Turning away is not an option: Engaging Pakistan through the SAARC

There is a French phrase which, roughly translated, says: the more things change, the more they stay the same. India-Pakistan relations seem condemned to remain stuck in the same place, despite valiant efforts to transform them.

Last week, even while India and other SAARC nations sought to change the regional dynamics, Pakistan seemed to be stuck in a time warp around the early 1990s. 

Islamabad refused to consider two game-changing connectivity agreements. Further, its prime minister reiterated Kashmir’s centrality to Pakistan’s India policy, and its Army sent a group of fedayeen to attack an army post in Jammu.

 

 The Pakistan Army continues to dash any hopes of productive talks with India

 

Cornered 

There was a great deal of movement in the 2004-2008 period with the two countries coming close to agreement on a range of issues. But ever since the Mumbai attacks of 2008, India’s relations with Pakistan have been fraught. 

In the past, too, there had been Pakistani complicity in terrorist attacks on India, but there was something about the brazen audacity of the attack, which had the finger-prints of the Pakistani deep state aka. the Army, which has changed things. 

Needless, to say, Pakistan, has done little or nothing to help. The trial of the key organisers of the carnage - Zaki ur Rehman and his associates - continues fitfully, even while the principal villain Jamaat ud Dawa chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed moves around freely in Pakistan with an official security detail. 

This week, Saeed will organise a congregation of the JuD at the Minar-e-Pakistan, built to commemorate the founding of the country. 

The Pakistani government headed by Asif Ali Zardari did make a few desultory attempts to improve ties, but was quickly swatted down by the Army. 

As for Nawaz Sharif, he came with much promise to not only normalise ties with India, but to put the powerful Army in its place. Today, it is Sharif who has been cornered and shown the limits of his authority. 

In such circumstances, there are a lot of question marks in India about ways and means of dealing with Pakistan. After the SAARC summit, which saw Islamabad blocking even multilateral efforts to promote road and rail connectivity, there were suggestions that maybe the time had come to simply turn away from Pakistan. But that is hardly a viable option.

Since 1991, India has followed a policy of engaging Pakistan in a broad-based dialogue, aimed at solving problems big and small. Initially, the aim was a process which would, by solving the relatively smaller issues like the Siachen, Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage disputes, generate momentum and goodwill to resolve the bigger issues like the J&K and Pakistani support for terrorism and militancy aimed at India. 

In 2004, the decision to create a South Asian Free Trade Area brought forwards the prospect of Indo-Pak normalisation in the wider ambit of regional cooperation. 

Surrender 

But over time it has become evident that this is not working. The Pakistani business community and large sections of its political class are aware of the benefits of opening up. However, the army and the deep state think that normalisation of ties is bad enough, but economic integration with India is nothing short of surrender. And so the struggle continues between those who seek to normalise ties, and those who oppose it. 

The duality in India-Pakistan relationship is evident from the fact that even while Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accepted Narendra Modi’s invitation to participate in the latter’s inaugural along with other SAARC leaders in May, the deep state’s answer was to get its proxies to attack the Indian consulate at Herat on May 23rd, the eve of Modi’s inauguration. Fortunately, the attackers failed to get into the mission and were killed by the outer ring security made up of Afghan personnel. 

Another manifestation of the same phenomenon has been the efforts to turn up the heat in the Kashmir border. It is no coincidence that the SAARC summit was followed by a fedayeen attack on an Indian Army post at Arnia sector in Jammu where three army personnel were killed along with five civilians. 

Isolation 

India shares a 3,323 km international border and a 740 km Line of Control with Pakistan. This is already fenced and floodlit and has prevented large-scale movement across the border. However, smaller scale intrusions take place almost every day and in recent months, the ceasefire that has held along the LoC since November 2003 has shown signs of breaking down. 

Given the length of the border and terrain it traverses, the idea of isolating Pakistan from India by building a huge wall, just as Israel has done with the West Bank and Gaza, does not hold water. As Israel has learnt, the fortress can be breached, not in the least by missiles and rockets. 

