India must go beyond geopolitics

It is not unnatural for world leaders to define their relationships with each other in grandiose terms strategic, indispensable or defining partnerships, which is the norm for American leaders looking at India. Indians are no slouches either. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described India’s relationship with the US as that of natural allies, and now Prime Minister Modi has declared that we are “natural global partners.”

Of course, the reality is somewhat different. Relations between India and America have not been good in the recent past. True, at the formal level, things are doing well. We have multiple dialogues and working groups in a range of subjects from counter-terrorism, international security, defence, science and technology, agriculture, health, energy and climate change, higher education, women’s empowerment and so on.

India and the US need a new vision for their relationship, which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment or education

The US has played a profound role in India, something that the ahistorical Indians themselves forget. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by the mid-1960s, the US government and foundations were often pumping as much money into Indian education as the UGC. Outdated syllabi of universities and schools were replaced with the help of exchange programmes that saw thousands of Indian teachers go to the US and American counterparts come here. The Americans helped us in not just improving science education, teacher training, enhancing the quality of regional engineering colleges across the country, but also placed subsidised modern science and technology text books in the hands of the students.

In recent times, Indo-US ties picked up, paradoxically, following their worst dip after the Indian nuclear weapons tests of 1998. The reason was geopolitical — the rise of China. The US saw, as indeed they did in the 1950s — that by virtue of its size, India is the only country that can offset China’s enormous pull. They also understood that India, after the Cold War, offered no geopolitical challenge to American interests.

Things were going swimmingly well till around 2008, culminating in the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. But it has been downhill since. Some people believe it has to do with the Obama administration, others say that the slow implosion of UPA II was responsible. It was probably a mix of the two.

One of the big problems in the India-US relationship is the asymmetry between the two of us. The US is rich and powerful, while over two-thirds of Indians live in abject poverty. This itself creates a divergence of goals. We often land up on the wrong side of trade, IPR and investment issues. Given our differing developmental profiles, this is, perhaps, inevitable. But what we need is the diplomatic effort to create the space for things that join us together.

The US, as the global hegemon, needs to relearn what it knew so well in the 1950s and 1960s that relations between nations is as much about symbols and gestures as about FDI and trading rules.

This is something the Chinese know well with their agitprop background. Where the US comes up with the geopolitical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese articulate the same thing as the New Maritime Silk Route. China’s trade is expanding, they say; our interests are growing, we want you to be part of this prosperity and so we will help you build your ports, railways and highways and become part of a seamless link from China to Africa and Europe. For the US, the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be confined to the strategic community and foreign policy wonks. The Chinese, on the other hand, are speaking directly to the people and about self-interest not just in the realm of security, but development.

There is a new government in place in New Delhi, one that is the first since 1989 to function on its own majority in the Lok Sabha. In other words, not subject to the buffeting the UPA I got because of its coalition partners. But the administration in Washington DC has not changed and will not for another two years.

Whatever Modi may want to do in the coming years is circumscribed by the fact that India does not have too many cards in its hands. It is not an oil-rich country, or one with some ideology to export. It is a poor country whose primary goal is to transform the lives of its people. Within limits, everything else is subordinate to that.

In the case of the US, the limits are of a different kind. Unlike China or Japan, the US government does not have investible funds in its hands. That money is in the hands of US private players who India has to attract through its policies and by easing its horribly complicated rules of setting up business. What the US government can do, and it is actually committed to doing, is to ease technology restrictions that have been part of the old regime of sanctions. But beyond that, India and the US need a new vision for their relationship which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment, education, energy and climate change and people-to-people ties.

Mid Day September 30, 2014

It is not unnatural for world leaders to define their relationships with each other in grandiose terms strategic, indispensable or defining partnerships, which is the norm for American leaders looking at India. Indians are no slouches either. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described India’s relationship with the US as that of natural allies, and now Prime Minister Modi has declared that we are “natural global partners.”
Of course, the reality is somewhat different. Relations between India and America have not been good in the recent past. True, at the formal level, things are doing well. We have multiple dialogues and working groups in a range of subjects from counter-terrorism, international security, defence, science and technology, agriculture, health, energy and climate change, higher education, women’s empowerment and so on.
 
