Why relations with Japan are so important

In an interview to a Japanese newspaper last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that India was not “currently” taking any steps to revise its nuclear doctrine. This is aimed at laying to rest concerns that the BJP election manifesto’s commitment to update and revise the nuclear doctrine could result in an abandonment of India’s no first use pledge and a more assertive Indian nuclear posture.

He made it clear, and this has been the Indian negotiating position with Japan on this issue, that India will stick to the non-proliferation commitments that it has already made to the US and other countries declaring that India remained committed “to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.”

Prime Minister Modi with Japanese PM Shinzo Abe after a joint press conference at Akasaka State Guest House in Tokyo yesterday. Pic/AFP

Modi’s strong reiteration of India’s seemingly contradictory posture of being a nuclear armed state and one that is committed to nuclear disarmament and the principles of non-proliferation is aimed at bringing Japan around to a nuclear deal with India. There is a lot at stake here — Japan’s Toshiba controls Westinghouse, a premier American maker of nuclear reactors. In addition, many key components for western reactors are sourced from Japanese vendors. A deal with Japan will smoothen the path towards civil nuclear cooperation with western countries.

Of course, the operative word here is “currently”. Modi did, in all fairness, emphasise that doctrines were flexible, dependent on the prevailing strategic scenario. All this is in line with the stand India has taken from the very outset. All this is important because of the incredible surge in the modernisation of the Chinese military. The simple logic is that the Chinese are benchmarking their capabilities with those of the United States. But those very capabilities can have adverse implications for us. As is well known, in realist thinking, what matters are capabilities, not intentions which cannot be easily gauged.

In the past eight months of the year, we have seen significant developments that have direct implications for us. First, at the beginning of the year, we saw the military exercise in which three ships, including the Changbaishan-— China’s largest landing craft that can carry a marine battalion and 15-20 armoured vehicles — crossed the Makassar Straits between Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and then went through the Lombok straits and entered the Indian Ocean. According to Chinese sources, the exercise was aimed at displaying the ability to break through a strait which may be under the control of an adversary. Then came the patrol of a single Chinese Shang Class submarine which came through the Ombai Wetar Straits near Papua New Guinea, and surfaced near Somalia.

The third was the test of a boost glide hypersonic vehicle dubbed WU 14 by the West. Though this is meant to overcome American ballistic missile defences, the capability of such vehicles as nuclear weapon delivery systems has implications for India’s deterrence capabilities. The fourth was the Chinese ballistic missile test of July 2014. In the past four years, China has reportedly conducted three successful mid-course ballistic missile defence tests. This is an area where the US is clearly number one, but is having problems with its programme. What is germane here is the speed with which China is catching up with the US in the high-tech areas like boost glide weapons and BMD systems. According to analysts, China may be just four or five years behind the US in both these areas.

Earlier this year, Frank Kendall, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for acquisition and technology, told a US Congressional committee that the US technological superiority is being “challenged in ways that I have not seen for decades.” He went on to add that “this is not a future problem. This is a here-now problem.”

The implications for India are obvious. Such technologies, designed to overcome US defences, can pose a threat to our very limited nuclear capabilities. The Chinese are developing them because they fear that the US could use them for a first strike to disarm China’s limited forces. By the same logic, China can do the same to us.

It is in this context that relations with Japan are important. In terms of technology, Japan is way ahead of us and China in many areas. While for the present, Japan maintains restrictions in the export of its defence technologies; it is moving slowly but surely towards opening up. It may be some time before we can expect Japan to export complete weapons systems, but Japanese technologies, be they the fly-by-light aircraft control systems, sonar equipment, or those that go into its own BMD systems, can be very useful.

Equally important is Japanese goodwill to join the four key technology denial cartels — the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Since these restrict key dual use technologies in a range of areas from chemical, machine tools, nuclear and aerospace industries, it is important for India to be inside the cartel rather than the outside. As part of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Americans are committed to helping us join them, but the heavy lifting with the more skittish members of the cartels, like Japan, has to be done by New Delhi itself.

Mid Day September 2, 2014

Narendra Modi's Japan visit 2014: Can Tokyo provide Prime Minister his first big bang moment?

A civil nuclear agreement is one of the key outcomes New Delhi is pushing for in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Japan that starts tomorrow. Recently, in Naypidaw, Myanmar, foreign minister Sushma Swaraj called on her Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida to "bring talks on civil nuclear agreement to their logical conclusion".