Further, as IB chief Asif Ibrahim has pointed out, the Indian diaspora - especially in the Gulf - is a target of Pakistani efforts to radicalise India’s Muslim population.

In any case, Pakistani agents have made use of the more-or-less open border that our country has with Nepal and Bangladesh. 

There are no easy fixes for Indian policy. Its long-term goal has to be the transformation of Pakistan to a “normal” country. 

In a bid to prevent the Pakistani veto in SAARC, India sought to promote the extra-regional Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Cooperation (BIMSTEC) involving Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal. But somehow, BIMSTEC has not quite taken off and has been victim of Indian lassitude. 

So, SAARC remains the only viable vehicle for South Asian integration, a project vital for India because a viable South Asian economy is a necessary pre-condition for our ability to engage effectively with ASEAN and China. And when we look at SAARC, the key hurdle it must overcome is the India-Pakistan problem. 

Mail Today December 3, 2014

Narenda Modi makes a mark on the global stage

It has been six months since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister of India. In this period he has set a scorching pace, but mainly in the area of foreign policy. He has undertaken eight foreign trips, of which six were to the Asia-Pacific region. There were bilateral visits, as well as some which took place on the sidelines of multilateral summits. 

In the process, we have a clearer outline of a Modi foreign policy which appears to have two key elements—first, to attract investment and technology to trigger rapid economic growth in the country; and second, to shore up India’s strategic position in its neighbourhood and larger Asian region. 

It has featured several of “out of the box” elements, such as the invite to all Saarc head of states to attend his inauguration, or to have the president of the United States come as the chief guest at the 2015 Republic Day parade.

One set of Modi’s visits can be seen as roadshows, aimed at showcasing himself and his government and offering up the promise of a new India which was open for business, both economic and strategic. 

This was aimed at two targets—first, countries like the Japan, U.S. and Australia, from whom India expected investment, trade and with whom New Delhi sought strategic ties; and second, mainly with neighbours like Bhutan, Myanmar and Nepal, was where the aim was to bind the neighbourhood in closer economic and strategic ties to India. 

There can be little doubt that the subtext of his visits to nine countries has been China. Whether it is in shoring up the neighbourhood, or Japan, U.S., Australia or even Fiji, New Delhi has Beijing in its mind. 

But Modi has, at the same time, signalled a desire to do business with China. 

Modi appears to be a realist of the old school believing that what is supreme is national interest (pictured in Brisbane, Australia on 14th November, 2014)

He has gone along with Beijing on economic issues and taken India into the membership of the New Development Bank (Brics) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both Chinese initiatives aimed at loosening the power of western countries and Japan over international financial institutions. 

But he has been equally firm in his dealings with the country, as was evidenced by his handling of the Chumar incident during the visit of Xi Jinping. 

In speeches and joint statements in Japan, U.S. and Australia, security in relation to China was a key element. 

It does not take a genius to understand the context of India-Japan’s shared commitment to “maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight, civil aviation safety, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law”. 

With Australia, too, Modi called for greater cooperation on maintaining maritime security. 

Considering both these countries are close allies of the U.S., it also means, though not quite spelt out, enhanced Indo-U.S. naval cooperation. 

Modi appears to be a realist of the old school believing that what is supreme is national interest. 

While India shares its world view with the West in terms of its institutions, laws— domestic and international— and so on, it is also aware that countries like Japan and the U.S. have a far denser relationship, and hence understands the need for good relations with China. 

So, even while India has made it clear that it stands with the West on freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes, it is also aware that it needs to have friendly, if not excellent, relations with China, the Asian economic giant which is on its way to becoming a world power. 

This was most clearly manifested in the dual nature of the Xi Jinping visit to India, which featured Chinese commitments on infrastructure investments, as well as Modi’s appointment of Ajit Doval as the Special Representative of India for talks on the border issue and strategic relations with China only after the stage had been set through his visits to the U.S., Japan and Australia. 

Modi has been radical, but not rash and has displayed the surefootedness of a veteran. An example of this was evident in his dealings with Pakistan. Despite a great deal of speculation, he steadfastly refused to deal with Nawaz Sharif in Kathmandu. 

