Events and consequences

This month is likely to see a number of visits by Indian Ministers and officials to Beijing. Last month, the Union Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman acknowledged that she would be visiting China, probably sometime late this month. Also expected in Beijing is Union External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj who will attend the meet of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Foreign Ministers on April 24.

Also expected in Beijing is the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval,  who is expected to attend a meeting of the National Security Advisers of the SCO countries. At this juncture, it would be premature to give a bilateral spin to the visit, though there is every possibility that he will, indeed, meet his counterpart, the recently promoted State Councilor, Wang Yi who also doubles as Foreign Minister. Wang is also likely to be appointed as Doval’s counterpart as the Special Representative for relations between India and China. Last year in December and earlier at the height of the Doklam crisis, Doval had interacted with the then State Councilor and SR, Yang Jiechi. 

For the present we must assume that while Sitharaman’s visit is part of the normal high-level intercourse between the two countries, the visits of Swaraj and Doval are linked to the SCO summit in Qingdao in June which will be attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But there have been persistent reports that we may see an earlier Modi visit to China and in that event, it is possible that Doval would use the opportunity to do some preliminary spade-work.

 In all this, it is important to assess as to the longer-term perspectives of Beijing and New Delhi and whether what is happening is really a reset of sorts, or merely another round of maneuvering between two countries that remain suspicious of each other.

Doklam remains an uncomfortable backdrop of this because while the two sides have disengaged from the site of last year’s face-off, they remain in the in strength in the proximity.

Earlier in February, New Delhi had signaled a shift of sorts when in a letter leaked a day before he was to go to Beijing, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale wrote to the Cabinet Secretary, P K Sinha advising  state leaders and officials to stay away from the functions of the Dalai Lama. A major annual seminar on China organized by the MOD-run Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses was cancelled because of its China connect. Observers felt that the Modi government was signaling a shift away from its “muscular” policy towards China which featured the use of the Tibet card. However later that month, it was revealed that BJP General Secretary Ram Madhav and the Union Culture Minister Mahesh Sharma would indeed visit Dharamsala to participate in the celebrations marking the 60th year of the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India.

Later in March, the Ministry of Defence took a group of journalists from Delhi to a highly publicized visit to the easternmost area of Walong and they reported that India had significantly increased patrolling in the mountain areas of the Dibang, Dau-Delai and Lohit Valleys.

The question to ask is whether New Delhi’s moves are tactical aimed at correcting the needlessly loud stand it had taken, especially on China’s blockade on India’s membership to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and the proscription of Masood Azhar by a UN committee.

Another reason could be India’s assessment that it did not have the heft to take on China across the board in the South Asia and Indian Ocean Region and it needed to recalibrate its posture, in the light of the consolidation of power in the hands of Xi Jinping.

There have been worries, too, that prolonged confrontation with China and a possible move in Doklam, bypassing the point near the Doka La pass that the Indians had blockaded could see the Chinese on the Jampheri ridge to the detriment of Indian security. Given the ground realities, India would not be able to do anything about it, short of triggering a war. This would not be a particularly helpful prospect in view of the coming general elections in India. A perception that Modi had “lost” the Doklam advantage could be devastating for his re-election efforts.

 All this is happening even as the US and China are girding up for what could be a debilitating trade war. But even the trade war could well be a side-show for a longer contest between the two sides, given the new US National Security Strategy which is aimed not at striking some deal with China, but a complete overhaul of US policy. And just around the corner is the likely American decision to walk out of  the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the nuclear deal with Iran. All these events will have consequences and there will be collateral casualties and so it is important for us to understand the need to stay out of the way.

Greater Kashmir April 9, 2018

New Bhutan government's attitude towards India is not clear. This should worry India

It’s a measure of our attitude to neighbours that the outcome of the third, and possibly most consequential general elections in Bhutan that took place last Thursday, hardly figured in the Indian media the day the results came out, last Friday.

Bhutan Election hardly figured in the Indian media. (Photo: AP)

The decisive victory of a party, Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), which was set up only in 2013, is a signal that the voter is looking for change, both within the country, as well as in its relationship with the outside world.