Given its nuclear history, it is a wonder that Japan is even willing to consider a deal with a country that refuses to sign either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). That they are, is a function of geopolitics, business sense and the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal.
Japan has struck nuclear deals with Vietnam, Jordan and Turkey. But India is the only country that Japan is dealing with which possesses nuclear weapons and has not signed the NPT. The deal could compromise Japan's national identity as a leader of non-proliferation and disarmament, ironically, a self-image that India still has of itself. Tokyo wants a separate safeguards agreement underscoring India's commitment to a nuclear test moratorium and non-proliferation. New Delhi says the assurances provided for in the Indo-US nuclear agreement are sufficient.
India has an obvious interest in meeting its burgeoning energy demand through nuclear energy. India plans to construct 18 more nuclear power stations by 2020. This provides an enormous business opportunity for Japanese companies.
Japan does not have a reactor design of its own. But the US-based Westinghouse Electric Co is controlled by Toshiba of Japan and it currently builds and operates half of the world's nuclear plants. Four of its AP1000 reactors are being built in China. The GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy is a nuclear alliance of two global giants also headquartered in the US. As of now, it doesn't have a working reactor, but it has several advanced designs that have been certified, or are in the process of certification.
Of course, there is also interest among Japanese equipment-makers that fabricate equipment like large-size 1,000 KW turbines, instrumentation and control systems that go into power plants. Several of the reactors being offered by the US and France have Japanese components. But there are other issues Japan needs to consider.
First, it will enhance the geopolitical closeness of India and Japan in confronting an assertive China. This underlies the strategic partnership that Tokyo and New Delhi are seeking to construct with the blessings of the US. Second, an Indian deal could also kick-start the dormant Japanese nuclear business that has virtually shut down after the Fukushima disaster. Third, with China also moving into the reactor export market with its own 1,000 MW reactor, opportunities for Japanese companies are declining.
When it comes to the nuclear business, India is not lacking for options. South Korea, the US, France and Russia are all keen to work with India. India recently became the first non-NPT country to which Australia will export uranium. China — yes, China — is another country interested in nuclear-dealing with India.
In 1993, China supplied India low-enriched uranium to fuel the Tarapur reactor after the US and France stopped their supply. Beijing was reluctant to support the Indo-US nuclear deal for geopolitical reasons. But it finally allowed the waiver for India to pass in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Last May, the joint statement issued following Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi declared that the two sides would "carry out bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy" within the bounds of their international commitments. Sino-Indian nuclear cooperation is not quite around the corner. Apart from the industry being relatively young there, China remains wholly committed to Pakistan and any dealings with India could cause turbulence in Sino-Pakistani ties.
The 1,400 MW reactor base plant that South Korea is building in the UAE is one of the most advanced in the world. In 2011, India signed a nuclear agreement with South Korea. The South Koreans are interested in setting up a power plant in India based on their 1,000 MW reactor design. This option will probably be more competitive than the US and French offers, but India may be under geopolitical obligations to push the latter projects first.
The ball is now in India's court. It needs to do something about the draconian nuclear liability law that has effectively scuttled the enormous opportunities that opened up with the NSG waiver. The Modi government has promised to facilitate the process of starting businesses in India. It could show how serious it is by starting with the nuclear power business.
The Economic Times August 29, 2014

Assessing Indo-US defence ties

There is an interesting, but uncomfortable dichotomy in United States’ relations with India and Pakistan. For India, there is untrammelled praise, soaring rhetoric about the two great democracies and our destiny as natural allies. But there is little else. Pakistan gets a lot of harsh words and complaints, but along with that comes generous dollops of aid —both military and developmental.

All of these have been on display in recent weeks in the visits of senior US officials to New Delhi on one hand, and the well-choreographed drama wherein the Pakistan Army has launched an offensive in North Waziristan, and the US has released $8 million in aid and will soon be forthcoming with the latest tranche of Coalition Support Funds, reportedly of the order of $300 million, with perhaps even more coming by way of security assistance and humanitarian aid in the coming months.

The US has emerged as a major supplier of defence equipment and  US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel pointed out that India had bought some $9 billion worth of US equipment. Pic/AFP

As for India, the rhetoric has soared even higher with US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel developing a connectedness between two countries, wherein one a tea-seller’s son becomes prime minister, and in another, the child of a Kenyan father becomes president. But for those looking at the substance of the relationship, it would be hard going. Yes, the US has emerged as a major supplier of defence equipment and as Hagel himself pointed out, India had bought some $9 billion worth of US equipment, mainly aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force. The US is also hoping to quickly close a number of other deals — $1.4 billion worth of Apache attack helicopters, $1.1 billion for 15 Chinook heavy lift helicopters, 4 more P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and so on.