The reason became apparent when it transpired that the first meeting and the customary hand-shake would have taken place on November 26, the sixth anniversary of the Mumbai attack, and played badly at home. But the following day, at the retreat at Dhulikhel, he went and shared a warm handshake with Sharif. 

COURTING UNCLE SAM

Modi's political skills were most evident during his trip to the U.S. 

The watershed was his Madison Square Garden speech, which was widely seen and commented on in the U.S. and sent a signal to Barack Obama that a different kind of

The result was a successful visit with multiple features— commitment by the U.S. to open the defence technology tap as well as cooperation in a range of other areas. 

India is acutely aware that relations with the world’s greatest power has a multiplier effect on opening doors in Japan, Australia and Europe, all of whom are military allies of the U.S. 

But Uncle Sam and the others expect a lot of deliverables from India—easier terms for doing business in the country, stronger IPR protection, a revised nuclear liability law and so on. 

Obama’s visit as chief guest at the Republic Day function will also put pressure on both sides to come up with their respective deliverables. 

You can be sure that both sides are working hard at it and there will be a marked transformation in the texture of Indo-U.S. relations over the coming years.

ASIAN ALLY 

Going by body language, Modi’s most successful visit has been to Japan. 

This was apparent from the warm hug Modi & his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe shared at their meeting. 

Modi plays Japan’s traditional Taiko drum during his Tokyo trip. He came  away with a promise of $35 billion worth of investment over the next five years

At the end of the visit, Modi was not able to get a nuclear agreement with Tokyo, but he did come away with a promise of $35 billion worth of investment over the next five years, perhaps, just about the amount India would actually be able to absorb. 

Just what Japanese investment means is evident from projects that are already underway, such as the Delhi Metro. 

Equally important is the fledgling cooperation in defence between the two.

PAL IN THE PACIFIC

Modi is the first Indian PM to visit Australia after Rajiv Gandhi in 1986. Australia may be a small player on the international stage, but it is a big one in the Asia-Pacific region through its network of relationships in the ASEAN, and this is what Modi is seeking to exploit. 

Australia is an important cog of the U.S. alliance system and closer ties with it could boost India’s maritime security, given the nation’s sophisticated intelligence system and proximity to key straits leading into the Indian Ocean. 

There was a pleasant break in the formality of G20 when Modi walked in and gave Aussie PM Abbott a hug. 

By the time he addressed the Oz Parliament later in the week, Australia was won over

It is one of the richest countries in the world, with a GDP of $1.56 trillion, just a shade behind India’s $1.87 trillion. 

Of great significance is the community of nearly 300,000 Australians of Indian origin, many of whom are professionals in a variety of sectors like medicine, IT and finance. 

Australia is also an important destination for Indian students.

NEIGHBOUR

India's relations with Nepal have been fraught.Remarkably, however, the prickly Nepalese have taken to Modi. 

Modi with Nepal PM Sushil Koirala. 

One reason for this is that Modi is the first Indian PM to visit Nepal in 17 years. 

He has also indicated to Kathmandu that he is open to suggestions on revising the 1950 India-Nepal Friendship Treaty, an important item in the agenda of many Nepalese nationalists. 

Nepal’s location makes it vital to India’s security and Modi’s government is determined to take steps to integrate it into the larger South Asian system through the integration of road, rail and power grid systems & economic cooperation.

 Mail Today November 30, 2014

India must adjust to the rise of China

The decision to invite US President Barack Obama to be the chief guest at the 66th Republic Day marks out in the clearest terms Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strategic outlook. Having personally had to deal with the Chumur episode during the visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping in September, Modi is familiar with just how the assertive leader of China is seeking to redraw the geopolitical landscape of Asia.

In the past year, we have seen Beijing make inroads into Sri Lanka and witnessed our old ally Russia drifting into the Chinese camp. We have also seen the PLA Navy’s forays into the Indian Ocean region which are barely concealed by the mask of anti-piracy operations.

 

India’s Prime Minister Modi expressed concern to China’s visiting President Xi Jinping on September 18 about “incidents” on the two countries’ disputed border, as a stand-off between troops at the frontier had eclipsed key talks. 