Indo-Bhutan relation

The DNT, headed by surgeon Lotay Tshering, won 30 out of the 47 seats to the National Assembly, while its rival Druk Phuenseum Tshogpa got the other 17 in a run-off, which is limited by the Bhutanese law to just two parties that got the maximum number of votes in the first primary round of the election that was held September 2018 and that saw the shock exit of the ruling People’s Democratic Party.

That round saw the DNT and DPT neck and neck, but in the final round, the DNT has surged ahead.

The DPT had won the first election in 2008 and sat in the Opposition in the 2008-2013 period.

It is a measure of Bhutan’s size that the total electorate is 4,38,663 only, of which 3,13, 473 cast their votes.

Dr Lotay Tshering (Right), the Prime Minister-designate, is an MBBS from Dhaka University. (Photo: Facebook of Dr Lotay Tshering)

The DNT’s slogan “Narrow the Gap” focused on the need to reduce inequalities, promote affordable healthcare and restructure the economy. It clearly struck a chord with the electorate.

Dr Lotay Tshering, the leader of the party and the Prime Minister-designate, is a noted urologist who worked at the Jigme Dorji Wangchuck National Referral Hospital till 2013.

Selected by the party to contest the elections, he paid the equivalent of Rs 60 lakh indemnity to leave the Royal Civil Service. It was only in May 2018 that he was elected as the head of the DNT. Tshering is an MBBS from Dhaka University, Bangladesh and has another degree from Australia.

Reports suggest that India was not a factor in the elections this time, though there should be no doubts that the elections can and will have consequences for Indo-Bhutan relations.

In 2013, Bhutan was hit by high fuel prices when India withdrew subsidies for kerosene and gas on the eve of the elections. The move was seen as a signal of New Delhi’s annoyance with the Bhutan PDP. The party lost the election that year, even though India claimed that the subsidy withdrawal was a ‘technical lapse’. The DPT, which was seen in the past to be leaning towards China, made it clear in its election manifesto that it sought to maintain and further “excellent relations with the people and government of India.”

The voters were looking for change, both within the country, as well as in its relationship with the outside world. (Photo: Facebook of Dr Lotay Tshering)

Doklam problem

It proposed to enhance electricity production through three new hydropower projects, which would boost Bhutan’s primary exports — electricity to India.

The DNT had no section on external affairs in its manifesto.

However, it pointedly sought to focus on internal affairs such as balancing the economy, which, in its view, was too dependent on hydropower exports.

The Bangladesh, Bhutan India (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement did not figure in the elections.

It may be recalled that in 2017, the Bhutan PDP government had failed to pass an enabling legislation in the National Council, Bhutan Parliament’s upper chamber. There was clearly popular sentiment against the agreement which would have smoothed the motor vehicle movement between the three countries.

The defeat of the incumbent government headed by Tshering Tobgay could not have been comfortable for New Delhi. This is especially because along with the Bhutanese government, New Delhi had managed the crisis over Doklam successfully last year.

The DNT’s attitude towards India is not clear, and neither is its position on Bhutan’s border problems with China that gave rise to the Doklam problem. But it is seen as a party that seeks to focus on economic change.

Chinese connect

Bhutan’s politicians have observed self-restraint in not openly discussing relations with India or its other giant neighbour China. Doklam, which was ostensibly about Bhutanese territory claimed by China, did not figure in the elections.

But Bhutan is in the social media age, and there has been a lesser degree of restraint.

Foreign policy issues have been raised, even though Bhutan election officials have levied fines on candidates, some for making charges relating to ties with India.

Bhutan presents a unique challenge for India.

On the surface, relations between the two countries are excellent and Bhutan’s geography ensures that India holds it tightly. Nevertheless, things are not exactly what they appear, and so, the upset defeat of the PDP, which was seen as being close to India, must be carefully analysed.

The DNT is a new factor and New Delhi must resist the temptation to look at relations with Bhutan through only the lenses of security.

