Pakistan trending towards collapse

Since 1991, India has pursued a policy of engaging Pakistan, regardless of what the latter has thrown at us - bombs, terror assaults, fedayeen. This has meant an effort to promote dialogue to resolve outstanding issues, and develop ties with the civilian governments, as against the military. However, two decades later, it seems that this is not working.

If anything, the deep state dominated by the military retains its iron grip on the system and the civilian system remains unable to get its act together. The ‘Lion of Punjab’ Nawaz Sharif is looking like a lamb, while his rival Bilawal Bhutto has become the butt of jokes, and as for Imran Khan, the less said the better.

There were expectations that Nawaz Sharif could keep the army in check and initiate an opening up to India. But a year later, he is a spent force and has been successfully boxed in by the army. Pic/Getty Images

Maybe the time has come to change course — not by reaching out to the military or taking recourse to tit-for-tat covert war. But by encouraging the peaceful breakup of Pakistan. Across the Islamic world, boundaries and states created by colonial powers are breaking down, and there is no reason to assume that Pakistan ought to be an exception. Using military means or a covert war would be counterproductive, but there could be a way out by persuading the international community that this is the best course, and by providing moral and political support to those who advocate separatism in Pakistan.

No doubt there will be Pakistanis who will claim that this is exactly what they always feared and that India has never reconciled to the creation of Pakistan. But we most certainly do not advocate the annexation of Pakistani territory, not even of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

The Bangladesh war is another issue. But by now, there is enough evidence to show that the responsibility for the loss of East Pakistan rests firmly with Islamabad. All that India did was play the role of a
midwife who actually prevented greater bloodshed and horrors. Had India been the factor, Pakistan could have reunited in the 1977-1984 period when anti-Indian governments held sway.

Actually from the outset, it is Pakistan which has promoted violence to obtain the breakup of India. In the 1950s and 1960s, the ISI used its location in East Pakistan to aid the Naga and Mizo insurgencies. In the 1980s, after re-establishing themselves in Bangladesh, they became the principal backers of ULFA and continued giving support to whichever dissident group they could find in the North-east.

Then, when opportunity arose in the west, the ISI jumped into the fray in Punjab in the early 1980s and, few years later, into Jammu & Kashmir. Simultaneously, they also began promoting terrorist attacks across the country. There were two aims in mind. First, the breaking away of two important states of the Indian union. Second, encouraging communal violence with the view of developing an unbridgeable communal divide in the country.

Most Indians, even now, believe that it is in their interest to have a stable and united Pakistan on their western borders, notwithstanding the hostility they have faced in recent decades. This is not because of any altruism, but a perceived national interest in not having a failed nuclear state on our borders. However, without any particular Indian encouragement or assistance, Pakistan is trending towards collapse and chaos.

There is no dearth of fault lines in Pakistan. The primary ones are ethnic, pitting the dominant Punjabis against the Baloch and the Sindhis, with the Mohajirs as a category of their own. The newer one shaping up is one which pits the Pakhtun-dominated Taliban against Pakistan. Then there are sectarian lines, primarily dividing the Sunni and the Shia. But the really complex one divides its dominant military from its civilian establishment.

The idea of Pakistan breaking up has been around for a while. There are two impulses for this. First is from within, where ethnic groups such as the Pakhtuns, Baloch and Sindhis want out of the Punjab-dominated system. The second is from the point of view of the global community, for whom Pakistan has proved to be a menace as an exporter of terrorism and a proliferator of nuclear weapons. But so far the idea has been confined to think tanks and some individuals. Smaller units will certainly reduce the megalomania of the generals who have exaggerated notions of Pakistan’s standing in the comity of nations by virtue of its nuclear weapons and ability to give pain to its neighbours, namely India and Afghanistan.

The one thing that can save Pakistan is the normalisation of ties with India and opening up to the larger economy to its east. But there are equally powerful forces that have prevented this from happening and they show no signs of weakening.

There were expectations that Nawaz Sharif was the leader who could keep the army in check and initiate an opening up to India. However, a year later we find that Nawaz is a spent force and has been successfully boxed in by the army. No one is clear as to where things go from here.

So far, India has displayed little or no inclination from getting involved in Pakistan’s internal issues, Islamabad’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding . But now our own security demands that we begin thinking about the unthinkable, and consulting with like-minded countries on the issue.

A nuclear-armed Pakistan needs to be handled carefully and there is little scope for adventurism here.

As noted, we are not advocating a violent breakup, but a velvet event of the kind that led to the emergence of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Mid Day October 28, 2014

Pakistan is not ready for peace in Kashmir

There should be some things clear about the Kashmir issue. Howsoever convinced we may be of our case, the international community views the state of Jammu & Kashmir to be disputed territory. We need not repeat the long and sorry story of how this came about, but as of now, that is the situation.