This is not a new development, but has intensified since 2010 as Xi jockeyed for power in Beijing. But now backed by the modernised PLA and the huge cash reserves accumulated by the economy, China is seeking to expand its economic and political universe.

In the past months, China has set out its ambitions through the establishment of the New Development or BRICS Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and committing more than $40 billion to create transportation linkages under the aegis of its Silk Route initiative. Speaking at the BRICS CEO’s meeting, earlier in November, Xi’s message to the world was that in the next five years China would import goods worth $10 trillion, send outward direct investments worth $1.2 trillion, and also send out 500 million tourists.

All this was part of a more ambitious scheme for a Free Trade Area Asia Pacific (FTAAP) which China got the 21-member APEC to endorse. Economists say that the FTAAP could provide a substantial boost to world trade as compared to the two regional trade pacts that are presently under prolonged negotiation the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership (RCEP).

What we are witnessing is the third surge of the Chinese economy, one aimed at even closer integration of the Asian economies, with much clearer Chinese leadership. In a range of area China seeks to move from being a low-cost manufacturer to a producer of Chinese-designed and made goods.

The other leg of this advance is political. China insists in asserting its maritime claims in Asia, even while seeking to draw it into a close economic embrace. However, in human affairs, it is well known that national pride is often a greater concern than a desire for economic benefit. As a result, many Asian countries are bandwagoning with the United States in its military “rebalance” to the region.

In the face off between China and the US, we see features of competition and cooperation. This was manifested by the FTAAP, as well as three important bilateral agreements signed in Beijing between the US and China at the sidelines of the APEC summit. The first was a bilateral agreement on climate change which could have the effect of driving the negotiations for a global climate deal. The two other military agreements that are still under negotiations that seek to manage their military competition.

But the big Chinese achievement which also played itself out on the sidelines of the APEC summit was the four-point agreement between China and Japan that enabled the Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe to have a short, but significant summit.

In the agreement, Japan accepted the need for “facing history squarely and looking forward to the future” short-hand for its horrific wartime role in China. Further, it acknowledged that the two parties “had different views” about the issue of the Senkaku/Diayou islands. Japan may not quite have accepted that there is a dispute over the status of the islands, but it has come close to it.

What do all these developments mean for India ? First, after a period of rising tensions, countries like the US and Japan are seeking to reset their ties with a rising China. Even while standing up to China, their approach seeks to accommodate it as well. All three are densely connected with each other through trade and economic ties and are aware of the consequences of a breakdown.

Second, China is benchmarking itself against the United States. While its “new type of great power relations” seeks a non-confrontational and cooperative relationship with the US, it is bent on getting the US to accept it as an equal stake-holder in the Asia Pacific; in future, of course, it may seek to supplant it.

India’s best course is the one that Prime Minister Modi is setting. This seeks to position India as a “swing state”. On one hand, India has joined the New Development Bank, the AIIB and resisted American-led efforts to condemn Russia over Ukraine. On the other, it is actively wooing the US and its allies, Japan and Australia, in the Asia Pacific region.

This is also a prudent course, both the US and Japan, which have much denser relations with China are adjusting to the rise of China in a similar way competition and cooperation there is no reason why New Delhi should not. Yet, at a broad level, in the area of trade, finance, maritime security, non-proliferation and human rights, India remains broadly aligned with the western countries.

India has some sympathy with China’s demand for a more equitable world order. But is also aware that Beijing, in turn, is not particular sympathetic to India’s demand for a membership in bodies like the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the UN Security Council. India remains deeply distrustful of Beijing because of the Sino-Indian border dispute, its relationship with Pakistan and its competitive efforts to displace India in its own backyard, the South Asian region and its new activities in the Indian Ocean region. 

Mid Day November 25, 2014

Modi's historic Obama coup

The decision to invite US President Barack Obama to be the chief guest at the 66th Republic Day is the clearest indicator of the directions of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strategic outlook. 

An assertive China under the leadership of Xi Jinping is seeking to re-draw the geopolitical landscape of Asia backed by a modernised PLA and the massive cash reserves of the country. India’s ally Russia is drifting into the Chinese camp.