India and the US need a new vision for their relationship, which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment or education
The US has played a profound role in India, something that the ahistorical Indians themselves forget. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by the mid-1960s, the US government and foundations were often pumping as much money into Indian education as the UGC. Outdated syllabi of universities and schools were replaced with the help of exchange programmes that saw thousands of Indian teachers go to the US and American counterparts come here. The Americans helped us in not just improving science education, teacher training, enhancing the quality of regional engineering colleges across the country, but also placed subsidised modern science and technology text books in the hands of the students.
In recent times, Indo-US ties picked up, paradoxically, following their worst dip after the Indian nuclear weapons tests of 1998. The reason was geopolitical — the rise of China. The US saw, as indeed they did in the 1950s — that by virtue of its size, India is the only country that can offset China’s enormous pull. They also understood that India, after the Cold War, offered no geopolitical challenge to American interests.
Things were going swimmingly well till around 2008, culminating in the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. But it has been downhill since. Some people believe it has to do with the Obama administration, others say that the slow implosion of UPA II was responsible. It was probably a mix of the two.
One of the big problems in the India-US relationship is the asymmetry between the two of us. The US is rich and powerful, while over two-thirds of Indians live in abject poverty. This itself creates a divergence of goals. We often land up on the wrong side of trade, IPR and investment issues. Given our differing developmental profiles, this is, perhaps, inevitable. But what we need is the diplomatic effort to create the space for things that join us together.
The US, as the global hegemon, needs to relearn what it knew so well in the 1950s and 1960s that relations between nations is as much about symbols and gestures as about FDI and trading rules.
This is something the Chinese know well with their agitprop background. Where the US comes up with the geopolitical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese articulate the same thing as the New Maritime Silk Route. China’s trade is expanding, they say; our interests are growing, we want you to be part of this prosperity and so we will help you build your ports, railways and highways and become part of a seamless link from China to Africa and Europe. For the US, the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be confined to the strategic community and foreign policy wonks. The Chinese, on the other hand, are speaking directly to the people and about self-interest not just in the realm of security, but development.
There is a new government in place in New Delhi, one that is the first since 1989 to function on its own majority in the Lok Sabha. In other words, not subject to the buffeting the UPA I got because of its coalition partners. But the administration in Washington DC has not changed and will not for another two years.
Whatever Modi may want to do in the coming years is circumscribed by the fact that India does not have too many cards in its hands. It is not an oil-rich country, or one with some ideology to export. It is a poor country whose primary goal is to transform the lives of its people. Within limits, everything else is subordinate to that.
In the case of the US, the limits are of a different kind. Unlike China or Japan, the US government does not have investible funds in its hands. That money is in the hands of US private players who India has to attract through its policies and by easing its horribly complicated rules of setting up business. What the US government can do, and it is actually committed to doing, is to ease technology restrictions that have been part of the old regime of sanctions. But beyond that, India and the US need a new vision for their relationship which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment, education, energy and climate change and people-to-people ties.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/india-us-must-go-beyond-geopolitics/15645190#sthash.XyFpRpIB.dpuf

PM Modi spells out his vision

In the past month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sketched out the broad contours of his foreign and security policy vision, culminating in his official visit to the United States.

For most Americans, this would have been yet another visit by an important global leader. But for most Indians, both in the US and back home, there has been a palpable sense of excitement about it.

This is because of the understanding that Modi is the first prime minister since 1989, to have a majority of his own in the Lok Sabha. Most of us have lived with the frustration of coalition governments which were not able to take the decisive decisions that this country needs to get its act together to act as the economic and regional power that it already is.

