India needs a federal foreign policy

The competitive populism in Tamil Nadu over the situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka has generated a great deal of alarm in New Delhi over the manner in which political issues relating to a State have begun impinging on India’s foreign and security policies. Though somewhat over the top, the Dravidian parties have a point, but a general one rather than the specific case they are advocating.

The general point is that in any country, the people have a right to advocate and push for a particular foreign and security policy. Given our linguistic, ethnic, religious and ideological divisions, these views often come across as those belonging to this or that section. That, too, is legitimate. But at the end of the day, this diverse country must have a single policy and its execution must be the responsibility of its federal government. 

Sectional interests

The government structure as such does not cater to these sectional interests; in other words, there are no constitutional or institutional mechanisms to relay those interests. So, with Union governments taking the form of coalitions, they have become vulnerable to party or sectional pressure which often takes the form of pure blackmail.

The withdrawal of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam from the United Progressive Alliance government could be seen as being part of the rough and tumble of coalition politics. Actually, it is more likely that the party has used the Sri Lankan crisis to push for a separation from the UPA, because it is politically expedient for it to do so. After all, what is happening in 2013 — or even what happened in 2012 — is not the worst that has befallen the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

But with general elections looming, competitive populism seems to be ruling the roost. The DMK wanted the UPA government to pilot a resolution in the United Nations demanding an international probe into alleged war crimes tantamount to “genocide” in Sri Lanka. Then with Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa joining the fray, the demands escalated — a boycott of the Commonwealth Heads of Government summit to be held later this year in Colombo, a ban on Sri Lankan players in the Indian Premier League matches in Tamil Nadu and an Assembly resolution asking the Union government to get the U.N. to create a separate Eelam in Sri Lanka.

The DMK and the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam are only a more extreme manifestation of a trend we have been witnessing recently in India where coalition constituents and States are bringing foreign and security issues to the bargaining table. Actually, the leader of this pack has been the Indian Left for which the United States is a permanent anathema. This is what led to the crisis in UPA-I in 2008 when the Left pulled out of the coalition because it opposed the India-U.S. civil nuclear deal. This move of the Left was also pitched as much on its belief that nothing good could come out of an agreement with “imperialist” America, as its attempt to cloak the decision in the garb of attacking America for its anti-Muslim policies.

The next instance of this “State-first” approach occurred when West Bengal Chief Minister and then UPA coalition partner, Mamata Banerjee, opposed the river waters agreement with Bangladesh. In September 2011, on the eve of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka, the Union government was forced to call off the signing of a pact that would have ratified a formula for sharing the waters of the Teesta with Bangladesh.

The surprise entrant into this club was Narendra Modi who suddenly jumped into the Sir Creek issue on the eve of the Gujarat elections. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Modi said that not only should India not hand over the Creek to Pakistan, it should stop any dialogue with Islamabad on the issue. Any concession by New Delhi would affect Gujarat negatively.

In all four instances, it is possible to argue for a “Union of India” stand rather than that of the State or party in question. In Sri Lanka, the Government of India has had to balance its policies to ensure that Colombo does not drift towards Beijing and Islamabad. There also is the question of pushing resolutions on the territorial issues of other countries, having burnt our hands on the Kashmir issue once. Equally, resolutions on human rights in international bodies are a double-edged sword, especially given our own shoddy record in dealing with internal insurgency.

As for the Teesta issue, there were expectations that in exchange for the river waters treaty, Bangladesh would sign an agreement giving India transit rights to its land-locked north-east. Clearly, while West Bengal may have notionally given up something, there was the advantage of the greater good that would accrue, not only for the north-eastern states but West Bengal as well, through the increased commerce that would have resulted from a transit agreement.

In the case of the nuclear deal, too, the net gainer was India. It was the U.S. which had to abandon its sanctions regime against us and agree to allow civil nuclear commerce to resume with India. Given the balance of power in the international system, it was a deal only the U.S. could pilot — not France, China or Russia — though all of them had to finally put their stamp on it through the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

In Gujarat, the boundary between India and Pakistan on Sir Creek remains disputed and, as a result, the maritime boundary between the two countries has yet to be finalised. In this sense, India and Pakistan are both losers, not only because no one will invest in exploiting the natural resources from a disputed area, but also because they will lose out on the extended exclusive economic zone they can get under the U.N. convention on the laws of the seas.