Having said that, we need to also spell out the corollary of that point – that there is nothing the international community, including the United Nations, can do to resolve the problem. Only India and Pakistan can do so through direct negotiations.  

So, Jammu & Kashmir does constitute an important aspect of our relationship with Pakistan. Though not officially articulated, the Indian solution to the problem has been a partition of the state along the existing Line of Control. Pakistan’s stand varies – there was a time when it said that J&K ought to be part of Pakistan, then, it began to say that all they wanted was the right of self-determination for the people of the state. But their actions in the parts of the state they occupy indicates that the goal remains the assimilation of the state into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Islamabad now knows that there is nothing it can do to wrest the state from Indian hands by force. It has tried war twice, and continues to fight a covert war for the past quarter century using jihadi proxies and backing Kashmiri separatists.

Conflict

But getting Pakistan to end the conflict has been a difficult task, because Kashmir means many things to them. At one level, it is a cause that unites everyone in that country – the jihadis, the army and the civilian elite. At another, it provides it a means to maintain a hostile posture towards India, something necessary for its current sense of national identity.

Remarkably, the two countries achieved a measure of convergence towards a solution in the period 2004-08. Worked in a back-channel, the idea was to work towards a special status of the state, without altering the current boundaries as set by the 1972 Line of Control. The idea was to encourage cross-LoC trade and eventually human movement and provide for a measure of joint management in governance.

The Indian perspective was that the state’s river waters are already committed to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, so, having Pakistan involved in watershed management would not be such an affront to Indian sovereignty. Likewise, there could be areas like tourism which the two sides could work out together. However, and contrary to claims on the Pakistan side, there were no commitments made on joint governance or political management. That is because a vast gulf separates the basic outlook of the Indian and Pakistani political systems.

The two sides did manage to open up the LoC to enable trade and persons to move back and forth. But beyond that the project came unstuck. The regime of Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani dictator under whose regime the agreements were made to be imploded. The successor government of Asif Ali Zardari lacked the clout with the army to push on with the project.

It is important to understand the Indian strategic perspective on the issue. The key agreements announced through the January 4, 2004 joint statement between India and Pakistan, came on the sidelines of the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Concessions

It was at this SAARC meeting where the now eight-member organisation decided that they would like to create a South Asian Free Trade Area by 2014. A common free trade area would also see the opening up of the region to the movement of people and a degree of coordination on governance issues relating to areas of common concern like river waters, watershed management, flood control and so on.

In the long term, greater economic integration would lead to political integration as well. So, the Indian perspective on resolving the Kashmir issue rested on its being embedded in the SAARC process. India and Pakistan may find it difficult to make concessions, but they could possibly do so in a multilateral framework of SAARC.

Ceasefire

Today, the process is going nowhere. The initiatives of the 2004-2007 period have come to a halt. A key element in these developments was the ceasefire along the LoC called by Musharraf in November 2003 and agreed to by Prime Minister Vajpayee. Today, as the ceasefire frays, so does the process that once held so much promise.

There are the important issues relating to the state and the union. When India became independent, it got the accession of most of the princely states with the promise of controlling only defence, foreign affairs, communications and currency. However, these states were reorganised and the commitments on autonomy abandoned. In the case of J&K, the problem has yet to be resolved. There is no doubt the original intention was to have a flexible system which would lead to J&K being like any other state of the union. However, domestic politics and foreign policy issues have prevented this from happening.

Mail Today October 16, 2014

Capturing the American Mindspace

The real clout of a country in foreign affairs doesn’t come from being able to check or pressure adversaries and buy friends through trade and aid. It comes from the ability to assimilate their interests into your own in such a way that you can shape their policy. Indeed, to go a step further, to get into their minds.

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the United States has, perhaps for the first time, given us a glimpse of how we could achieve this with the country which has actually pioneered this model. Till now, prime ministerial visits came in several preset categories whose main purpose was transactional, ceremonial, or when it came to the US, to kowtow to the global hegemon. In setting the NRI pot to boil, Modi has pointed to the potential India has of changing the India-America discourse. Skillfully exploited, it could help India to some day match the UKUSA ties, or the clout of its 51st state, Israel.

The implications of the Madison Square show should not be oversold. What is needed now is systematic work to work out ways and means of exploiting the opportunities that our Indian American community in the US offers. Pic/AFP

India has never possessed any resource that the US deemed vital, like oil. There was a time in the 19th century, before the invention of cordite, when saltpetre exports from Bihar were important for US military requirements. Nor has it been an exporter of ideologies of communism or jihad. In the economic field, too, indolent India has not emerged as an economic powerhouse, like Japan was and China is, to unsettle the US. In short, it has not been, and is not likely to be, a threat, to American interests.

India has offered up another resource which has gained salience in recent times — human capital. Beginning in the 1950s, US aid to India modernised our educational system through aid which seeded new institutions like what became the NCERT, subsidised science text books, reset syllabi of various disciplines and transformed our agriculture through the introduction of new technologies as well as helping new land-grant type agricultural universities to come up. Hundreds of US experts were embedded in Indian institutions and thousands of teachers and engineers were trained and upgraded by them.

