A nuclear weapons state in all but name

The best way to get a handle on the otherwise dense safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency is to see what its American critics are saying. We already have Dr Jeffrey Lewis, the man who posted a leaked copy of the agreement on armscontrolwonk.com early Thursday morning, headlining his post “India safeguards agreement stinks.” He is concerned over the fact that nowhere is the word “perpetuity” mentioned. In other words, even the indigenous reactors that New Delhi is offering for safeguards will have a loophole which will permit us to take them out, if needed. He has called on the IAEA to scrap this agreement and come up with another, tighter, document.
What is remarkable is the latitude India has managed with regard to what it will place under safeguards. First, the Agency has accepted that India “on the basis of its sole determination” will identify and “voluntarily” offer a facility for safeguards. In the separation plan announced on March 2, 2006, India agreed to put into safeguards eight indigenous power reactors, in addition to six already under safeguards. It said that it could consider placing some future reactors as well. In addition, certain facilities like the Nuclear Fuel Complex, too, could be put under the IAEA verification regime. People like Lewis complain that under this agreement India will have the right, under certain circumstances, to pull even these eight reactors out of the safeguards regime.

The preamble to the agreement lists all the Indian requirements noting that while India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, it will also provide assurance against withdrawal of material from civilian use at any time. Further, for India to accept the safeguards, the Agency understood India’s need “to obtain access to the international fuel market including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nation. “ It understood that India could set up a “strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption in supply” and it also accepted that India “may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.” There is much of a to do over specifying the so-called corrective measures. Left wanted to know whether India would have the ability to withdraw indigenous or imported reactors from safeguards if the US or other parties reneged on fuel supply. Critics in India and abroad, for different reasons, say that India should spell it out. That would be most foolish. If you reveal the sanctions you will take in the event of the other party reneging on its part of the deal, you’re blunting your own weapon.
Critics will say that this is only stated in the preamble. Aren’t preambles statements ? The statement that India is a “sovereign, socialist, secular democratic republic “ is not without meaning. More important is that this preamble concludes noting that “taking into account the above India and the agency have agreed to as follows:” and then spells out the clauses in the agreement.

The key here is the understanding both the IAEA and India have of each other. Clearly the IAEA accepts India’s record in living up to its commitments in letter and in spirit. The practical fact it recognizes is that India will have as many as eight indigenous reactors, and the fast breeder test reactor, uranium enrichment facilities, and the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing plant outside the safeguards regime. So there is no incentive for India to cheat and transfer nuclear material from the safeguarded civilian programme to its military one.
With this agreement, India can have its cake and eat it too. The India-specific provisions have made an extraordinary exception for India. The IAEA is the policeman of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and what it has done is to provide a legal sanction for trade, even though we are, by its reckoning, an illegal nuclear weapons state.

The El Baradei visit

With Congress chief Sonia Gandhi signaling her party’s determination to stay the course on the Indo-US nuclear deal, it is only a matter of time, before the government formally declares that it is negotiating with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But as of now, given the Left ultimatum on freezing action on the Indo-US nuclear deal, the government remains committed to avoiding any formal negotiations with the international body. Last week, the government denied reports that it had been given a draft safeguards agreement by the IAEA. A DAE press note did obliquely confirm that it was talking to the IAEA when it noted that it was “not holding any formal negotiations with the IAEA.” No formal negotiations with the IAEA, get it ?

But the next meeting of the UPA-Left committee has now been put to October 22. This is four days after the scheduled meeting of the CPI(M) Politburo. Is there any significance to the date. Well, for one thing, it seems to suggest that the two sides are giving one more chance to each other for reaching a compromise. Had it not been so, they would have announced a divorce right now. But then, neither of the parties are ready for elections. In fact, no one is. But, the Left has to consider the sorry state of its party unit in Kerala, and the situation in West Bengal. In the latter state, it has to contend with the possibility of a Trinamul-Congress alliance, an alienation of the Muslims (one-quarter of the state's population) brought on by the Nandigram and Rizwanur episodes, as well as the outbreak of protests against the Public Distribution System in the state. This is not a happy congruence.

So, the three day visit of International Atomic Energy Director-General Mohammed El Baradei is more likely to be an occasion to fine-tune relations between India and the international nuclear watch-dog who has been a strong and early supporter of the Indo-US nuclear deal. As it is the ostensible purpose of his visit is a technical one to speak at an energy conference, visit a nuclear research facility in Mumbai and meet with Indian nuclear officials. Sources in the government acknowledge that informal negotiations are taking place between the government and the IAEA for the nuclear safeguards agreement. But they say that this is happening in Vienna, and Dr. El Baradei is not involved in the nuts and bolts of the agreement as of now. The safeguards agreement is likely to follow the one that has been worked out for the two 1000MW reactors that India is getting from Russia at Kudankulam, so there is not that much work required for the agreement.

Last month, Indian officials held informal talks with the IAEA at the sidelines of the annual Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, but denied that it was conducting any formal negotiations. But there was enough in statements of ministers to suggest that that was indeed what was happening.

In addition to a safeguards agreement that will place eight Indian nuclear reactors under a perpetual inspection regime of the IAEA, India is committed to signing an additional protocol with the IAEA for stepped up inspections on all the sites that will be safeguarded. However, officials say that the actual timeline on the additional protocol is more open-ended. The Hyde act only requires India to have made "substantial progress" towards negotiating the additional protocol and there is no requirement to have one before the deal enters into force. (Thanks to Sid Varadarajan for this and the following)

The sequencing of the operationalsation of the Indo-US nuclear deal now is the following:

1. India negotiates text of safeguards agreement with IAEA secretariat

2. Copy of final text goes to Nuclear Suppliers Group

3. NSG changes rules

4. US Congress approves 123

5. India signs safeguards agreement with IAEA

6. Eventually an additional protocol is concluded and enters into force.

But this is the technical time-line. There is another, a political clock, that has already begun ticking towards another general election.