But when it comes to India’s deepest desire — to become a defence industrial power, the US is somewhat circumspect. In October 2013, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington DC, we were conferred the title of “closest partner”. But as for actual agreements on these transfers, we are still some distance away. The Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation that was released at the time, committed the two countries to identify “collaborative projects in advanced defence technologies and systems, within the next year.”

A year before that, the then Defence Secretary Leon Panetta had announced a Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) whose self-stated goal of the initiative was to shift from a buyer-seller relationship to one involving co-production and co-development. As last year’s joint declaration put it, the “closest partners” would collaborate in “defence technology transfer, trade, research, co-development and co-production for defence articles and services, including the most advanced and sophisticated technology.”

But the search for collaborative projects has run up against the wall of an understandable US desire to keep its high-quality technology to itself. As it is, US licensing procedures and the Indian refusal to sign certain agreements such as the Communications Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), have made forward movement difficult. The US, like all countries, which possess top-quality technology is not likely to share it with anyone. In that context, India’s decision to allow 49 per cent FDI means little.

Just how restricted the American perspective is likely to be is evident from what is on offer. In June this year, Frank Kendall, US Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the point man for the DTTI, said that the US had a “ground breaking offer” to share the next generation Javelin missile for co-development and co-production, a helicopter programme and an unmanned aerial vehicle programme and an artillery gun.

The gun, is presumably the M777 155 mm which the US is offering for direct sale. As for the Javelin, there is nothing particularly earth-shaking about the offer, since it is really about developing another kind of a warhead for the missile which is already in service with the US and several other countries. Further, the offer seems aimed at stymieing the sale of the Israeli Spike, which is a global competitor of the Javelin. The helicopter and the UAV, too, are items that are on a list for acquisition by India through a competitive process, since there are several potential vendors for the items.

There is nothing on the list which is unique, such as, for example, the nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine or the supersonic Brahmos missile that Russia has helped India to build, or the long-range surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) which is being co-developed with Israel. The Americans seem to be using the DTTI to push aside competing vendors, rather than offering something we would not be able to get elsewhere. If so, India needs to tread carefully because it has important arms and technology transfer relationships with some of the countries like Israel and Russia which it also needs to preserve since they have stood by us in difficult times in the past.

A lot of the things are hanging in the air because Indo-US relations are doing so as well. Given India’s reticence in giving any kind of political shape to the partnership with the US, Washington is understandably stringing New Delhi along with promises. Modi’s forthcoming visit to Washington DC could be an opportunity to move forward in some of the issues. But the problem today is the enormous geopolitical flux generated, in part by China’s growth and assertiveness, and in part by the chaos in the Middle East. Handled wisely, it could advance India’s cause, but if not, could well lead us to a dead-end.

Mid Day August 19, 2014

India dozes as China modernises military

Though it has been more than six decades since we attained Independence, securing our nation and its inhabitants remains an overwhelming concern. Security threats, external and internal, have dogged us through our history, and even though we are stronger than we have ever been - indeed a nuclear weapons power - the sense of insecurity remains.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Narendra Modi government has made it clear that when it comes to security, terrorism remains a major concern. Rejecting Pakistan's criticism of Modi's "proxy war" remarks during his visit to Ladakh, the Indian official spokesman said last Thursday that terrorism was not only a "core concern in our relations with Pakistan" but that it remained a "real and present danger" to the country.

Terrorism
We may not have had a major terror attack since 2008, but terrorism remains an issue that worries people. This was brought out by a Pew Global Attitudes poll earlier this year which revealed that while people were concerned about economic, political and corruption issues, nearly nine in 10 respondents, some 88 per cent, said that terrorism was a "very big problem," and that Pakistan (47 per cent) and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (20 per cent) posed the greatest threat to India. Nineteen per cent said the Maoists were a threat, but just six per cent chose China.
The low figure for China is a measure of the Indian complacency about not just the rise of China, but the growth of its military capabilities - some of which are aimed at us. Already Chinese influence is lapping on our shores in the form of Chinese trade, and aid in South Asia matching or exceeding that of India. In 2012, India's trade with SAARC countries was some $17 billion, and Chinese totalled $25 billion.
There is little India can do in the short term to prevent the growth of Chinese influence in its geopolitical backyard. But the Modi government has shown itself to be clearly aware of the dimensions of the challenge. Its initial measures will, hopefully, clear the political detritus that has accumulated over the years and set the stage for a phase of more rewarding and friendly ties in the coming years which will coincide with the revival of high, sustained Indian economic growth.
What is more worrisome, and somehow largely ignored, is the growth of Chinese military power and the consequences it can have for us. In the last 10 years or so, India has become more aware of this and activated new airfields, fast-tracked border defence construction and raised new military formations on the border with Tibet and Xinjiang. Slowly, but surely, India's strategic deterrent capability with regard to China is shaping up through the Agni V long-range missile and the Arihant nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine.