Intersection of issues

Yet, there is a case for institutionalising the process of consultation and involvement of States which are affected by a particular foreign or security policy measure. Barring Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, all Indian States share borders with other countries, or with the international waters of the sea. In that sense, they have interests or issues that may intersect with the foreign and security policies of the country.

In recent times, we have seen how the politics of Kerala has impinged on a foreign affairs issue relating to two Italian marines. There is Jammu and Kashmir which still complains about the short shrift it got on the matter of river waters when the Union government signed the Indus Waters treaty with Pakistan. As for waters, the Chief Ministers of Bihar and Assam too have important issues which impinge on our relations with Nepal and China.

Among the various governmental systems, the U.S. is one in which the interests of its federal constituents are taken into account in the formulation and exercise of foreign and security policies. This was part of the large and small States compromise that resulted in its constitution. This enables its upper chamber, the Senate, to be the lead house on foreign policy issues — ratifying international agreements, approving appointments of envoys and so on. The Senate, as is well known, has a membership which is not based on population — each State, large and small, populous and otherwise, has the same number of Senators.

It would be difficult to graft something like the U.S. system on to the Indian system. Yet, clearly the time has come when Mizoram and Nagaland also have a say in India’s Myanmar policy, instead of merely having to bear its consequences.

(The Hindu, April 8, 2013)

China pivots to Russia

The new Chinese President Xi Jinping has wasted little time in conducting his own pivot - to Russia - in response to the much heralded American turn towards Asia. Geopolitically, the new Chinese-Russian entente harkens to the World Island of Sir Halford McKinder, which would dominate the world because of its location and command of the world's resources.
And which would more than offset the power of the outer or "insular" crescent stretching from Japan to the United States. Both geography and politics have dictated Xi's visit to Moscow, among the many agreements signed are those relating to China accessing the huge energy resources of Russia as well as those linked to arms transfers.
The politics, too, are quite easy to discern. China has deep economic linkages with the United States. But it also perceives itself to be a political rival of the Americans. 



As for Russia, under Vladimir Putin it has become more nationalistic and assertive abroad. It has clashed with the US on the issue of Georgia, on American ballistic missile defence systems in Europe, and on Syria and Iran.
Expectations of a "reset" in the presidency of Vladimir Medvedev have been belied, and his successor Putin harbours a deep suspicion of the US.
Last week, at the onset of Xi's visit to Moscow, ITAR-Tass news agency quoted Putin as saying that the relations between the two countries were helping to "shape a new, more just world order" and that Russia and China had shown a "balanced and pragmatic approach" to international crises, presumably in their opposition to the positions of the US and the west on Syria and Iran.
Xi, in turn, responded that he expected Russia to "strengthen coordination and interaction in tackling international and regional issues to ensure our common strategic security." 


 

Xi also underscored these remarks in a major speech at the Moscow Institute for International Relations, where he spelt out the current Chinese world view: "It will be impossible for any single country or country bloc to dominate international affairs".
In practical terms, China has worked out a series of energy agreements, which involve the doubling of oil supplies and the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Russia.
Additionally, there were agreements on developing Russian coal resources for the benefit of the Chinese.
These supplies will not only boost China's economy, but also its energy security, since the supply chains will avoid the maritime choke-points dominated by the United States and its allies.
Equally significant have been the two important arms sales agreements between the two countries - the first to purchase 24 Su-35 fighters and the second for 4 Lada class submarines - the first significant deals in a decade.
These deals have been in the making for the past six months and were signed on the eve of Xi's visit. But their announcement since then signifies a new turn in their arms transfer relationship.
In the 1950s, the Soviet Union supplied China the bulk of its military technology, but this ceased in the 1960s, and the Chinese subsequently reverse engineered many Soviet designs.
In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a broke Russian arms industry offered China its cutting edge systems. 