Mail Today October 23, 2018

Doklam Stand-Off Means the Current Process of Settling the China Border Has Run Its Course

Just how the Doklam crisis plays out is still a matter of speculation. Nearly two months into the stand-off, the Chinese verbal bombardment has not abated. The Bhutanese and Indian responses have remained low key after their respective press releases of June 29 and 30.
One important consequence of the stand-off is already evident – the parallel processes of negotiating China’s border with India and Bhutan seems to have reached a logical dead-end. The three countries now urgently need to come up with a new format if they wish to continue their conversation. Such talks are not merely technical discussions on the border, but since they are handled at a senior level, they are also a means of managing the relationship in depth and over a wide range of areas.
Since the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993, India’s relations with China had been stable and even predictable. The two countries managed their border issues well and have created layers of confidence building measures that aided the process.
Yet, in fact, they did not manage to actually settle their border dispute.

---

---

There have been two distinct cycles here, the first between 1993 and 2002 when the official level joint working groups sought to stabilise and work out a mutually agreed Line of Actual Control (LAC) – as per the agreement of 1993 – as a prelude to resolving the dispute itself. This process came to a grinding halt when the Chinese refused to exchange maps of the western sector. They came to believe that finalising a mutually agreed LAC could solidify it as a border and, as we have seen since the mid-1980s, they have been insistently making major claims in the eastern sector, which they now call southern Tibet.
Special representatives to deal with border issues
The two sides thus decided in 2003 that a political dimension needed to be added to the border settlement process and nominated a special representative each to deal with the issue.
The process was at a ministerial level, the current Chinese special representative, Yang Jichei, is a state councillor and senior even to the foreign minister Wang Yi. The special representatives have had 19 rounds of talks till April 2016 and, in 2005, they had signed what was hoped to be a far reaching agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles of a border settlement.
This agreement baldly stated that “the two sides are seeking a political settlement of the boundary question ….” In 2014, the Indian special representative, Shivshankar Menon, acknowledged that all the technical work relating to the border settlement had been done, now all that was needed was a political go-ahead from the leaders of the two countries.
But more than a decade later, they are no nearer towards clinching a deal. In 2012, Dai Bingguo, the Chinese special representative, and his Indian counterpart Menon, drew up a 18-point consensus document on the eve of the former’s retirement, summing up the work they had done. The disclosure of some portions of this document and some earlier understanding, in the current war of words over Doklam, could well be the clearest signal that the special representative process has run out of steam. This is not surprising, the moment the Chinese stepped back from the political parameters agreement, sometime around 2007, this had probably happened.

China, Bhutan peace agreement 
Parallel to this, China and Bhutan have had 24 rounds of border talks. According to reports, the two sides came close to a settlement in 1996-2001, based on China agreeing to concede two parcels of land in northern Bhutan for three lots, including Doklam in the western part of the country. But thereafter Bhutan revised its claims and the process has not moved much. Yet, like the process of the special representatives, the Chinese and the Bhutanese continue to hold talks.
However, in the case of the Bhutanese, the peace and tranquillity agreement they signed with the Chinese in 1998 barely worked. This agreement committing both sides to maintain status quo as of 1959 has most obviously been violated in the Doklam area. The reason for this is that while India has steadily enhanced its border management capacities along the LAC, the Bhutanese simply lack the population or resources to police their 470 km border with the Chinese. The present crisis has shown that as of now, any resolution of Bhutan’s boundary issue is likely to be embedded in a Sino-Indian border settlement, unless Bhutan takes the drastic decision of making a deal without taking India into confidence.

Source: Google Maps

With the Sino-Indian and the China-Bhutan processes at a dead end, the time has come for the countries to explore new institutional mechanisms of resolving their border dispute and maintaining “peace and tranquillity” on their border.

Rising frictions between the two Asian giants 
There is also a larger view of the friction between a rising China and a rising India.
From the 1970s, India has seen the manner in which Beijing has sought to limit India to South Asia by using Pakistan. Now, a much richer and militarily more powerful China is pushing into not only South Asia but also the Indian Ocean Region in an unprecedented fashion. It is not that Bhutan will become a new platform for Chinese forays into South Asia like Pakistan, but that it will neutralise an important South Asian friend of India and add to Beijing self-worth as a regional power without compare. As it is, in Nepal and Sri Lanka, India must now compete directly with China for influence.

---

---

In response, New Delhi is intensifying cooperation with the US and Japan. India’s actions are still constrained by its self image as an independent player in the international system. It, therefore, does not have a military alliance with the US and will therefore not be privileged to receive US assistance in the event of a conflict with China. In a recent article, historian John Garver suggested that Beijing may be seeing India as “the weakest link in the chain of ‘anti-China containment’ being built” in Asia.