Narendra Modi with Chinese president Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Brazil.Nuclear forces
But these efforts pale into insignificance when placed against the massive and comprehensive modernisation being undertaken by China of both its conventional and nuclear forces. In this build up, it is benchmarking itself against the United States. But it is very obvious that the capabilities that the Chinese are building up for a possible conflict with the US, will have negative consequences for India.
Observers often tend to focus on specific Chinese achievements such as the J-20 fifth generation fighter, or the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or WU14 hypersonic vehicle. But the reality is that the Chinese developments have been comprehensive. In the naval area, for example it is not just the ASBM or the aircraft carrier, but cruise missiles, UAVs, submarines, destroyers, amphibious ships, patrol craft and so on.
More disturbing are reports on the Chinese strategic force modernisation. A report in the South China Morning Post in early August, sourced from official documents, indicated that China planned to increase its nuclear and conventional warheads held by its strategic force, known as the 2nd Artillery Command.

No first use
Most estimates of the Chinese nuclear arsenal place it at a "bare minimum" level of around 200-250 warheads, with land-based missiles as the primary delivery system. However, over the years, the Chinese have been modernising the landbased missiles, as well as developing their submarine-based arsenal. As of now their three Type 094 submarines do not have operational missiles, but these are being developed. An accidental release of information by a Chinese environment outfit has confirmed the reports of the existence of the DF-41 ICBM with sufficient range to target most of the United States from China. US intelligence sources say that these missiles could also have multiple warheads.
Like some Indians, the Chinese are also worried that their 'No First Use' pledge can leave them vulnerable to a surprise first strike. Chinese worries have centred around what the US calls "Prompt Global Strike" technologies - hypersonic vehicles, terminally guided ballistic missiles, reusable unmanned spacecraft and scramjets. The US says these are for use with conventional warheads, but they can also be armed with nuclear warheads, too, and so, the precision and speed of the strikes could have devastating consequences for global deterrence stability. To counter this, the Chinese have carried out ballistic missile defence tests in 2010, 2013 and in July this year. And in January this China surprised the world with its own test of the WU 14 hypersonic boost glide vehicle and experts say that they are just years behind the Americans in this area.
Such systems have huge implications for India because if China was concerned about US use of such technologies for a first strike, so does India have to worry that China, which is developing similar technologies, can pursue similar goals.
These are not technologies you can acquire off the shelf - they require an enormous amount of R&D effort, of the kind simply not visible in India. What is remarkable, however, is that no one seems to be even talking about these issues, leave alone doing something about them.
Mail Today August 18, 2014

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-dozes-as-china-modernises-military/1/377539.html

Parties should move forward and leave old alliances be

Lord Krishna's main message to Arjuna at Kurukshetra was that there was no turning back. Events that had led to the Pandava and Kaurava armies being arrayed against each other could not be undone.

The only option before Arjuna was to move forward into the battle and discover his destiny.

In Kalyug, this is a lesson that remains unlearnt. Only that can explain the furious activity across the Gangetic plain to construct a "secular" alliance to counter the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

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Former deputy CM of Bihar Sushil Kumar Modi during a public meeting

At one level, of course, the Lalu-Nitish entente is desperate effort at self-preservation, but at another, it appears to be a pathetic effort to turn the clock back.

Now they are seeking to rope in Mulayam Singh Yadav of the Samajwadi party and Mayawati of the Bahujan Samaj Party into a "maha-alliance".

On Wednesday, the redoubtable Mayawati of the Bahujan Samaj Party rejected Samajwadi chief Mulayam Singh Yadav's call for a united front.

