The attack that killed seven military
personnel in Nagrota has been a serious breach. At one level, it may be
dismissed as part of a pattern of attacks we have witnessed since 2013.
At another, there should be concern that in this case, the penetration
has taken place in an area that houses the headquarters of one of the
biggest corps of Indian Army. It is a far more serious than the Uri
event, and yet we are hearing nothing from the fire-eaters who
celebrated the 'surgical strikes' to avenge it."
To say that this is a wake-up call for the Army would be futile
because the wake-up calls have been coming since the strikes on
Pathankot and Uri. The government's response has been to promote
deterrent counter strikes. It is necessary but insufficient. What is
also needed is a revision of standard operating procedures for
perimeter security in the hundreds of camps, pickets, cantonments and
bases that are strung out along the border in J&K. Both the
components of Indian counter-militant strategy — deterrence and defence —
must be robust and innovative, just as the attackers are.
The Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, which claimed 166 civilians,
caused a wave of revulsion across the world. Uncomfortably for Pakistan,
it also revealed how the tentacles of the jihadis were entangled with
the Pakistani deep state. Names of various Pak military officials like
Sajid Mir surfaced, Islamabad brushed it away by arresting some of the
LeT functionaries involved and slow-tracking their trial. The US
obtained information through its own channel through Daood Gilani, aka
David Coleman Headley. So, the ISI took recourse to a new technique to
keep up the pressure on India — avoid mass-casualty civilian attacks
which would bring huge pressure on India to launch a military strike,
and carry out a succession of low impact attacks on Indian military or
police targets and confine them to the J&K area.
These unfolded after 2012 across the International Border (termed
working boundary in Pakistan) in Jammu, parallel to National Highway
1A. The pattern was roughly similar — small groups of men would cross
the border, which is guarded by BSF, don military fatigues, hijack a
passing vehicle and hit a target, usually a police station or a military
post and die in the process. However, the attack on Nagrota is more
serious.
For one, it is further inland and for another, it should have been
better protected, considering it is the location of the headquarters of
India's largest corps. On September 26, 2013, a few days ahead of the
Manmohan Singh-Nawaz Sharif meeting in New York, militants dressed in
army fatigues struck a police station at Hiranagar, near Kathua, killing
several policemen. Later they attacked an army camp before being gunned
down.
On November 27, 2014, just as PM Modi was meeting his Pak counterpart
at Dhulikhel, Nepal, four gunmen who had come across the border clashed
with an army patrol in the Arnia sector of Jammu leaving three soldiers
and five civilians dead.
On March 28, 2014, two days after a Modi election rally near Jammu,
three militants hijacked a vehicle and attacked an Army camp at Janglore
and killed a jawan, before getting killed. On July 27, 2015, three
gunmen dressed in army fatigues who crossed the border, turned south to
Punjab and fired on a bus near Dinanagar, near Gurdaspur. They hijacked a
car and attacked a police station killing three civilians and four
policemen. For the first time, the militants came in from Jammu and
deliberately
struck a target in Punjab.
This pattern was repeated on January 1-3, 2016; gunmen crossed the
border in Jammu, hijacked a police officer's vehicle to reach the
Pathankot Air Force base to launch an attack. Despite advanced
intelligence, the perimeter was breached and two army personnel were
killed. The repeated penetrations of the border do raise the question
about the efficiency of India's border management and perimeter
security practices, even as they roil efforts to normalise relations
between the two neighbours. Officials usually come up with various
explanations and promise high-tech solutions, like automated machine
guns and laser curtains to foil attackers. The problem is the serrated
nature of the terrain, which is cut by rivers and nallahs leading out of
the mountains and flowing towards Pakistan. They provide several
channels of ingress which are familiar to smugglers.
But the problem is often with the quality of equipment and the
forces, namely the BSF, being used to guard the border. As for perimeter
security, the government should understand that this involves
substantial costs and be ready to provide money to build walls not only
around the bases and cantonments, but within them to foil easy movement
of militants who might get through. There is also need to come up with a
standardised concrete guardhouse which is sufficiently protected and
provides easy line of sight for the guarding forces. The DRDO, which
focuses on futuristic projects, should consider designing taut-wire
sensors and physical barriers which are rugged and reliable.
Mid Day December 6, 2016
Sunday, January 29, 2017
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