New Delhi has so far been somnolent, but now, with a new and vigorous Government, it is staking out its response. 

This is evident to those reading between the lines of official statements and comments made during the official visits of Modi to Japan, the US and Australia in recent months. Remarkably, till now, not a single American leader has ever been invited as the chief guest for Republic Day. 

 

We have had the Chinese — Marshal Ye Jianying in 1958, and even the Pakistanis, Ghulam Mohammed in 1955 and Rana Abdul Hamid in 1965 — and of course, the Soviets, British, French and others, but never an American. 

This was clearly no oversight, but a statement of India’s world view. Well, that world view is now changing. The decision to dump hidebound attitudes is very much in keeping with Modi’s “out of the box” approach in policy-making. 

This was first evident in Modi’s invitation to all SAARC leaders to attend his swearing-in. Subsequently, he followed this up with close interactions with America’s two key Asia-Pacific allies Japan and Australia. 

It was also marked by the showmanship visible in the public meetings with Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in New York and Sydney which helped focus minds in Washington and Canberra. 

There should be no doubt in any mind that these two countries march lockstep with the Americans and all our initiatives with them, especially those related to nuclear and strategic issues will come to nought, unless Washington is on board. 

Actually, to be more accurate, the issue was more about India coming on board the American-led initiatives to coordinate a response to the rise of China. 

 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee recognised this when he spoke of the US and India as “natural allies”. Subsequently, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice privately declared that the US was ready to help India become a great power in the 21st century. Since 2010, Beijing’s growing assertion has been causing disquiet in many Asian capitals. It is to address this that the US announced a “pivot” to Asia, later rechristened “rebalance.” 

Though India was facing its own pressures along the entire length of its 4,000km border with China, New Delhi chose to stick it out alone and try and work out an accommodation with Beijing.Towards this end, it accepted the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in October 2013 and accepted China’s invitation for a Maritime Security Dialogue.

But the events in September 2014, when supreme leader Xi Jinping’s visit was accompanied by a show of force by the PLA in Chumur, convinced New Delhi that the Chinese policy had a depth and purpose which required a new and more sophisticated response.

Towards that end, India has adopted a stance of cooperation and competition with China, manifested by its decision to be party to the Chinese-sponsored initiatives like the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, even while enhancing its own defence infrastructure and reaching out to countries wary of Beijing.

India’s relations with the US have zig-zagged since the mid 1990s when Robin Raphel and Bill Clinton sought to pummel New Delhi on the score of non-proliferation and Kashmir. They reached their nadir with the nuclear tests of 1998, but the Talbott-Jaswant Singh dialogue led to Bill Clinton reaching out to India in the last years of his presidency.

The George W. Bush era (2001-09) was an Indian-American love fest culminating in the Indo-US nuclear deal which no one but Bush and the Republicans could have delivered.But thereafter, under Obama, and the paralysis afflicting the UPA-II government in New Delhi, things were allowed to drift.

Obama may be a lame duck, but it is the American system we are engaging, and it is clear in word and deed that Washington has now come to accept the centrality of India to any future Asian pivot or re-balance.

Mail Today November 23, 2014

The pragmatic idealism of Jawaharlal Nehru

Somewhere in the files of the PMO there is a 1949 query by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to his Army chief, General K M Cariappa, asking if the Indian Army would be able to intervene and prevent the Chinese conquest of Tibet. The General’s response was that, given the capacity of the Army and the difficult communication links with Tibet, intervention was out of the question. 

Nehru was not the caricature woolly-headed idealist that his critics make him out to be. He had to deal with the instruments under his command. And among these was an army that lacked the size and heft to take on the battle-hardened PLA across the Himalayas in Tibet in 1950. 

Redeployment 

India’s response to the invasion of Tibet by China, beginning January 1, 1950, was, therefore, cautious. Nehru’s interim government had already supplied weapons and trained Tibetans since 1946. But with Chinese power rampant, the Indian effort became covert. 

According to one source, India quietly dispatched 40,000 rifles to the Khampa regions, the first to feel the weight of the PLA invasion. 

