Running aground at the NSG

My simple view on the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Indo-US nuclear agreement: First, the entire agreement is premised on the NSG community accepting that India is a de facto, not de jure nuclear weapons state. In other words 1) India has not and will not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 2) that it has demonstrated that it possesses nuclear weapons and intends to retain them. The challenge for the NSG is to skirt these two issues in a manner that enables nuclear trade with India and also ensures that nothing in the process goes against their non-proliferation commitments. As of now they seem unable to do so.
You may say that India is demanding to have its cake and eat it too. Possibly, but that is what the so-called Nuclear Weapons States under the NPT do. India has stayed out of the NPT and has broken no international agreement in testing or possessing nuclear weapons. The 123 Agreement between India and the US has successfully dealt with the issue, as has the India-specific IAEA agreement by the simple device of working on the agreement in the narrow sense—dealing with nuclear trade issues rather than the larger question of nuclear weapons possession by India.
The NSG purists however want to get in through the backdoor what was kept out of the front.
For a more detailed analysis, you must see Siddharth Varadajan in The Hindu

A nuclear weapons state in all but name

The best way to get a handle on the otherwise dense safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency is to see what its American critics are saying. We already have Dr Jeffrey Lewis, the man who posted a leaked copy of the agreement on armscontrolwonk.com early Thursday morning, headlining his post “India safeguards agreement stinks.” He is concerned over the fact that nowhere is the word “perpetuity” mentioned. In other words, even the indigenous reactors that New Delhi is offering for safeguards will have a loophole which will permit us to take them out, if needed. He has called on the IAEA to scrap this agreement and come up with another, tighter, document.
What is remarkable is the latitude India has managed with regard to what it will place under safeguards. First, the Agency has accepted that India “on the basis of its sole determination” will identify and “voluntarily” offer a facility for safeguards. In the separation plan announced on March 2, 2006, India agreed to put into safeguards eight indigenous power reactors, in addition to six already under safeguards. It said that it could consider placing some future reactors as well. In addition, certain facilities like the Nuclear Fuel Complex, too, could be put under the IAEA verification regime. People like Lewis complain that under this agreement India will have the right, under certain circumstances, to pull even these eight reactors out of the safeguards regime.

The preamble to the agreement lists all the Indian requirements noting that while India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, it will also provide assurance against withdrawal of material from civilian use at any time. Further, for India to accept the safeguards, the Agency understood India’s need “to obtain access to the international fuel market including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nation. “ It understood that India could set up a “strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption in supply” and it also accepted that India “may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.” There is much of a to do over specifying the so-called corrective measures. Left wanted to know whether India would have the ability to withdraw indigenous or imported reactors from safeguards if the US or other parties reneged on fuel supply. Critics in India and abroad, for different reasons, say that India should spell it out. That would be most foolish. If you reveal the sanctions you will take in the event of the other party reneging on its part of the deal, you’re blunting your own weapon.
Critics will say that this is only stated in the preamble. Aren’t preambles statements ? The statement that India is a “sovereign, socialist, secular democratic republic “ is not without meaning. More important is that this preamble concludes noting that “taking into account the above India and the agency have agreed to as follows:” and then spells out the clauses in the agreement.

The key here is the understanding both the IAEA and India have of each other. Clearly the IAEA accepts India’s record in living up to its commitments in letter and in spirit. The practical fact it recognizes is that India will have as many as eight indigenous reactors, and the fast breeder test reactor, uranium enrichment facilities, and the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing plant outside the safeguards regime. So there is no incentive for India to cheat and transfer nuclear material from the safeguarded civilian programme to its military one.
With this agreement, India can have its cake and eat it too. The India-specific provisions have made an extraordinary exception for India. The IAEA is the policeman of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and what it has done is to provide a legal sanction for trade, even though we are, by its reckoning, an illegal nuclear weapons state.

One step forward, two steps back

In contrast to Lenin's dictum, "Two steps forward, one step back," the Left has succeeded in inflicting a wound on itself by its maneuvering on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Its concession allowing the government to begin negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency means it has abandoned its stand demanding that the government do nothing to "operationalise" the deal. In fact, all that is left to operationalise the deal from the Indian side is to work out an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Thereafter, the US will take the agreement to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and seek an exemption from its rule barring trade with countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only the US can do that,India is not an NSG member (as yet). But India can, and has been talking to individual NSG members for the past year or so, though there is no public record of the discussions. Formally, it is the US that will have to approach the NSG and seek, as India has demanded, a "clean exemption" ie, an unconditional one. This is not likely to be easy because the non-proliferationists in the US and Europe are mobilising their efforts to ensure that an NSG exemption is conditional on India's agreeing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and commit itself to the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, if and when the latter is negotiated.Conditions are likely to be political dynamite in India and will be unacceptable to New Delhi.

The IAEA agreement is not likely to be too complicated because it will be based, as we have noted before, on the basic IAEA safeguards document relevant, INFCIRC/66. The Left has demanded, and the government has conceded, that the safeguards agreement will placed before the Left-UPA committee for approval. Just how this highly technical document be judged on by a political committee is not clear.The Left could insist on demanding provisions that are available for the de jure nuclear weapons states (under the NPT provision of having conducted a nuclear test before January 1, 1967). However, this would be a deal-breaker. Because while the US is willing to give India a de facto nuclear weapons state status, it simply does not have the power to turn the clock back and give India a de jure one. Seeking parity for the sake of parity will be a counter-productive move.
Whatever it is, Comrade Prakash Karat has given special interviews to indicate that there is no change in the Left's policy. That is hard to accept considering that he had declared that any step to operationalise the deal would lead to a withdrawal of the Left's support.
My guess is that the government is readying for an election by March-April and at the appropriate moment, it will move to clinch the deal and precipitate an election.