In foreign policy, as in domestic, Modi has raised expectations sky high. As of now, however, what we are seeing in both domestic and foreign policy are broad brush-strokes, not the finished picture.

Consolidation

In Modi’s case, this has worked at two levels. First is the inspirational and global, delivered through public speeches such as those at the UN or Madison Square Garden.

The UN speech spelt out his world view: the importance of being a good neighbour, peace with Pakistan, the dangers of terrorism, the need for accommodative trading systems and a multipolar world order.

The second level is the behind-the-scenes realism which has been manifested by the stance India has taken with its interlocutors, whether they be Pakistan, China, US or Japan on issues ranging from the peace talks, border, climate change, and nuclear agreements. But what we are seeing are only the opening gambits of a longer game.

Foreign policy is a bit different from domestic. Within a country, you can influence, dictate or direct an outcome with relative ease. But in foreign affairs, it is not easy to shape things in the way you want. So far Modi has been careful in articulating his foreign and security policy. His primary political aim is consolidation.

As an outlier, he needs to ensure that he is now the BJP’s mainstream. He may be the “hriday samrat” (emperor of minds) of the public, but within the party he still faces opposition and resistance.

In these circumstances, he will make haste slowly and not undertake policy measures – foreign or domestic – which could give his enemies a handle. His initial strategy, much like that of Narasimha Rao, will be change through stealth. A lot of that is already visible in economic policy and administration.

In foreign and security policy, from the outset he has hewn close to the Vapayee mold. He may have been tough with Pakistan, but he has ignored fire-eaters who want him to do more. He has refused calls to change the nuclear doctrine, invoking Vajpayee. And, if Atalji termed the US as its “natural ally”, Modi modified it only slightly to term it as a “natural global partner.”

Articulation

But at some point, he needs to prepare for the day when his interlocutors will ask: What do you bring to the table ?

In another context, in August, President Obama put it bluntly when he commented that China has been a free rider on the international system for the last thirty years or so. The question also needs to be posed to India which often talks of “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy.”

Is India also free-riding on the world system where the US provides security to or oil sea lanes, or takes on the Islamist challenge in the Middle-East?

While India was poor and weak, we could always look away at some of these issues, but if India’s economy grows in the next decade, we may have to provide some answers to the questions, in our own self interest. So, beyond the broad geopolitical formulations, what many of these countries and China, are wondering, is: What is the role India intends to play in the coming decade – which politically is likely to be the Modi decade?

Actually they wonder what role is India capable of playing. Capability here, is a combination of capacity – military and economic – as well as intentions articulated through policy.

Potential

As of now, all that India brings to the table is its potential. In the present circumstances, this is a big plus. The global balance of power is inexorably shifting in favour of China. Under pressure in the East and South China Sea, the US and its allies want India to rise so as to counter some of China’s pull.

Given the asymmetry between Indian and Chinese military and economic power, India cannot do this by itself, but in combination with others it can. So Modi needs to unpack India’s new foreign and security policies in a world where the US is becoming more selective about its global role, while China is feeling its way around to see how it can shape regional and global policy using its still growing economic and military clout.

Modi is right to emphasise the fact that our destiny will be our neighbourhood, but it also lies in the reshaping and reform of our economic and national security structures to keep pace with what we hope will be a burgeoning economy. Given the ground realities – where China’s power exceeds ours by orders of magnitude – we need allies. That is where relationships with the US, Japan, ASEAN and Australia come in.
Mail Today September 30, 2014

India & China still have big problems between them

From the outset it has been clear that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have to walk the razor's edge in his interaction with China's paramount leader Xi Jinping.

That is because, notwithstanding the friendly rhetoric and promises of Chinese investment, India and China still have big problems between them. The biggest, as Modi's remarks at the press interaction noted, was the border. Since the last major flare up in 1986-87, India and China . 

