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Saturday, November 15, 2014

Chance to resolve China-India border dispute

There has been a lot of commentary on the economic goodies that China's paramount leader Xi Jinping is bringing to New Delhi: $100 billion investment in the infrastructure sector, the creation of several large industrial zones and Chinese participation in the modernisation of India's railways, New Silk Route initiatives, Indian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and so on. The sky, it would seem, is the limit.


Obstacle
But Sino-Indian relations are likely to go nowhere unless the two countries are able to resolve their border issue. Having fought a war in 1962, and come close to another in 1987, they have managed to maintain peace and tranquillity there for the past 25 years and forged closer economic and political ties. But the Depsang Plains incident of April-May 2013 is a warning that a disputed border can never be a peaceful border, and it remains the principal obstacle to normal ties between the two rising Asian giants.
Narendra Modi and China's supreme leader Xi Jinping have a historic opportunity to transform this state of affairs. Both are the most powerful politicians to have taken charge of their respective countries in recent times, and, they appear to have the political capital needed and, more important, the larger vision of Sino-Indian relations, to obtain a border settlement.
PM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi’s visit to IndiaPM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi’s visit to IndiaThe dispute no longer makes sense - both sides have secured their most vital non-negotiable areas - China has Aksai Chin and India Arunachal Pradesh - and neither side will give them up short of a major war, which itself will be disastrous for both countries.
Intriguingly enough, thrice in the past year and a half, the Chinese leadership has suggested that they are looking for change. In March 2013, May 2013 and more recently in June 2014.
When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had met Xi Jinping in March 2013 during the BRICS meet in Durban, both sides had agreed on the need to accelerate the process of the border settlement. The Chinese news agency Xinhua quoted Xi as saying on March 29 that China and India should "make good use of the mechanism of Special Representatives (SR) to strive for a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon as possible."
The first part of the formulation has been standard in recent years, but it is the second part - "as soon as possible"- that Chance to resolve border dispute PM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi's visit to India by Manoj Joshi is significant. This message was repeated by Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi in May 2013, and most recently by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, during his visit to greet the new Modi government in Delhi in June 2014. In a statement, he noted, "Through years of negotiation, we have come to an agreement on the basics of a boundary agreement, and we are prepared to reach a final settlement." That's as clear a message as you can get.

Push
Curiously, there have been no comparable statements from the Indian side on the desirability or feasibility of an early border settlement. However, privately officials involved in the negotiations say that the Special Representatives' negotiations have achieved what they could, now the top leaderships in the two countries must make the final push.
The SR level talks were initiated in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 2003. The two sides made quick progress, and by April 2005 they reached an "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question." It virtually spelt out the contours of a border settlement: Article IV gave "due consideration" to the two sides "strategic and reasonable interests" and Article VIII agreed that any settlement "should safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas." This was as clear a statement the two sides were ready to swap their claims - India would concede Aksai Chin, a vital strategic area which provides the only all-weather link between Xinjiang and Tibet. And China would accept India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, which has settled populations, in contrast to the other areas in dispute.

Reality
But having achieved this agreement in 2005, there was a slide back. Between 2007-2010, Sino-Indian relations nosedived. In some measure the Indo-US nuclear deal was responsible, and in some measure China's nervousness relating to Tibet where there had been large scale disturbances in 2008 for which Beijing privately held New Delhi responsible. So it was a pleasant surprise when Yang Jichei, appointed China's SR by the Xi Jinping government said at the start of the 16th round of SR talks in June 2013 that he was ready to "break new ground" and "strive for the settlement of the China-India boundary question…in a new period."
The Chinese posture suggests the Xi-Li team has done its homework and feels the time has come to clinch a settlement. There are indications the Modi team has also done its homework. In the last two months this issue has been discussed in depth by the new team led by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.
This is where Modi and Xi come in. Both are regarded as the most powerful politicians to head their respective countries in recent times. But we should not underestimate their difficulties. Any settlement will be unsettling for important constituencies in both countries. If Modi has to get an agreement through Parliament and, before that, the Sangh Parivar, Xi needs to take his Politburo, if not his Central Committee with him.
Both are aware of the historical consequences of the deal and both know that they can only do it now when they are at the height of their powers. Indeed, this is what Prime Minister Vajpayee intended to do in 2003. Unfortunately for him and the nation, he lost the 2004 elections and thereafter India lacked a powerful leader with the necessary political capital to work out a settlement with China.
Mail Today Sep 16, 2014