Till 2001, 90 per cent of Chinese arms imports came from Russia. These included Tor M1 mobile air defence missiles, Mi-17 helicopters, Su-27 fighters, Sovremenny destroyers, S-300 SAMs, Kilo class submarines and so on.
In many instances, the Russians also transferred the technology of manufacture to the Chinese, who also acquired ex-Soviet systems from ex-Soviet countries like Ukraine.
Then there was a ten year hiatus in which the Russians stopped selling cutting edge systems to the Chinese because they were angered by the Chinese cloning their systems, as well as the fear that the Chinese could pose a military threat to a weakened Russia.
Moscow now seems to have calculated that China does not pose an immediate threat, that it seems to be focused on the East and South China sea for the near future.
Chinese money will help keep the Russian military industrial complex going, and Russia derives additional leverage with the West by opening up to the Chinese.
The new Chinese-Russian entente should certainly set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. As a news report by SPS Pannu in Mail Today earlier this week pointed out, India is the loser in the growing China-Russia energy ties. New Delhi could also lose out in the emerging Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship.
So far, India has held the technological edge in terms of the quality of its fighter aircraft. The SU-35 will begin to tilt the balance against us, unless we pay for the expensive upgrade of the SU-30MKI or begin receiving the Russian fifth generation fighters in significant numbers.
The Chinese-Russian entente could also mean that there could be an agreement for the supply of Russian engines for Chinese-designed and built fighters which would make them much more capable than they are at present.
The Indian subcontinent would seem to be an outlier when it comes to the geopolitics of Eurasia.
Even so, New Delhi needs to get its act together in formulating and executing its foreign and security policies for what is clearly a period of great change.
First and foremost, we need to shore up our relations with out neighbours where Beijing seems to be able to operate with great ease.
Then, we need to fix the new problem of our diverse states noisily undermining New Delhi's policies.
Both the United States and Japan offer India strategic openings to offset China's power in conjunction with a host of South-east Asian countries, who are wary of China's assertiveness.
Given their past relations the longevity of the Sino-Russian entente, too, is moot. Clearly, India is not entirely without options in this geopolitical competition, the only problem is to get New Delhi to play the game.
Mail Today April 1, 2013

'Chinese dream' will haunt the new world

On Saturday, China completed the process of its once in- a-decade leadership transition. It has been one of the smoothest transitions of leadership in recent decades.
Xi Jinping, who was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of its Central Military Commission in November, has taken over as the President of the country, along with a new prime minister Li Keqiang and a council of ministers.
In taking over the three offices in such quick time, he has emerged as the most powerful Communist party boss since Deng Xiaoping. 


He has wasted little time in consolidating his authority. No doubt circumstances, notably the Bo Xilai affair and other corruption scandals have aided the process.
Though his first tour to the southern, economically vibrant zones, including Shenzhen was aimed at signaling his commitment to economic growth and reform, his most significant actions so far seem to have been in stamping his authority over the crucial pillar of the CPC - the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the country's national security policy.
It was in this tour that he delivered a speech to senior PLA brass and party officials, where he stressed the need for "absolute loyalty" of the PLA to the CPC. Many western analysts have been pointing to the signs of the growing importance of the PLA and the role that it has played in the factional politics of the Chinese leadership.
In the four months that Xi has been in power, he has undertaken a largescale reshuffle of the top leaders of the PLA general staff departments, as well as the seven military regions.
Last month, the military authorities issued "Ten Regulations on improving the Work Style of the Army", aimed at checking corruption and high living among the mid and senior level officers.
Among its more draconian prescriptions is the banning of liquor from public functions. Senior officers have been asked not to talk out of turn, and get clearance from the Central Military Commission General Office before commenting on sensitive issues to the media.

 