That is because, notwithstanding the friendly rhetoric and promises of Chinese investment, India and China still have big problems between them. The biggest, as Modi's remarks at the press interaction noted, was the border. Since the last major flare up in 1986-87, India and China have created a 'confidence building measures' regime, which has effectively kept peace there. But, as incidents in the last couple of days reveal, unsettled borders can never really be quiet borders.

For this reason, Modi, was perhaps the first Indian leader in recent times to directly speak of the issue, and that, too, before China's supreme leader. He echoed what Xi himself has been saying, and what he reiterated — that we should resolve the border at the earliest. Second, while the CBMs have done a good work, Modi said there was a need to, at least, work out a commonly accepted alignment of the 4,056-km long Line of Actual Control that marks the border today. There are some 14 places on the LAC where India and China's perception of where it lies differs, and this gives rise to the so-called "transgressions" or "incursions".

According to the 1993 agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity on the LAC, the two countries committed themselves to coming up with a mutually acceptable LAC. But after initial exchanges of maps, the process ground to a halt because in Atal Bihari Vajpayee's tenure, there were expectations that the two sides would actually resolve their border dispute quick time.

Following the appointment of highlevel Special Representatives in the wake of Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing, things moved fast and the two sides worked out a basic agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question "in 2005 which would essentially have the two sides swap their claims — India's Aksai Chin for China's Arunachal Pradesh.

The 17 rounds of discussions between the Special Representatives have done the required work, what is now needed is for the political leaders, which means Xi and Modi, to finalise the settlement. There are other problems, some that have been spoken about openly, some not and some only obliquely. Among the ones that have not openly come up is China's activities in South Asia, especially Pakistan. As long as Beijing seeks to keep India unsettled in its own region, we cannot really develop ties which could be called friendly.  

Among the ones that have been obliquely mentioned by Modi is that of transboundary rivers. In the west the problem relates to the Sutlej and the Indus, and in the east to the Brahmaputra. The Chinese have agreed to provide India with data related to river flows, but there is nothing we can do to prevent them from damming or diverting the flow of the rivers that flow into India.

International law is weak on these issues and the Chinese say they provide India information on river flows on "humanitarian grounds" not on the basis of any special right that we have as a lower riparian.

As a realist, Modi cannot but be unaware of the fact that the Indian public's expectations of him relate to his ability to deliver on the economic front. In that scheme of things, China plays a huge role as the engine of the world's economy. At the same time, that same constituency also expects Modi to best China in the geopolitical competition with China.

Unfortunately, he cannot do both at the same time, particularly at this juncture. He needs time to get the economy going, as well as to reform and restructure the instrumentalities of the state to even think of competing with China as an equal. 

The Economic Times September 20, 2014

India - A counterweight to the rise of China

The report that Chinese President Xi Jinping will be bringing investment offers of over $100 billion is seen as a riposte for Japan’s promise of putting in $35 billion into India over the next five years.

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Japan was invested with all manner of strategic significance by analysts suggesting that this could well be the beginning of a new strategic coalition to check the rise of China.

However, the outcome of the visit was a tad disappointing. India and Japan failed to sign the long-negotiated nuclear deal, or give any clearer indication of the future strategic partnership such as a defence cooperation pact, of the kind India has with the United States.

 

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Japan was invested with all manner of strategic significance by analysts suggesting that this could well be the beginning of a new strategic coalition to check the rise of China. Pic/AFP

Let us look at the metrics: India-Japan trade stands at around $19 billion per annum in contrast to the India-China trade at $65 billion (Japan-China trade is around $350 billion).

Japan is India’s fourth largest investor, having put in about $16 billion since 2000. In 2011, India and Japan signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, but it has not had the desired impact on trade growth.

India is the largest recipient of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance, having got some $16 billion worth of loan assistance mainly in the infrastructure and energy areas along with a commitment of some $38 billion.

China has been a bit player in India till now. But, earlier this year, at the first India-China strategic dialogue, Beijing offered to invest $300 billion in India’s 12th Plan infrastructure requirements, which were estimated at around $1 trillion. Now, comes Mr Xi with his $100 billion.