Sardar Patel’s famous letter to Nehru on November 7, 1950, warning of the dangers arising from the Chinese invasion of Tibet, was not meant as a critique of Nehru as many uber-nationalists claim, but as part of a policy review which was undertaken after the Sardar passed away a month later. 

Jawaharlal Nehru meets then Army chief General K.C. Cariappa at Palam Aerodrome in 1949

A committee headed by Major General Himmatsinhji, the Deputy Minister for Defence, was set up to examine the issues of the border and external intelligence. 

The Committee, which comprised of senior army, intelligence and foreign ministry officials, submitted its reports in two parts, one dealing with the eastern border in April 1951 and the other with the western border in September. 

The recommendations called for the reorganisation and redeployment of the military forces and an increase in the size of the infantry and supporting arms, the development of certain airfields, the setting up of radar stations in the east, and an increase in the size of the Assam Rifles to patrol the border. 

It called for the strengthening of the administration in the eastern areas and the strengthening of the IB network. 

The dilemma before Nehru was stark. His army could not take on the PLA in Tibet. So, he used diplomacy to delay that moment of confrontation. Unfortunately, it came sooner rather than later and its causes had as much to do with India’s China policy as Beijijng’s internal power struggles.

The Indian Army not only lacked the capacity to intervene in Tibet - it did not even have the ability to defend India’s northern border. To right this, paradoxically, Nehru needed economic growth, which required minimising defence expenditures, while encouraging the creation of a domestic defence industry. 

Towards that end, the government appointed Dr D.S. Kothari as the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and the head of the new Defence Science Organisation in 1949. 

In 1957 India began work on the design and development of a combat aircraft which was to be done by a German team of Dr Kurt Tank and Engineer Mittelhuber, while an Indian team of Dr Ghatage and Raj Mahindra would design a jet trainer. 

The first flight of the HF-24 took place in June 1961 and the trainer HJT-16 (Kiran) in September 1964. 

But Nehru’s diplomacy failed to synchronise with his defence modernisation plans. Also, it was hit by America’s decision to arm Pakistan in the name of fighting Communism. 

Even though India expanded its ordnance factories and established facilities to make and assemble trucks, aircraft and other equipment, poor management and scarce resources ensured that the armed forces were badly equipped when the crisis with China erupted in 1959, culminating in the disastrous war of 1962 that shattered Nehru’s reputation and health. 

Pragmatism 

Nehru’s pragmatism is best visible in his policy on nuclear weapons. He was among the first leaders to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons in the world. However, he was also the person who summoned Homi Bhabha and gave him the wherewithal to start India’s civil nuclear programme. 

In 1956, a nuclear reactor named Apsara, designed and built by Indian scientists and engineers, went critical. This was the first reactor to go critical in all of Asia. By 1958-1959, the DAE overtook the CSIR as the most important scientific institution in the country. 

One third of all R&D expenditures were flowing to the DAE. This led to the 1955 Canadian offer of a nuclear reactor called CIRUS (Canada-India-US) with the initial load of uranium fuel to be supplied by them came through. Nehru and Bhabha’s strategy was to build India’s nuclear capacity in such a way that it could be quickly transformed into a strategic capability.

Once again, unfortunately, they were let down by their instrumentalities. The DAE failed to deliver the plutonium reprocessing facility in time and the result was that India did not have the wherewithal to carry out a nuclear test shortly after the Chinese test of October 1964 or before the cut-off date of January 1, 1967 for the NPT. 

 Criticism 

It is easy to criticise Nehru today. His priority then, as it remains that of our country today, is to take hundreds of millions of poor Indians out of poverty and protect the country’s territorial integrity. 

Given the circumstances, he did not do a bad job, and he did it without murdering millions as was done in China, or overturning democracy, as was the case in many countries of the time. 

But to understand him, you have to place yourself in his very large-sized shoes. Suffice to say, none of the heroes of today’s uber-nationalists would be able to fill them.