India’s military modernisation is delayed by a decade and a half, and there is nothing to suggest that it is doing anything about it.
That China has become more assertive since 2008-2009 is well known, but Modi’s India also sets a value by adopting an assertive stance in the South Asian and Indian Ocean region. And, unlike the smaller countries of the region, India does have the capacity to deal with China on its own terms. And almost everyone is agreed that in the coming  decade, this capacity will only increase. As the more powerful party, China is the one that needs to figure out how it must deal with India because whether India becomes more powerful, or, for that matter flounders, it can still cause a lot of trouble for Beijing.
Conflict between the two Asian giants will act as a drag on their rise. It was famously said that there is enough room for both of them to grow at the same time. As of now, unfortunately, their simultaneous growth is causing dangerous friction and their unsettled border can always provide the spark for conflict.
With their dispute resolution processes not working, the two giant neighbours urgently need to devise a newer mechanism. And this must be done in a larger framework of engagement to promote what Xi Jinping says is a “win win” relationship. It does not take much imagination to predict what will happen otherwise.
The Wire August 7, 2017

Commentators have pounced on just one point in the joint press release of the sixth round of the Indian and Chinese senior commanders meeting at Moldo, near Chushul, on 21 September. That is, the commitment to “stop sending more troops to the frontline”.

What this essentially says is that both sides are keen to stabilise the situation, but this does not mean that we are anywhere near achieving the status quo ante of April 2020 in eastern Ladakh.

The rest of the statement is what the Americans call ‘motherhood and apple pie’ — in other words, platitudes, such as, there was agreement “to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen communications on the ground… avoid taking action that may complicate the situation.”

You can be sure that local commanders can and will act to adopt tactically superior positions – but for the present, both sides have already done what they needed to do.

Dark Mode

• Home
• COVID-19
• News Videos
• Politics
• Opinion
• Entertainment
• WebQoof Fact Check
• News
• My Report
• FIT
• Sports
• Technology
• Good News
• Podcast
• Gender
• Explainers
• NEON
• Education
• Photos
• Infographics
• Business
• World
• Cyber
• Law
• Big Story
• About Us
• T&C
• Privacy Policy

FOLLOW US ON

About UsContact UsPrivacy Policy

ADVERTISEMENT

Is India-China Agreement To Stop Sending More Troops A Good Sign?

India & China want things to stabilise, but we aren’t close to achieving status quo ante of April in eastern Ladakh.

MANOJ JOSHI

Published: 23 Sep 2020, 6:27 PM IST

OPINION

6 min read

i

• Share
• Share
• Share
• Share
• Share
• Comments

Commentators have pounced on just one point in the joint press release of the sixth round of the Indian and Chinese senior commanders meeting at Moldo, near Chushul, on 21 September. That is, the commitment to “stop sending more troops to the frontline”.

What this essentially says is that both sides are keen to stabilise the situation, but this does not mean that we are anywhere near achieving the status quo ante of April 2020 in eastern Ladakh.

The rest of the statement is what the Americans call ‘motherhood and apple pie’ — in other words, platitudes, such as, there was agreement “to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen communications on the ground… avoid taking action that may complicate the situation.”

You can be sure that local commanders can and will act to adopt tactically superior positions – but for the present, both sides have already done what they needed to do.

Also Read

India-China Latest Negotiations & What They Imply

The Chinese negotiating strategy is to wear the other side down by introducing new issues, as soon as old ones are resolved. Currently, we are seeing a variant of this where the Chinese now say that the key issue is the need for India to vacate the dominating heights it occupied on 29/30 August on the south bank of the Pangong Tso. Only after that will they discuss the original issue, which is that of China occupying Finger 4 and adjacent areas on the north bank.

The difference is that, at least according to the Ministry of Defence, the Indian side is occupying heights on its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while the Chinese occupied Finger 4 which was in a grey zone which fell within the claims of both sides, and which was patrolled by them till that point in time.

The negotiations between the two sides went on for more than 13 hours.