None of these offers Japanese or Chinese are altruistic. Both follow the logic of market economics. Investing in India provides an outlet for Chinese and Japanese infrastructure construction giants who cannot build anymore at home. Both the countries have a surfeit of new and relatively new highways, railroads and bridges and are looking around for projects in the under-developed world.

But they are also part of a geopolitical competition which pits China against Japan and its ally, the US, in East Asia. India is being seen by Japan and the US as an important counterweight to the rise of China. They do not expect India to be some kind of a military ally, but they believe that a strong India, which has its own set of problems with China, will offset the increasing gravitational pull of Beijing in the East and South-east Asian region.

China has a somewhat limited aim keep India as a neutral in their real battle that for pre-eminence in East Asia, where they are pitted against the Japan-US combine.

India has no real stakes in the conflict, and it is not as if Japan supports the Indian position on our borders with China or Jammu & Kashmir. Yet, New Delhi needs to handle the issue with a great deal of care, and balance the pros and cons of any particular course. We can, as we are doing now, parlay an equidistant posture into obtaining investment and technology from both China and Japan. We already have difficulties with China over our border. Buying more enmity by getting involved in the East Asian power struggle would compromise our security situation, because China is much stronger than India, both economically and in military terms.

However, given our weakness relative to China, we also need to think of friends we may need if China were to turn up the heat against us. An autonomous posture requires a strong military posture, which is what India does not have. And, unless it reforms and restructures its national security system, it will not have in the next decade.

While the Chinese are eager, the Japanese seem to be getting ready to miss the Indian bus once again, to go by their reluctance to press on with the nuclear deal. In the 1990s, when India opened its economy, Japanese companies kept hemming and hawing, and coming up with all kinds of demands, including concessions on importing special food for Japanese expatriates in India. Meanwhile, the Koreans stole the march and established themselves across the country. This is despite the fact that a Japanese company Suzuki had nearly a decade’s advantage over everyone else in the Indian market.

The same could happen again. While Japanese companies like Toshiba and Hitachi are important in the nuclear power business, there are equally good Korean and Russian options available, and the Chinese are not too far behind. As it is, India must also contend with geopolitical unreliability of the Japanese and the Americans. Rich and powerful countries, like rich and powerful individuals, are usually more concerned about themselves. So, in our times of difficulty, Tokyo has ignored us. But, as it is now finding out, its American allies are not as firmly behind them on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue as they would like.

So, India’s best bet is to take what it can, from wherever it comes and build up its infrastructure and keep its geopolitical head down, at least for the next decade. Indeed, we have been too squeamish in accepting Chinese investments. Beijing was not fussy about accepting Japanese and western investment and technology to build up its own infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities in the 1980s and 1990s. Yes, there are areas like telecommunications where discretion would be the better part of valour, but if the Chinese money and Chinese companies want to build roads, railways, bridges and industrial zones in the country, they should be welcomed.

Mid Day September 16, 2014

The report that Chinese President Xi Jinping will be bringing investment offers of over $100 billion is seen as a riposte for Japan’s promise of putting in $35 billion into India over the next five years. - See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/india---a-counterweight-to-the-rise-of-china/15606168#sthash.1JJ6Q612.dpuf

Chance to resolve China-India border dispute

There has been a lot of commentary on the economic goodies that China's paramount leader Xi Jinping is bringing to New Delhi: $100 billion investment in the infrastructure sector, the creation of several large industrial zones and Chinese participation in the modernisation of India's railways, New Silk Route initiatives, Indian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and so on. The sky, it would seem, is the limit.