Mail Today  November 20, 2014

Kashmir and AFSPA

The sentencing of five army personnel, including the commanding officer of 4 Rajput regiment, for the murder of three young Kashmiris, is a major development for the promotion of human rights and ending the policy of impunity with which the army and police forces have operated in some parts of the country. It will also help to make the fight against Islamist militancy and radicalism more effective.

In April 2010, the three Kashmiris—Shezad Ahmed, Riyaz Ahmed and Mohammed Shafi of Nadihal village of Baramulla were lured by two local counter-insurgency agents to the Kalaroos village in the Machil sector near the LoC. They were promised jobs as porters, instead they were handed over to the army personnel who killed them near the Sona Pindi post and claimed that they were Pakistani infiltrators.  After a hue and cry and despite the efforts of some senior officers, the Army took up their court martial proceedings in December 2013 and the verdict was passed on Thursday. It will now go through the appeals process.

The sentencing of the men is only the tip of the iceberg of the issue of some 3,000 unknown men who lie buried along the Line of Control in Kashmir. While most of them are militants who tried to infiltrate or leave the Valley during the 25-year old insurgency, there is a suspicion among many that they have also fallen victim to the greed of rogue army personnel. This is an issue the country needs to confront with some urgency.

The issue is directly linked to that of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act which gives military personnel indemnity against killing people in an insurgency-hit area. The indemnity is meant to protect the personnel from prosecution and legal action. However, it is only for actions done in the exercise of their duty, but the forces have often used it to cover up actions that were in clearly illegal and some of them ought to be classified as murder. But while the intention of the act is to protect soldiers who have acted in good faith, often it is used to protect people who have clearly violated its intention and carried out acts that are clearly illegal.

There is little doubt that if the armed forces and police personnel are to operate in insurgency-hit areas, they need legal protection against suits and prosecution for acts they may carry out in the exercise of their duties. However, equally, there is need to protect the ordinary citizens from palpably illegal actions carried out by security forces’ personnel using the act as a shield. The best way out of this conundrum is to ensure that the draconian provisions of the law are balanced with equally draconian penalties against those who wilfully misuse the act.
The government needs to consider, too, that the situation in most insurgency-hit parts of the country is very different from the time the law was passed. Whether it is the North-east or J&K militancy is at an all time low and this is not because of the AFSPA, but the changed political dynamics of the region. It would be fitting for the government to consider the abrogation of the act in line with the improved situation there.

The role of the army and police is to fight against those who violate the laws of the land and try to overthrow its legal government. But by equal measure, it is the duty of these forces to uphold the law and any violation of the rights of non-combatants and innocents deserves punishment. In our country, as is well known, even the President cannot order the death of a person. It can only be done by the courts of law and through due process.

Most people in India are not quite aware of the extent of human rights violations and illegal acts that have taken place in Kashmir and other places like Nagaland and Manipur.  Torture was fairly common, there were a lot of extra-judicial killings and cover-ups of incidents were common.

The interesting thing is that the Indian Army usually took a tough approach towards such actions and many of its soldiers were court-martialled and jailed for excessive use of force, custodial killings and rapes. However, the army, in its wisdom, did not publicise this. However, other forces like the BSF and CRPF more often than not failed to act against their personnel in many of the very obvious atrocities that took place and which only added fuel to the fire of militancy.

Ironically, the government was much tougher on violations in the pre Nine-Eleven era. After the “Global War on Terror”, the government has taken the excuse of terrorism to deny justice to the innocent who have been victimised in the name of fighting terror. In the past the government used to provide details on the personnel punished and even publish them in the Home Ministry annual report. Now that tradition is forgotten and the lobby in support of maintaining the AFSPA, regardless of the dramatic improvement in the ground situation, has become impossible to counter.  

The problem is that many of the atrocities took place in the very small area of the Kashmir Valley. It has understandably left behind a residue of bitterness which will not be easy to eliminate. Actions like the Army’s decision to acknowledge a mistake in the killing of two young men in Budgam earlier this month, and the sentence to the Rajput regiment personnel, are an important first step. The people know that we cannot turn back time or get back their loved ones, but an acknowledgement of the truth of what happened in the past helps in the healing process.
An expanded version of article published in Nai Dunia November 18 2014