Monday, November 03, 2014

What Modi can learn from Xi

Last month, Prime Minister Modi articulated the Indian dream in his extempore address on Independence Day. He packaged a deceptively large vision of the Indian future in penny-packets - a clean country with toilets for all, especially women, a country free of violence, again, especially against women, a manufacturing hub with a social safety net for all and so on.
Though he did dwell on moral corruption, he had little to say on monetary corruption, something which has plagued the nation for a long time, and which roiled the politics of the country for years leading to the UPA's defeat and Modi's spectacular election victory. Somehow, with the passage of the Lokpal Bill, the issue seems to have receded from public memory.

Corruption
Modi has, coined the memorable slogan, "na khaunga, na khaney doonga" (loosely translated to "I will not be corrupt nor permit corruption"). There is little doubt he has tightened the governmental system and his ministers are on tenterhooks all the time, a function of the fact that their boss is not just first among equals, but their omniscient supremo. However, corruption is so widespread, that without tackling it on an institutionalised scale, it cannot be managed by a vigilant leader all by himself. Though, it must be pointed out there is no doubt there will be a positive trickle down impact of a government which is honest at the top, just as it had worked the other way with the UPA.
The one country that Modi can take lessons from is China. Both Modi and Xi are seeking to consolidate a vision of a nation with middle-class values, virtues and attainments though they articulate it in different ways. A corruption free and efficient government which provides a level playing field is the most desirable goal for middle-class folk.
Perhaps Modi has wanted to avoid negativity in taking up corruption at this stage. But he cannot be unaware of the fact that corrupt police, administrators, judges and, above all, politicians, have made India the dystopia of poverty, filth, violence, illiteracy and joblessness. Across the country, at every level of government - chaprasis, policemen, junior engineers, and IAS officers - function in a corrupt system in symbiotic lock-step with our politicians. Beyond the venality of officials exists the criminalised society of new India where mafias operate freely-real estate, sand-mining, coal, timber, liquor, drugs, even education, tent supplies and parking. These cannot be rooted out through ordinary means because they have infiltrated the machinery of the state - the police and the governance system.
The Lokpal movement of Anna Hazare, seems to have lost its way. Modi, himself, has been ambivalent about the Lokpal, believing, presumably, a revitalised administration will make this institution redundant. If so, he is wrong. At some point, he will have to take up the fight directly.

Learning
This is the lesson we can learn from Xi Jinping. From the outset, Xi has been involved in a struggle against corruption. In his first press conference on the first day he took over as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012, Xi announced corruption was ruining the CPC and the country. To fix this he got his aide Wang Qishan to take the post of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Through its draconian authority over the 91 million party members, the CCDI covers almost every aspect of the Chinese government and administration.
Wang has launched a campaign to ensnare both "flies" (smaller functionaries of government) as well as the "tigers" (the highranking leaders). The CCDI and its associated Ministry of Supervision has investigated 182,000 officials in 2013 alone, the highest number in 30 years.

Values
As for the "tigers," since about a year ago 28 ministerial and provincial-level senior leaders have been arrested, including four members (two full members and two alternate members) of the newly formed 18th Central Committee. On their cross-hairs now are a former Poliburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yonkang, the highest ranking official to ever face action, a former Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou who was also a Politburo member has been expelled by the party and is to be court-martialed; another CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong is under investigation.
It would be easy to accuse Xi of using the anti-corruption campaign to consolidate his authority in China. But in taking on the top echelons of the party, he is taking a big risk. But, clearly, the idea of a corruption free country is an intrinsic part of his "dream" because it will make for a more resilient China. Just as, of course, it would a corruption free India. Modi, too, has articulated an dream of development and prosperity, but he needs to ensure that it is not distorted by corruption.
W B Yeats once wrote, "In dreams begins responsibilities." Hopefully, this is something that the leader of China Xi Jinping, and the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi understand well. Both have packaged their plans and perspectives as visions or dreams that spring from the positions of authority that they occupy.
But both can be undone if somehow they are unable to deliver.
Mail Today September 4, 2014

Why relations with Japan are so important



In an interview to a Japanese newspaper last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that India was not “currently” taking any steps to revise its nuclear doctrine. This is aimed at laying to rest concerns that the BJP election manifesto’s commitment to update and revise the nuclear doctrine could result in an abandonment of India’s no first use pledge and a more assertive Indian nuclear posture.
He made it clear, and this has been the Indian negotiating position with Japan on this issue, that India will stick to the non-proliferation commitments that it has already made to the US and other countries declaring that India remained committed “to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.”


