line in the sand to prevent Chinese influence from undermining our interests. But it needs to reinforce this lesson in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. New Delhi needs to equip itself with policy options that will make it both feared and respected in the neighbourhood.
The third challenge relates to India's position in Asia. The two countries are already engaged in negotiations in the Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership that could shape the emerging Asian economy. China will clearly be its main driver, but India could well emerge as a significant second pole.
The bigger challenges are in China's larger political goals. India has a view of itself as a regional power that would seek to offset any Chinese efforts to establish its hegemony in South Asia. The current imbalance requires India to get on to a path of sustained high economic growth and simultaneously develop linkages with countries like Japan, Asean countries and the US.
Sino-Indian relations will feature both competition and cooperation. How we fare depends on the policy choices we make and the skill with which we employ them.
The Economic Times July 30, 2014