Of greater significance, perhaps, was Xi's January visit to the Guangzhou Military Region - the one that fronts the South China Sea. According to observers, it was significant that the Chinese media described it as the Guangzhou "war theatre" rather than the "military region" that it is.
It was during this visit that the new General Secretary emphasised his requirements of the PLA, "We must ensure that our troops are ready when called upon, that they are fully capable of fighting, and that they must win every war".
This has rung alarm bells across the region because it breaks away from the anodyne statements that leaders make about the need for "readiness" in the armed forces, or their duty to "defend national interests."
All this has generated unease and indeed fear, among China's neighbours, particularly Japan. In recent months, China has stepped up pressure on the Senkaku islands, which it claims.
There has been an increase in Chinese air and sea activity in the seas around the islands, which are currently under Japanese control. Japan is a useful target for Chinese nationalism.
Given the history of the Japanese military invasions and atrocities, it is fodder to the ultranationalist forces in China.
Indeed, it was in the 1894-95 invasion of the country that Japan is alleged to haveto the post of the head of the CPC, Xi was given charge of the top interagency group, which had been oversee China's maritime disputes. So it is not without significance that it is since Xi took charge that the Chinese have been active in the Senkaku area.
But Japan is not the only target. In November 2012, China issued new regulations, effective January 1, which would allow the police of the Hainan prefecture to board and search ships, which in the Chinese views, were trespassing in their waters in the South China Sea.
This is bringing China's other neighbours in the region into a zone of tension. But the country most affected could be the Philippines.
But, both Japan and the Philippines could well be proxy targets because they are tied with the United States through Mutual Defence treaties.
The Chinese are playing this carefully. In December, they took their claims to the continental shelf of the east China sea (which affects the Senkaku islands) to the United Nations.
But it is the Philippines that is proposing arbitration on the South China sea. Whatever be the case, the bottom line here is that China has a new and vigorous leader who has made it clear that he is determined to outdo his predecessors and fulfill the "Chinese dream".
What kind of a world view constitutes that dream is not yet clear. But it has important consequences for peace, tranquility and prosperity of the world.
By ratcheting up tension, they are also causing alarm in other countries that use the busy South China Sea as the shortest and most convenient link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
The Chinese could well end up the losers as the countries affected could band together to offset Chinese aggressiveness.
Worse, it could well trigger off Japanese nationalism and rearmament. In great measure, this depends on whether the hard edge in Xi's positions are postures linked to a domestic debate within the party and the PLA, or they are what they say they are: an announcement that the world better get used to Chinese power.

Mail Today  March 17, 2013

India the soft state

(I had written this is January, but forgot to post it)


When  Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal coined the phrase "soft state" in the early 1960s, he did have countries such as India in mind.
What he was speaking of was states that had low expectations from its citizens.
Today, the phrase is used to refer to countries like India in a different way - as states which, despite their size and power, are unable to exercise the influence that should by right be theirs.

India is larger than all the other South Asian nations combined, but despite its size and economy, it looks like a pitiable giant in the neighbourhood.
Whether it is Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Nepal - leave alone Pakistan - cocking a snook at India is par for the course. 

 

India is larger than all the other South Asian countries combined

 
Take Sri Lanka, a country for whose security more than 1,000 soldiers and officers of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) laid down their lives.
Yet, today, Colombo keeps New Delhi at an arm's length and ignores the politically sensitive Indian concern over the rehabilitation of its Tamil minority.
This is despite a highly favourable free trade agreement that has increased commerce between the two countries manifold and promoted Indian investment in the island.

As for Nepal, not even the US and Canada have the kind of open border that India has with its northern neighbour, one that is of enormous benefit to the Nepalese.
Yet, every government that takes office in Nepal thinks nothing of playing the Chinese card against India.
With the Maoists having become an important force in the country, China's influence is likely to grow, though India has been diplomatically quite effective in checking this trend as of now.
India is not a small country - on a European map it would stretch from Minsk to Madrid. It has the world's largest standing army, and one of the larger air forces and navies.
Its economy is already eight times as large that of the next biggest country, Pakistan, and slated to get even bigger in the coming decade.
India's advantages are accentuated by geography and culture.
The former makes India the natural centre of the subcontinent - Bangladesh is virtually "India locked" as is Nepal because of the high Himalayas, and Pakistan is cut off from West Asia by turbulent Afghanistan and the deserts of Balochistan.
One important reason for India's inability to exercise its clout is that the smaller countries have, at various times, brought in effective "offshore balancers" to counter India.
The US played this role for a considerable period of time and this position now has been taken up by China.
With its export prowess, full coffers and a burgeoning arms industry, Beijing has the combination of "hard power" assets that effectively, and often, stymie India.

