However else it is dressed up, the reality is that the world is about
to witness a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan, one that can have
disastrous consequences for the region
It is well known that of all military operations, retreat is the most
difficult and complicated. A victorious march that takes a wrong turn
can end in a stalemate, but a retreat gone wrong will most likely turn
into a disaster. These are the grim forebodings that come to mind when
we think of the forthcoming withdrawal of the American-led military
forces from Afghanistan.
Whistling in the dark
The Obama Administration is putting it out as though the withdrawal is a
great achievement, since it will pull it out of the quagmire that it
has been stuck in ever since George Bush declared a “global war on
terror.” But the reality is shoddier — we are witnessing yet another
western retreat from Afghanistan, one that can have baleful consequences
for others. No matter what the Americans say or do officially, they
are, essentially, whistling in the dark.
The departure of the Americans and their allies — even though reports
suggest that a small force will remain — is a fraught moment for the
Afghans, the United States and neighbouring countries. Last month,
representatives of India, Russia and China met in Moscow. According to
an official in the know, the discussion was businesslike and devoid of
the double-speak that often marks the occasion. The subject was
Afghanistan. Faced with the withdrawal of the American-led alliance from
the country, the three regional powers are scrambling to see how they
can stabilise the situation. Each of them has interests there, and none
of these really clash.
But all three have an interest in ensuring that Afghanistan is stable
and secure, witnesses economic growth and reconstruction, and is
integrated into the regional economy. India and China are interested in
ensuring that a war-ravaged Afghanistan does not once again become a
place where militants are able to establish training camps freely. Both
have important investments — India’s $ 2 billion are spread in
development projects to promote Afghan stability, while China’s $ 3
billion could aid in its prosperity. As for Russia, it is the primary
security provider to the Central Asian states and has an interest in
preventing the return of a situation of civil war.
It is important that the post-U.S. situation does not degenerate into an
India-Pakistan battlefield. The responsibility here lies heavier with
New Delhi, since Pakistan can be trusted to follow its baser instincts.
Indeed, New Delhi’s strategy must be to prevent Islamabad from trying to
turn the Afghan clock back to the pre-American days. In this, it can
fruitfully use the dialogue processes it has established with Russia and
China and, separately, the U.S. Interestingly, in the recent
India-China-Russia talks, the Chinese pointedly avoided projecting
Islamabad’s case and spoke for their own interests, just as the other
interlocutors did.
But for things to work, there is need for both Washington and Islamabad
to confront the hard realities. As for the U.S., writing in Foreign Policy,
Vali Nasr wrote “America has not won this war on the battlefield, nor
has the country ended it at the negotiating table. America is just
washing its hands of this war.” According to Mr. Nasr, who worked in
Richard Holbrooke’s AfPak team in the U.S. State Department, President
Obama’s attitude to the American commitment in Afghanistan has been
dictated by domestic politics — when it was popular back home he backed
it, and when it became unpopular, he pushed for terminating the U.S.
commitment. The American withdrawal, Mr. Nasr argues, is without any
concern for the fate of Afghanistan itself, or for the possible chaos
that may follow in the region.
As for Pakistan, the belief among some key players, notably in the Army,
that there can once again be “Fateh” (Victory) in Kabul is delusional.
Nothing in the ground situation suggests that the writ of the Taliban
will run across Afghanistan again, at least not the Taliban that
Pakistan so effectively aided and controlled in the 1990s. Indeed, the
most unstable part of the country will be the eastern region bordering
Pakistan, whose own border with Afghanistan is the site of an insurgency
led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP). If anything, the TTP
could be the principal beneficiary of the withdrawal, since it will find
it easier to get sanctuary and arms from the Taliban.
As of now, in the international process, we have the western countries
trying to work out a negotiated settlement that will bring elements of
the Taliban into the governance of the country, based on the
constitution of the Loya Jirga of 2003. This Doha process has been a
slow-moving affair with the Taliban delegation in the Qatari capital
twiddling its thumbs most of the time. One problem is no one is really
clear as to whether they are dealing with the genuine representatives of
Mullah Omar. The bigger problem is that both Islamabad and the Taliban
are merely hedging in their responses to the West and they are waiting
to see how precipitous the American retreat is, and what happens in the
run-up to the Afghan elections of 2014.
Even today, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar, and several of
its top leaders live in Pakistan. Though Islamabad says it is supporting
the Doha process, there are doubts as to whether or not Pakistan can
actually “deliver” the Taliban to the U.S. and its allies. But there can
be few doubts about Islamabad’s ability to play the spoiler. This is
what countries like the U.S., India, Russia and China need to prevent
through coordinated diplomacy. And talking of elections, we have to see
just how the election in Pakistan expected in a few months will play
out.
Since 2002, a set of new facts has been created on the ground. Foremost
among these have been the presence of an elected Afghan government and,
now, a substantial Afghan National Security Force. This will continue to
get the support of the international community and the ANSF will also
have the ability to control the key parts of the country, as long as it
gets external support. On the other hand, the Taliban has suffered
considerable attrition and the relations between Pakistan and the
Taliban have been conditioned by the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban,
Pakistan (TTP) as well as the unhappy experience of the Taliban at the
hands of the ISI.
There is one important, and indeed overriding, consideration in the
manner in which we deal with Afghanistan. Both the U.S. and India need
to recognise that they have far greater security interests in Pakistan
than in benighted Afghanistan. The “victor” of Kabul will inherit a
war-torn and ravaged country without the basics of schools, hospitals
and transportation systems. But should the Afghan situation catalyse the
rise of Islamists in Pakistan, India will be in for trouble. It does
not need to be repeated that Pakistan is a country with some industrial
capacity, nuclear weapons and a powerful military. Its capacity for
mischief would go up by orders of magnitude, were the Islamists gathered
by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the Difa-e-Pakistan Council to become even
more central to the country’s politics.
AfPak to PakAf
For this reason, it is important to reverse the appellation AfPak to
PakAf, at least mentally. We need to ensure that a “solution” in
Afghanistan has a collateral beneficial effect in Pakistan. Or, at
least, it should not affect Pakistan negatively. This is not, of course,
a call for pandering to Islamabad’s Afghan fantasies.
The presence of U.S.-led forces has played a stabilising role in
Afghanistan. But now they are going and leaving fear in their wake. The
Afghans are petrified at the prospect of a renewed civil war and the
return of the Taliban, the Pakistanis, or at least the sensible ones,
are scared of the threat from the TTP. India, Russia and China are
worried about the possible spill-over effects of a civil war in the
country. As for the U.S., its fear is that its retreat could, through
some missteps, become a rout.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
The Hindu March 11, 2013
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