Prime Minister Modi with Japanese PM Shinzo Abe after a joint press conference at Akasaka State Guest House in Tokyo yesterday. Pic/AFPPrime Minister Modi with Japanese PM Shinzo Abe after a joint press conference at Akasaka State Guest House in Tokyo yesterday. Pic/AFP

Modi’s strong reiteration of India’s seemingly contradictory posture of being a nuclear armed state and one that is committed to nuclear disarmament and the principles of non-proliferation is aimed at bringing Japan around to a nuclear deal with India. There is a lot at stake here — Japan’s Toshiba controls Westinghouse, a premier American maker of nuclear reactors. In addition, many key components for western reactors are sourced from Japanese vendors. A deal with Japan will smoothen the path towards civil nuclear cooperation with western countries.
Of course, the operative word here is “currently”. Modi did, in all fairness, emphasise that doctrines were flexible, dependent on the prevailing strategic scenario. All this is in line with the stand India has taken from the very outset. All this is important because of the incredible surge in the modernisation of the Chinese military. The simple logic is that the Chinese are benchmarking their capabilities with those of the United States. But those very capabilities can have adverse implications for us. As is well known, in realist thinking, what matters are capabilities, not intentions which cannot be easily gauged.
In the past eight months of the year, we have seen significant developments that have direct implications for us. First, at the beginning of the year, we saw the military exercise in which three ships, including the Changbaishan-— China’s largest landing craft that can carry a marine battalion and 15-20 armoured vehicles — crossed the Makassar Straits between Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and then went through the Lombok straits and entered the Indian Ocean. According to Chinese sources, the exercise was aimed at displaying the ability to break through a strait which may be under the control of an adversary. Then came the patrol of a single Chinese Shang Class submarine which came through the Ombai Wetar Straits near Papua New Guinea, and surfaced near Somalia.
The third was the test of a boost glide hypersonic vehicle dubbed WU 14 by the West. Though this is meant to overcome American ballistic missile defences, the capability of such vehicles as nuclear weapon delivery systems has implications for India’s deterrence capabilities. The fourth was the Chinese ballistic missile test of July 2014. In the past four years, China has reportedly conducted three successful mid-course ballistic missile defence tests. This is an area where the US is clearly number one, but is having problems with its programme. What is germane here is the speed with which China is catching up with the US in the high-tech areas like boost glide weapons and BMD systems. According to analysts, China may be just four or five years behind the US in both these areas.
Earlier this year, Frank Kendall, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for acquisition and technology, told a US Congressional committee that the US technological superiority is being “challenged in ways that I have not seen for decades.” He went on to add that “this is not a future problem. This is a here-now problem.”
The implications for India are obvious. Such technologies, designed to overcome US defences, can pose a threat to our very limited nuclear capabilities. The Chinese are developing them because they fear that the US could use them for a first strike to disarm China’s limited forces. By the same logic, China can do the same to us.
It is in this context that relations with Japan are important. In terms of technology, Japan is way ahead of us and China in many areas. While for the present, Japan maintains restrictions in the export of its defence technologies; it is moving slowly but surely towards opening up. It may be some time before we can expect Japan to export complete weapons systems, but Japanese technologies, be they the fly-by-light aircraft control systems, sonar equipment, or those that go into its own BMD systems, can be very useful.
Equally important is Japanese goodwill to join the four key technology denial cartels — the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Since these restrict key dual use technologies in a range of areas from chemical, machine tools, nuclear and aerospace industries, it is important for India to be inside the cartel rather than the outside. As part of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Americans are committed to helping us join them, but the heavy lifting with the more skittish members of the cartels, like Japan, has to be done by New Delhi itself.
Mid Day September 2, 2014

Narendra Modi's Japan visit 2014: Can Tokyo provide Prime Minister his first big bang moment?