Obstacle
But Sino-Indian relations are likely to go nowhere unless the two countries are able to resolve their border issue. Having fought a war in 1962, and come close to another in 1987, they have managed to maintain peace and tranquillity there for the past 25 years and forged closer economic and political ties. But the Depsang Plains incident of April-May 2013 is a warning that a disputed border can never be a peaceful border, and it remains the principal obstacle to normal ties between the two rising Asian giants.
Narendra Modi and China's supreme leader Xi Jinping have a historic opportunity to transform this state of affairs. Both are the most powerful politicians to have taken charge of their respective countries in recent times, and, they appear to have the political capital needed and, more important, the larger vision of Sino-Indian relations, to obtain a border settlement.
PM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi’s visit to IndiaThe dispute no longer makes sense - both sides have secured their most vital non-negotiable areas - China has Aksai Chin and India Arunachal Pradesh - and neither side will give them up short of a major war, which itself will be disastrous for both countries.
Intriguingly enough, thrice in the past year and a half, the Chinese leadership has suggested that they are looking for change. In March 2013, May 2013 and more recently in June 2014.
When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had met Xi Jinping in March 2013 during the BRICS meet in Durban, both sides had agreed on the need to accelerate the process of the border settlement. The Chinese news agency Xinhua quoted Xi as saying on March 29 that China and India should "make good use of the mechanism of Special Representatives (SR) to strive for a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon as possible."
The first part of the formulation has been standard in recent years, but it is the second part - "as soon as possible"- that Chance to resolve border dispute PM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi's visit to India by Manoj Joshi is significant. This message was repeated by Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi in May 2013, and most recently by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, during his visit to greet the new Modi government in Delhi in June 2014. In a statement, he noted, "Through years of negotiation, we have come to an agreement on the basics of a boundary agreement, and we are prepared to reach a final settlement." That's as clear a message as you can get.

Push
Curiously, there have been no comparable statements from the Indian side on the desirability or feasibility of an early border settlement. However, privately officials involved in the negotiations say that the Special Representatives' negotiations have achieved what they could, now the top leaderships in the two countries must make the final push.
The SR level talks were initiated in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 2003. The two sides made quick progress, and by April 2005 they reached an "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question." It virtually spelt out the contours of a border settlement: Article IV gave "due consideration" to the two sides "strategic and reasonable interests" and Article VIII agreed that any settlement "should safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas." This was as clear a statement the two sides were ready to swap their claims - India would concede Aksai Chin, a vital strategic area which provides the only all-weather link between Xinjiang and Tibet. And China would accept India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, which has settled populations, in contrast to the other areas in dispute.

Reality
But having achieved this agreement in 2005, there was a slide back. Between 2007-2010, Sino-Indian relations nosedived. In some measure the Indo-US nuclear deal was responsible, and in some measure China's nervousness relating to Tibet where there had been large scale disturbances in 2008 for which Beijing privately held New Delhi responsible. So it was a pleasant surprise when Yang Jichei, appointed China's SR by the Xi Jinping government said at the start of the 16th round of SR talks in June 2013 that he was ready to "break new ground" and "strive for the settlement of the China-India boundary question…in a new period."
The Chinese posture suggests the Xi-Li team has done its homework and feels the time has come to clinch a settlement. There are indications the Modi team has also done its homework. In the last two months this issue has been discussed in depth by the new team led by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.
This is where Modi and Xi come in. Both are regarded as the most powerful politicians to head their respective countries in recent times. But we should not underestimate their difficulties. Any settlement will be unsettling for important constituencies in both countries. If Modi has to get an agreement through Parliament and, before that, the Sangh Parivar, Xi needs to take his Politburo, if not his Central Committee with him.
Both are aware of the historical consequences of the deal and both know that they can only do it now when they are at the height of their powers. Indeed, this is what Prime Minister Vajpayee intended to do in 2003. Unfortunately for him and the nation, he lost the 2004 elections and thereafter India lacked a powerful leader with the necessary political capital to work out a settlement with China.
Mail Today Sep 16, 2014

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-china-border-dispute-xi-jinping-narendra-modi-depsang-plains-aksai-chin-arunachal-pradesh/1/383102.html

What Modi can learn from Xi

Last month, Prime Minister Modi articulated the Indian dream in his extempore address on Independence Day. He packaged a deceptively large vision of the Indian future in penny-packets - a clean country with toilets for all, especially women, a country free of violence, again, especially against women, a manufacturing hub with a social safety net for all and so on.
Though he did dwell on moral corruption, he had little to say on monetary corruption, something which has plagued the nation for a long time, and which roiled the politics of the country for years leading to the UPA's defeat and Modi's spectacular election victory. Somehow, with the passage of the Lokpal Bill, the issue seems to have receded from public memory.