India, the quintessential soft state, is also a great soft power. With its movies, dress styles, cuisine, popular and high culture, free India is the cultural centre for a vast region extending from Jakarta to Cairo.
But translating soft power into purposeful policy is never easy. The bottom line for India is its inability to compete with China's hard power.
Its soft power advantages count for nought when Beijing has the ability to mount massive economic aid programmes, investments in infrastructure, and supply armaments without any concern for human rights and other such niceties.
This is what Beijing uses in the region. It has sharply stepped up its aid to Sri Lanka, investing heavily in building its infrastructure, as well as its armed forces.
Located where it is on the Indian Ocean, China clearly views Sri Lanka as an important component of its Indian Ocean strategy.
Economic ties between Bangladesh and China are substantive. But even more impressive are the military ties.
The Bangladesh Army is equipped with Chinese tanks, its Navy has Chinese missile boats and frigates, and its air force flies Chinese fighters.
But perhaps of greater significance is the fact that India's lumbering government is unable to provide the kind of inter-departmental coordination and sense of purpose that would result in effective policy abroad.
Its foreign service is pitifully small and there is a constant battle between the IAS-dominated Commerce Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs.
As for arms exports, they are a non-starter, for the dysfunctional Indian defence industry can't even provide for our own armed forces.
The sad fact is that we have a governance system which finds it hard to exercise power within India, so where is the question of applying it abroad?

Mail Today January 13, 2013

The great American betrayal

However else it is dressed up, the reality is that the world is about to witness a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan, one that can have disastrous consequences for the region

It is well known that of all military operations, retreat is the most difficult and complicated. A victorious march that takes a wrong turn can end in a stalemate, but a retreat gone wrong will most likely turn into a disaster. These are the grim forebodings that come to mind when we think of the forthcoming withdrawal of the American-led military forces from Afghanistan.

Whistling in the dark

The Obama Administration is putting it out as though the withdrawal is a great achievement, since it will pull it out of the quagmire that it has been stuck in ever since George Bush declared a “global war on terror.” But the reality is shoddier — we are witnessing yet another western retreat from Afghanistan, one that can have baleful consequences for others. No matter what the Americans say or do officially, they are, essentially, whistling in the dark.

The departure of the Americans and their allies — even though reports suggest that a small force will remain — is a fraught moment for the Afghans, the United States and neighbouring countries. Last month, representatives of India, Russia and China met in Moscow. According to an official in the know, the discussion was businesslike and devoid of the double-speak that often marks the occasion. The subject was Afghanistan. Faced with the withdrawal of the American-led alliance from the country, the three regional powers are scrambling to see how they can stabilise the situation. Each of them has interests there, and none of these really clash.

But all three have an interest in ensuring that Afghanistan is stable and secure, witnesses economic growth and reconstruction, and is integrated into the regional economy. India and China are interested in ensuring that a war-ravaged Afghanistan does not once again become a place where militants are able to establish training camps freely. Both have important investments — India’s $ 2 billion are spread in development projects to promote Afghan stability, while China’s $ 3 billion could aid in its prosperity. As for Russia, it is the primary security provider to the Central Asian states and has an interest in preventing the return of a situation of civil war.

It is important that the post-U.S. situation does not degenerate into an India-Pakistan battlefield. The responsibility here lies heavier with New Delhi, since Pakistan can be trusted to follow its baser instincts. Indeed, New Delhi’s strategy must be to prevent Islamabad from trying to turn the Afghan clock back to the pre-American days. In this, it can fruitfully use the dialogue processes it has established with Russia and China and, separately, the U.S. Interestingly, in the recent India-China-Russia talks, the Chinese pointedly avoided projecting Islamabad’s case and spoke for their own interests, just as the other interlocutors did.

But for things to work, there is need for both Washington and Islamabad to confront the hard realities. As for the U.S., writing in Foreign Policy, Vali Nasr wrote “America has not won this war on the battlefield, nor has the country ended it at the negotiating table. America is just washing its hands of this war.” According to Mr. Nasr, who worked in Richard Holbrooke’s AfPak team in the U.S. State Department, President Obama’s attitude to the American commitment in Afghanistan has been dictated by domestic politics — when it was popular back home he backed it, and when it became unpopular, he pushed for terminating the U.S. commitment. The American withdrawal, Mr. Nasr argues, is without any concern for the fate of Afghanistan itself, or for the possible chaos that may follow in the region.