A civil nuclear agreement is one of the key outcomes New Delhi is pushing for in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Japan that starts tomorrow. Recently, in Naypidaw, Myanmar, foreign minister Sushma Swaraj called on her Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida to "bring talks on civil nuclear agreement to their logical conclusion".
Given its nuclear history, it is a wonder that Japan is even willing to consider a deal with a country that refuses to sign either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). That they are, is a function of geopolitics, business sense and the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal.
Japan has struck nuclear deals with Vietnam, Jordan and Turkey. But India is the only country that Japan is dealing with which possesses nuclear weapons and has not signed the NPT. The deal could compromise Japan's national identity as a leader of non-proliferation and disarmament, ironically, a self-image that India still has of itself. Tokyo wants a separate safeguards agreement underscoring India's commitment to a nuclear test moratorium and non-proliferation. New Delhi says the assurances provided for in the Indo-US nuclear agreement are sufficient.
India has an obvious interest in meeting its burgeoning energy demand through nuclear energy. India plans to construct 18 more nuclear power stations by 2020. This provides an enormous business opportunity for Japanese companies.
Japan does not have a reactor design of its own. But the US-based Westinghouse Electric Co is controlled by Toshiba of Japan and it currently builds and operates half of the world's nuclear plants. Four of its AP1000 reactors are being built in China. The GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy is a nuclear alliance of two global giants also headquartered in the US. As of now, it doesn't have a working reactor, but it has several advanced designs that have been certified, or are in the process of certification.
Of course, there is also interest among Japanese equipment-makers that fabricate equipment like large-size 1,000 KW turbines, instrumentation and control systems that go into power plants. Several of the reactors being offered by the US and France have Japanese components. But there are other issues Japan needs to consider.
First, it will enhance the geopolitical closeness of India and Japan in confronting an assertive China. This underlies the strategic partnership that Tokyo and New Delhi are seeking to construct with the blessings of the US. Second, an Indian deal could also kick-start the dormant Japanese nuclear business that has virtually shut down after the Fukushima disaster. Third, with China also moving into the reactor export market with its own 1,000 MW reactor, opportunities for Japanese companies are declining.
When it comes to the nuclear business, India is not lacking for options. South Korea, the US, France and Russia are all keen to work with India. India recently became the first non-NPT country to which Australia will export uranium. China — yes, China — is another country interested in nuclear-dealing with India.
In 1993, China supplied India low-enriched uranium to fuel the Tarapur reactor after the US and France stopped their supply. Beijing was reluctant to support the Indo-US nuclear deal for geopolitical reasons. But it finally allowed the waiver for India to pass in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Last May, the joint statement issued following Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi declared that the two sides would "carry out bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy" within the bounds of their international commitments. Sino-Indian nuclear cooperation is not quite around the corner. Apart from the industry being relatively young there, China remains wholly committed to Pakistan and any dealings with India could cause turbulence in Sino-Pakistani ties.
The 1,400 MW reactor base plant that South Korea is building in the UAE is one of the most advanced in the world. In 2011, India signed a nuclear agreement with South Korea. The South Koreans are interested in setting up a power plant in India based on their 1,000 MW reactor design. This option will probably be more competitive than the US and French offers, but India may be under geopolitical obligations to push the latter projects first.
The ball is now in India's court. It needs to do something about the draconian nuclear liability law that has effectively scuttled the enormous opportunities that opened up with the NSG waiver. The Modi government has promised to facilitate the process of starting businesses in India. It could show how serious it is by starting with the nuclear power business.
The Economic Times August 29, 2014

Sunday, October 26, 2014

Assessing Indo-US defence ties



There is an interesting, but uncomfortable dichotomy in United States’ relations with India and Pakistan. For India, there is untrammelled praise, soaring rhetoric about the two great democracies and our destiny as natural allies. But there is little else. Pakistan gets a lot of harsh words and complaints, but along with that comes generous dollops of aid —both military and developmental.
All of these have been on display in recent weeks in the visits of senior US officials to New Delhi on one hand, and the well-choreographed drama wherein the Pakistan Army has launched an offensive in North Waziristan, and the US has released $8 million in aid and will soon be forthcoming with the latest tranche of Coalition Support Funds, reportedly of the order of $300 million, with perhaps even more coming by way of security assistance and humanitarian aid in the coming months.