Indeed, she accused him of working with the BJP to stoke the communal fires in Uttar Pradesh. She said that there is no question of the BSP allying with anyone in Uttar Pradesh and will fight elections alone. 

Going back

The reasons why going back to the past will not help are evident from the outcome of the Lok Sabha polls of 2014. Details of voter behaviour have not yet been made public by pollsters, but the results made it clear that virtually all the forts were breached by the BJP's campaign.

Mighty Mulayam's SP, which had swept the state Assembly polls in 2012 by winning 224 of 403 seats, won just 5 seats out of 80. The BSP, which had 80 seats in the Assembly and arguably the most disciplined voter base, scored zero.

Likewise, the BJP and its ally the Lok Janshakti Party and the Rashtriya Lok Samta Party won 31 out of the state's 40 seats, leaving the OBC standard bearers - Nitish and Lalu - just six seats.

The idea of an alliance looks tempting from the point of view of arithmetic. In UP for example, the BJP won 71 seats with 42.30 per cent of the popular vote.

The combined vote of the BSP and SP was 41.80 per cent. But the figures hide the way that politics has been working.

This is evident from the fact that both the BSP and SP suffered a significant erosion of their vote share.

In the Vidhan Sabha election of 2012, the BSP had got 25.91 per cent of the vote, and the SP 29.15.

But in the Lok Sabha election earlier this year, BSP was down to 19.60 and the SP to 22.20, a rough 7 per cent decline by both.

We don't have actual studies based on polling voter preferences, but a preliminary analysis suggests that the BJP was able to win because its opponents were divided, but more important, using Narendra Modi's appeal they were able to reach out to erode important segments of the voters loyal to the SP and BSP.

In great measure this was done through a communal polarisation of the kind we are witnessing these days in the numerous incidents taking place across UP.

Support

But it was also an outcome of the party's ability to consolidate the support of the urban and semi-urban middle classes onto the Modi bandwagon that promised "achche din," in the form of better infrastructure, educational facilities and, more important, jobs and prospects.

Therefore, merely emphasising secularism will not be enough to stop the BJP. In any case, what Mulayam and Lalu and even the Congress grandees mean by secularism is quite different from its real meaning.

What the challengers of the BJP need is an entirely new political strategy, something they have not grasped as yet. 

 Mail Today August 13, 2014

India-Pakistan stand- off gets a new twist

India's decision to call off Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan because the latter insisted in going ahead with consultations with separatist leaders from Jammu & Kashmir, is a new twist in the old India-Pakistan standoff.

It is new because in the past Islamabad has routinely held such consultations on the eve of bilateral dialogues for no other reason than to show its constituencies back home that Kashmiri interests had a primacy in Pakistan's India policy.

Indeed, the Pakistan Foreign Office response noted that the meetings were "a longstanding practice" and were aimed at facilitating "meaningful discussions on the issue of Kashmir."

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif during the latter's visit to India in May

New Delhi went along with this fiction, knowing fully well that the separatists - Hurriyat leaders like Shabbir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Geelani or Yasin Malik - had little traction in the Valley.

But now, by insisting that any dialogue with the Hurriyat is tantamount to interference in India's internal affairs and, as such, unacceptable to India, the Modi government has upped the ante.

Maybe Pakistan was testing the new government, if so, they have got a clearer idea of what it is all about.

Narendra Modi has his own compulsions. He has come to power with a promise of taking a different and tougher approach towards Pakistan. So, it cannot be business as usual for him.

Why did Pakistan choose to make this provocative move towards the Hurriyat right now? The meetings may have been a longstanding practice, but that was not the only message coming out of Islamabad.

In the last two weeks, there have been almost continuous and egregious violations of the ceasefire. Taken together, it would suggest that there are forces in Pakistan that do not want any change in Pakistan's ties with India. It does not take a genius to figure out who those forces are.

The answer to this question probably lies in Pakistan's internal politics and turmoil. Nawaz Sharif, who defied hardliners to attend Modi's swearing in, had two goals in mind after sweeping the Pakistani elections to become prime minister in 2013.

First, to rein in the Army, and second, to pick up the threads of peace that were dropped in 1999 when he was overthrown by Musharraf.

In his present circumstances, where Islamabad is being besieged by Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the religious leader Tahir al Qadri, he has chosen to make a quick deal with the Army.

But New Delhi, having sent a tough message, will hopefully, be working along a coherent policy perspective. Relations with Pakistan are too important to be left hostage to knee-jerk reactions. 
Mail Today August 18, 2014