As for Pakistan, the belief among some key players, notably in the Army, that there can once again be “Fateh” (Victory) in Kabul is delusional. Nothing in the ground situation suggests that the writ of the Taliban will run across Afghanistan again, at least not the Taliban that Pakistan so effectively aided and controlled in the 1990s. Indeed, the most unstable part of the country will be the eastern region bordering Pakistan, whose own border with Afghanistan is the site of an insurgency led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP). If anything, the TTP could be the principal beneficiary of the withdrawal, since it will find it easier to get sanctuary and arms from the Taliban.

As of now, in the international process, we have the western countries trying to work out a negotiated settlement that will bring elements of the Taliban into the governance of the country, based on the constitution of the Loya Jirga of 2003. This Doha process has been a slow-moving affair with the Taliban delegation in the Qatari capital twiddling its thumbs most of the time. One problem is no one is really clear as to whether they are dealing with the genuine representatives of Mullah Omar. The bigger problem is that both Islamabad and the Taliban are merely hedging in their responses to the West and they are waiting to see how precipitous the American retreat is, and what happens in the run-up to the Afghan elections of 2014.

Even today, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar, and several of its top leaders live in Pakistan. Though Islamabad says it is supporting the Doha process, there are doubts as to whether or not Pakistan can actually “deliver” the Taliban to the U.S. and its allies. But there can be few doubts about Islamabad’s ability to play the spoiler. This is what countries like the U.S., India, Russia and China need to prevent through coordinated diplomacy. And talking of elections, we have to see just how the election in Pakistan expected in a few months will play out.

Since 2002, a set of new facts has been created on the ground. Foremost among these have been the presence of an elected Afghan government and, now, a substantial Afghan National Security Force. This will continue to get the support of the international community and the ANSF will also have the ability to control the key parts of the country, as long as it gets external support. On the other hand, the Taliban has suffered considerable attrition and the relations between Pakistan and the Taliban have been conditioned by the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) as well as the unhappy experience of the Taliban at the hands of the ISI.

There is one important, and indeed overriding, consideration in the manner in which we deal with Afghanistan. Both the U.S. and India need to recognise that they have far greater security interests in Pakistan than in benighted Afghanistan. The “victor” of Kabul will inherit a war-torn and ravaged country without the basics of schools, hospitals and transportation systems. But should the Afghan situation catalyse the rise of Islamists in Pakistan, India will be in for trouble. It does not need to be repeated that Pakistan is a country with some industrial capacity, nuclear weapons and a powerful military. Its capacity for mischief would go up by orders of magnitude, were the Islamists gathered by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the Difa-e-Pakistan Council to become even more central to the country’s politics.

AfPak to PakAf

For this reason, it is important to reverse the appellation AfPak to PakAf, at least mentally. We need to ensure that a “solution” in Afghanistan has a collateral beneficial effect in Pakistan. Or, at least, it should not affect Pakistan negatively. This is not, of course, a call for pandering to Islamabad’s Afghan fantasies.

The presence of U.S.-led forces has played a stabilising role in Afghanistan. But now they are going and leaving fear in their wake. The Afghans are petrified at the prospect of a renewed civil war and the return of the Taliban, the Pakistanis, or at least the sensible ones, are scared of the threat from the TTP. India, Russia and China are worried about the possible spill-over effects of a civil war in the country. As for the U.S., its fear is that its retreat could, through some missteps, become a rout.

(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)

The Hindu March 11, 2013 

What the electoral tea leaves say

By now it should be clear that the general elections are not around the corner. If there were any lingering doubts, they have been dispelled by the Union Budget.
It was neither here nor there, but it was certainly not a populist Budget, which is usually a harbinger of elections.
The Congress will have to show uncommon courage were it to call an election after socking it to the middle class who will have to pay more to even visit the neighbouring Barista. 