The Indian delegation was headed by the commander of 14 (Leh) Corps Lt Gen Harinder Singh, as well as his successor Lt Gen PGK Menon. Accompanying them for the first time was the senior-most external affairs ministry official dealing with China, Naveen Srivastava, who is Joint Secretary (East Asia). The Chinese side was headed by Major General Liu Lin, Commander of the South Xinjiang Military District.

‘Indication’ That The Chinese Have ‘No Plans’ For A Local War?

The two sides also announced an agreement to hold a seventh round of the military-commander type meeting “as soon as possible”. All this sounds nice, but the successive rounds of meetings could well be aimed at showing the world that the Chinese side are being ‘reasonable’ in the face of Indian intransigence. It could be yet another variant of the Chinese negotiating strategy.

Even so, we must welcome the decision of the two sides to stop sending more forces to the frontline. Given the fact that China has just two divisions in the area indicates that the Chinese have no plans for a local war in the area. 

India has also put in matching numbers, and if the two sides refrain from a further build-up, it is possible to – at least – ensure that there is some kind of a stabilisation, even though one in which India is, for the present, the loser.

How Doklam Issue Compelled Chinese Leadership To Focus On Sino-Indian Border

In the wake of the Doklam crisis in January 2018, Senior Colonel Zhu Bo, a well-connected People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer, wrote a commentary in the South China Morning Post. Zhu, a familiar sight in international conferences like the Shangri-La Dialogue, warned that India would have to pay a heavy price for its stand in Doklam. “For years, the disputed border has not really been on China’s strategic radar,” he wrote, “in part because of its emphatic victory against India in the 1962 border war, and in part because of China’s major strategic concerns lie elsewhere.”

But, the Doklam issue had compelled the Chinese leadership to focus on the Sino-Indian border.

“As a result, China will most probably enhance infrastructure construction along the border. India may follow suit, but it will in no way be comparable in either speed or scale.”

The words have turned out to be prophetic. In the past three years, the Indian Army has also been reporting a sharp uptick in infrastructure construction, as well as the establishment of newer cantonments closer to the border to station Chinese troops forward, in the manner India does. As for Doklam, the Chinese have established a permanent presence over most of it.

Chinese Military & Air Defence Reinforcements: Why India Should Be ‘Worried’

Last week, the geopolitical intelligence website Stratfor issued a report which said that China’s intensified development of military infrastructure suggests a shift in Beijing’s approach to the Sino-Indian border. The report said that China had more than doubled its total number of air bases, air defence positions and heliports in the last three years.

The one area that the PLA is focusing on is its air defence capabilities in the Tibetan plateau.

It is well-known that the Indian Air Force has an edge in terms of the capabilities of its fighters and their geographic location. Proximate to the LAC they have the ability to ‘pop up’ onto the Tibetan plateau, while Chinese fighters have to pay a weight penalty because of the altitudes their bases are located in. Further, they are easily tracked the moment they take off.

But, the PLA has a formidable integrated air defence system based on surface-to-air missiles already in place in Tibet.

To this it will add a significant component of fighter aircraft. For this purpose, it is now building regular air bases with underground shelters, as well as blast pens on the surface. They are also enhancing their radar cover.

Reports that they may locate two regiments of S-400s in the plateau could be a major challenge for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

What Are The Two Possible Outcomes Of The Sino-India Border Conflict?

Since the mid-2000s, Indian defence planners have been talking up a two-front and even sometimes a two-and-a-half front war scenario.

Suffice to say, with steadily declining defence budgets, we are not even ready for a one-front war.

Now China is confronted with a similar dilemma. M Taylor Fravel has pointed out that for long, the Sino-Indian border constituted a “secondary strategic direction” for China. Its principal interest lay in the direction of Taiwan and the western Pacific. This secondary challenge had to be managed in a way that China always retained the initiative.

After Doklam, Beijing seems to have realised that things have changed, and that India too cannot be managed easily, especially since New Delhi seemed inclined to get involved with the US in the western Pacific as well.

But unlike India, China does not lack resources – and it has been exponentially enhancing the quality of its military in the last decade and more.

In these circumstances, the Sino-Indian situation can end up in two outcomes:

• war – with China seeking to establish its primacy
• a permanent border settlement that will remove the LAC from becoming the PLA’s soft under-belly.
• The Quint September 23, 2020
•  https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-border-conflict-senior-commanders-meeting-latest-agreement?#read-more
•