The US has emerged as a major supplier of defence equipment and  US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel pointed out that India had bought some $9 billion worth of US equipment. Pic/AFPThe US has emerged as a major supplier of defence equipment and  US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel pointed out that India had bought some $9 billion worth of US equipment. Pic/AFP

As for India, the rhetoric has soared even higher with US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel developing a connectedness between two countries, wherein one a tea-seller’s son becomes prime minister, and in another, the child of a Kenyan father becomes president. But for those looking at the substance of the relationship, it would be hard going. Yes, the US has emerged as a major supplier of defence equipment and as Hagel himself pointed out, India had bought some $9 billion worth of US equipment, mainly aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force. The US is also hoping to quickly close a number of other deals — $1.4 billion worth of Apache attack helicopters, $1.1 billion for 15 Chinook heavy lift helicopters, 4 more P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and so on.
But when it comes to India’s deepest desire — to become a defence industrial power, the US is somewhat circumspect. In October 2013, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington DC, we were conferred the title of “closest partner”. But as for actual agreements on these transfers, we are still some distance away. The Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation that was released at the time, committed the two countries to identify “collaborative projects in advanced defence technologies and systems, within the next year.”
A year before that, the then Defence Secretary Leon Panetta had announced a Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) whose self-stated goal of the initiative was to shift from a buyer-seller relationship to one involving co-production and co-development. As last year’s joint declaration put it, the “closest partners” would collaborate in “defence technology transfer, trade, research, co-development and co-production for defence articles and services, including the most advanced and sophisticated technology.”
But the search for collaborative projects has run up against the wall of an understandable US desire to keep its high-quality technology to itself. As it is, US licensing procedures and the Indian refusal to sign certain agreements such as the Communications Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), have made forward movement difficult. The US, like all countries, which possess top-quality technology is not likely to share it with anyone. In that context, India’s decision to allow 49 per cent FDI means little.
Just how restricted the American perspective is likely to be is evident from what is on offer. In June this year, Frank Kendall, US Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the point man for the DTTI, said that the US had a “ground breaking offer” to share the next generation Javelin missile for co-development and co-production, a helicopter programme and an unmanned aerial vehicle programme and an artillery gun.
The gun, is presumably the M777 155 mm which the US is offering for direct sale. As for the Javelin, there is nothing particularly earth-shaking about the offer, since it is really about developing another kind of a warhead for the missile which is already in service with the US and several other countries. Further, the offer seems aimed at stymieing the sale of the Israeli Spike, which is a global competitor of the Javelin. The helicopter and the UAV, too, are items that are on a list for acquisition by India through a competitive process, since there are several potential vendors for the items.
There is nothing on the list which is unique, such as, for example, the nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine or the supersonic Brahmos missile that Russia has helped India to build, or the long-range surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) which is being co-developed with Israel. The Americans seem to be using the DTTI to push aside competing vendors, rather than offering something we would not be able to get elsewhere. If so, India needs to tread carefully because it has important arms and technology transfer relationships with some of the countries like Israel and Russia which it also needs to preserve since they have stood by us in difficult times in the past.
A lot of the things are hanging in the air because Indo-US relations are doing so as well. Given India’s reticence in giving any kind of political shape to the partnership with the US, Washington is understandably stringing New Delhi along with promises. Modi’s forthcoming visit to Washington DC could be an opportunity to move forward in some of the issues. But the problem today is the enormous geopolitical flux generated, in part by China’s growth and assertiveness, and in part by the chaos in the Middle East. Handled wisely, it could advance India’s cause, but if not, could well lead us to a dead-end.
Mid Day August 19, 2014

India dozes as China modernises military

Though it has been more than six decades since we attained Independence, securing our nation and its inhabitants remains an overwhelming concern. Security threats, external and internal, have dogged us through our history, and even though we are stronger than we have ever been - indeed a nuclear weapons power - the sense of insecurity remains.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Narendra Modi government has made it clear that when it comes to security, terrorism remains a major concern. Rejecting Pakistan's criticism of Modi's "proxy war" remarks during his visit to Ladakh, the Indian official spokesman said last Thursday that terrorism was not only a "core concern in our relations with Pakistan" but that it remained a "real and present danger" to the country.