This is a group whose support has been the foundation of the Congress party's performance in 2004-2008, and by common agreement, it is the group that is now disenchanted with the party.
A year, for that is what now broadly remains for the scheduled date of the next general elections, is a long time in politics.
The Congress party, no doubt, wishes that it were longer.
Just as it had managed to stabilise the political situation last autumn and shown a great flurry of activity in pressing ahead with permitting FDI in retail and then hanging Ajmal Kasab and Afzal Guru in quick succession, it found the ground under its feet slipping with the sudden emergence of the AgustaWestland helicopter scandal and Chidambaram's indifferent Budget reflects the return to the Congress normal of pusillanimity.

Strategy

No matter what Saint Antony the defence minister says, something remains rotten in Denmark.
We know that €51 million have been charged extra for the 12 helicopters, but what we need to know is why that has happened and who has received those moneys.
The Tyagis, as one writer has pointed out, are red herrings who have, at best managed some Euros in the hundred thousands, but there appear to be some people who have got the money in tens of millions.
Who are they ? The first part of the Congress strategy now rests in the hope that public memory tends to be short.

An AgustaWestland AW101 medium-lift helicopter

Given the many scandals we have been deluged with - the CWG scams, the 2G scandal, the National Rural Health Mission scam of UP and so on - they hope that people will forget the trifling matter of €51 million.

So, in quick order, the government has proactively insisted on a Joint Parliamentary Committee to investigate the issue.
Given the way the JPC for 2G is working, you can be sure that the helicopter matter will soon be buried in a mountain of words and chicanery.
The second part rests on the hope that with inflation down, the economy will pick up in the coming months and year and bring in a touch of the "feel-good" factor on the eve of the elections, which must take place by May 2014.
A lot of the hope, of course, rests on the figures that the government has itself conjured up.
While no sensible person would want the economy to tank so as to celebrate the schadenfreude of a possible election loss of the Congress, it is a fact that nothing in the numbers at this juncture provides any room for comfort.
It is true, of course, that economic forecasting using current statistics is notoriously difficult since the figures never quite catch the moment when things go up, rather than down.
But, to be brutally honest, in recent times, they have quite distinctly tended to head southwards. 

CBI has named former air chief Tyagi (pictured) and his cousins in AugustaWestland preliminary enquiry

The third hope of the ruling party is that the Modi bandwagon may have peaked a tad early.

Were the elections to have been held this summer, the BJP, or to be precise, Mr Modi, may have caught the Congress on the ascendant.
But, to repeat the tired phrase, a year is a long time in politics.
For the famously factious Sangh parivar to keep its act together for one long year may not be an easy task.
The fourth, and this is somewhat of a forlorn hope for the Congress, is that its heir apparent gets his act together in the coming year.
So far, we have been told through carefully managed media exercises that Rahul Gandhi is busy overhauling the organisation.
But to win elections he needs the organisation all right, but he also needs charisma.

Branding

The Congress, and this does not really have to be repeated, depends vitally on the Gandhi-Nehru brand to win elections.
So far, unfortunately for the party, young Mr Gandhi has not shown himself to be an election winner.
Indeed, he has not shown himself to be a particularly diligent party worker either.
Not for nothing is he called the "reluctant prince".
Whether he can shed that image in the coming year remains to be seen.
Yet, the Congress, at least, has the benefit of knowing which direction it is heading in terms of social and economic policy.
The internal debates of the past are over and Ms Sonia Gandhi seems to have signed on to Manmohan Singh and P Chidambaram's growth plus strategy.

Outcome

Defence Minister A K Antony has asserted the government's intention to get to the root of the scam

Which is more than you can say for the BJP which, minus Modi, lacks strategy or direction.
Its nattering negativism is apparent every day and in relation to almost any policy or proposal that comes up.
As for the Left, it is yet to recover from Mamata Banerjee, and it is unlikely it will do so as long as its leadership remains unchanged.
Outcomes of general elections more often than not overwhelm the calculations, tawdry or noble, of political parties and their leaders, no matter how carefully triangulated.
And so it will be with the coming general elections.
Just as the last year, the year before, and the year before that, came up with its surprises, you can be sure that the coming year will have its own pitfalls and bombshells, not necessarily all hitting the Congress.
But working on the old battlefield belief, no doubt, the Congress will be hoping that the shells do not strike the same craters again.
- The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation

Mail Today March 4, 2013