Corruption
Modi has, coined the memorable slogan, "na khaunga, na khaney doonga" (loosely translated to "I will not be corrupt nor permit corruption"). There is little doubt he has tightened the governmental system and his ministers are on tenterhooks all the time, a function of the fact that their boss is not just first among equals, but their omniscient supremo. However, corruption is so widespread, that without tackling it on an institutionalised scale, it cannot be managed by a vigilant leader all by himself. Though, it must be pointed out there is no doubt there will be a positive trickle down impact of a government which is honest at the top, just as it had worked the other way with the UPA.
The one country that Modi can take lessons from is China. Both Modi and Xi are seeking to consolidate a vision of a nation with middle-class values, virtues and attainments though they articulate it in different ways. A corruption free and efficient government which provides a level playing field is the most desirable goal for middle-class folk.
Perhaps Modi has wanted to avoid negativity in taking up corruption at this stage. But he cannot be unaware of the fact that corrupt police, administrators, judges and, above all, politicians, have made India the dystopia of poverty, filth, violence, illiteracy and joblessness. Across the country, at every level of government - chaprasis, policemen, junior engineers, and IAS officers - function in a corrupt system in symbiotic lock-step with our politicians. Beyond the venality of officials exists the criminalised society of new India where mafias operate freely-real estate, sand-mining, coal, timber, liquor, drugs, even education, tent supplies and parking. These cannot be rooted out through ordinary means because they have infiltrated the machinery of the state - the police and the governance system.
The Lokpal movement of Anna Hazare, seems to have lost its way. Modi, himself, has been ambivalent about the Lokpal, believing, presumably, a revitalised administration will make this institution redundant. If so, he is wrong. At some point, he will have to take up the fight directly.

Learning
This is the lesson we can learn from Xi Jinping. From the outset, Xi has been involved in a struggle against corruption. In his first press conference on the first day he took over as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012, Xi announced corruption was ruining the CPC and the country. To fix this he got his aide Wang Qishan to take the post of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Through its draconian authority over the 91 million party members, the CCDI covers almost every aspect of the Chinese government and administration.
Wang has launched a campaign to ensnare both "flies" (smaller functionaries of government) as well as the "tigers" (the highranking leaders). The CCDI and its associated Ministry of Supervision has investigated 182,000 officials in 2013 alone, the highest number in 30 years.

Values
As for the "tigers," since about a year ago 28 ministerial and provincial-level senior leaders have been arrested, including four members (two full members and two alternate members) of the newly formed 18th Central Committee. On their cross-hairs now are a former Poliburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yonkang, the highest ranking official to ever face action, a former Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou who was also a Politburo member has been expelled by the party and is to be court-martialed; another CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong is under investigation.
It would be easy to accuse Xi of using the anti-corruption campaign to consolidate his authority in China. But in taking on the top echelons of the party, he is taking a big risk. But, clearly, the idea of a corruption free country is an intrinsic part of his "dream" because it will make for a more resilient China. Just as, of course, it would a corruption free India. Modi, too, has articulated an dream of development and prosperity, but he needs to ensure that it is not distorted by corruption.
W B Yeats once wrote, "In dreams begins responsibilities." Hopefully, this is something that the leader of China Xi Jinping, and the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi understand well. Both have packaged their plans and perspectives as visions or dreams that spring from the positions of authority that they occupy.
But both can be undone if somehow they are unable to deliver.
Mail Today September 4, 2014

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