Terrorism
We may not have had a major terror attack since 2008, but terrorism remains an issue that worries people. This was brought out by a Pew Global Attitudes poll earlier this year which revealed that while people were concerned about economic, political and corruption issues, nearly nine in 10 respondents, some 88 per cent, said that terrorism was a "very big problem," and that Pakistan (47 per cent) and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (20 per cent) posed the greatest threat to India. Nineteen per cent said the Maoists were a threat, but just six per cent chose China.
The low figure for China is a measure of the Indian complacency about not just the rise of China, but the growth of its military capabilities - some of which are aimed at us. Already Chinese influence is lapping on our shores in the form of Chinese trade, and aid in South Asia matching or exceeding that of India. In 2012, India's trade with SAARC countries was some $17 billion, and Chinese totalled $25 billion.
There is little India can do in the short term to prevent the growth of Chinese influence in its geopolitical backyard. But the Modi government has shown itself to be clearly aware of the dimensions of the challenge. Its initial measures will, hopefully, clear the political detritus that has accumulated over the years and set the stage for a phase of more rewarding and friendly ties in the coming years which will coincide with the revival of high, sustained Indian economic growth.
What is more worrisome, and somehow largely ignored, is the growth of Chinese military power and the consequences it can have for us. In the last 10 years or so, India has become more aware of this and activated new airfields, fast-tracked border defence construction and raised new military formations on the border with Tibet and Xinjiang. Slowly, but surely, India's strategic deterrent capability with regard to China is shaping up through the Agni V long-range missile and the Arihant nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine.

Narendra Modi with Chinese president Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Brazil.Narendra Modi with Chinese president Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Brazil.Nuclear forces
But these efforts pale into insignificance when placed against the massive and comprehensive modernisation being undertaken by China of both its conventional and nuclear forces. In this build up, it is benchmarking itself against the United States. But it is very obvious that the capabilities that the Chinese are building up for a possible conflict with the US, will have negative consequences for India.
Observers often tend to focus on specific Chinese achievements such as the J-20 fifth generation fighter, or the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or WU14 hypersonic vehicle. But the reality is that the Chinese developments have been comprehensive. In the naval area, for example it is not just the ASBM or the aircraft carrier, but cruise missiles, UAVs, submarines, destroyers, amphibious ships, patrol craft and so on.
More disturbing are reports on the Chinese strategic force modernisation. A report in the South China Morning Post in early August, sourced from official documents, indicated that China planned to increase its nuclear and conventional warheads held by its strategic force, known as the 2nd Artillery Command.

No first use
Most estimates of the Chinese nuclear arsenal place it at a "bare minimum" level of around 200-250 warheads, with land-based missiles as the primary delivery system. However, over the years, the Chinese have been modernising the landbased missiles, as well as developing their submarine-based arsenal. As of now their three Type 094 submarines do not have operational missiles, but these are being developed. An accidental release of information by a Chinese environment outfit has confirmed the reports of the existence of the DF-41 ICBM with sufficient range to target most of the United States from China. US intelligence sources say that these missiles could also have multiple warheads.
Like some Indians, the Chinese are also worried that their 'No First Use' pledge can leave them vulnerable to a surprise first strike. Chinese worries have centred around what the US calls "Prompt Global Strike" technologies - hypersonic vehicles, terminally guided ballistic missiles, reusable unmanned spacecraft and scramjets. The US says these are for use with conventional warheads, but they can also be armed with nuclear warheads, too, and so, the precision and speed of the strikes could have devastating consequences for global deterrence stability. To counter this, the Chinese have carried out ballistic missile defence tests in 2010, 2013 and in July this year. And in January this China surprised the world with its own test of the WU 14 hypersonic boost glide vehicle and experts say that they are just years behind the Americans in this area.
Such systems have huge implications for India because if China was concerned about US use of such technologies for a first strike, so does India have to worry that China, which is developing similar technologies, can pursue similar goals.
These are not technologies you can acquire off the shelf - they require an enormous amount of R&D effort, of the kind simply not visible in India. What is remarkable, however, is that no one seems to be even talking about these issues, leave alone doing something about them.
Mail Today August 18, 2014