The US played a crucial role in India’s space and nuclear programmes as well. They provided the heavy water for the CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor-US) reactor, built the first nuclear power plant in Tarapur and trained an entire generation of Indian nuclear physicists in the US. In space it was equally dramatic, beginning with tracking stations for satellites in the 1950s, to sounding rockets, it graduated to space launch vehicles and communications satellites.

Along with these developments was the migration of many of the highly qualified Indians to the US and the emergence of the Indian American community which may, today, be less than one per cent in size, but is growing rapidly. In unique feature is its profile — 70 per cent have a college degree where the national average is around 25 per cent. Indian immigrants have founded one-third of Silicon Valley start ups in the past five years and have played key roles in most of them. Indian entrepreneurs have specialised in engineering and technology firms in other areas as well.

Equally significant is the increasing role Indian Americans are playing in American politics, both in seeking office or funding those who do. Unlike, say, the Chinese or the Vietnamese, Indians love politics and are ready to jump into the fray at the local, state or national level. Today, there is one US Congressman of Indian origin, Ami Bera, two governors Nikki Haley and Bobby Jindal, several state and local level politicians and scores of political appointees in the federal, state and local governments.

Till now relations between the US and India have had a tutelary character about them. What we have been witnessing in the last two and half decades is the turbulence that comes with a shift from the mentor-mentee relationship towards a partnership model. If there has been any faltering on this, it has been on India’s part, when it has simply failed to live up to the expectations of its potential. It has not been able to significantly reform its educational sector to promote innovation or create a manufacturing base to generate exports to offset its permanent need for oil imports. Indeed, if anything, the quality of India’s education has actually declined.

In part, this has been the result of the lack of political stability, manifested by coalition governments in the states and the centre. But with the new Modi government, we could change the state of affairs, provided there is an awareness of the challenges, especially in the educational sector, and provided there is political leadership to effect change.

To come back to the American connection. In the 1990s, the Indian embassy got a software to match Indian first names and surnames across the US with the mandatory database of political contributors. This generated a list of politically influential Indian Americans and their targeted politicians. Every Indian-American cold-called, was ready to help when asked to do so. However, another poorly managed operation, led a high-flying Indian American politician, Lalit Gadia, to jail for campaign fraud.

One swallow does not make a summer, and the implications of the Madison Square show should not be oversold. What is needed now is systematic work to work out ways and means of exploiting the opportunities that our Indian American community in the US offers. The new generation challenge for our diplomats and policy makers today is to capture the American mindspace. This is a task that requires subtlety, but its crucial asset is the human capital connect that we have established with the US. This, as most observers agree, has today become a two-way street with as much talent and investment coming in, as going out. But it needs to intensified and taken to a much higher level of educational, science and technology, business and people to people ties.

Mid Day October 14, 2014

India must go beyond geopolitics

It is not unnatural for world leaders to define their relationships with each other in grandiose terms strategic, indispensable or defining partnerships, which is the norm for American leaders looking at India. Indians are no slouches either. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described India’s relationship with the US as that of natural allies, and now Prime Minister Modi has declared that we are “natural global partners.”

Of course, the reality is somewhat different. Relations between India and America have not been good in the recent past. True, at the formal level, things are doing well. We have multiple dialogues and working groups in a range of subjects from counter-terrorism, international security, defence, science and technology, agriculture, health, energy and climate change, higher education, women’s empowerment and so on.

India and the US need a new vision for their relationship, which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment or education

The US has played a profound role in India, something that the ahistorical Indians themselves forget. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by the mid-1960s, the US government and foundations were often pumping as much money into Indian education as the UGC. Outdated syllabi of universities and schools were replaced with the help of exchange programmes that saw thousands of Indian teachers go to the US and American counterparts come here. The Americans helped us in not just improving science education, teacher training, enhancing the quality of regional engineering colleges across the country, but also placed subsidised modern science and technology text books in the hands of the students.

In recent times, Indo-US ties picked up, paradoxically, following their worst dip after the Indian nuclear weapons tests of 1998. The reason was geopolitical — the rise of China. The US saw, as indeed they did in the 1950s — that by virtue of its size, India is the only country that can offset China’s enormous pull. They also understood that India, after the Cold War, offered no geopolitical challenge to American interests.

Things were going swimmingly well till around 2008, culminating in the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. But it has been downhill since. Some people believe it has to do with the Obama administration, others say that the slow implosion of UPA II was responsible. It was probably a mix of the two.

One of the big problems in the India-US relationship is the asymmetry between the two of us. The US is rich and powerful, while over two-thirds of Indians live in abject poverty. This itself creates a divergence of goals. We often land up on the wrong side of trade, IPR and investment issues. Given our differing developmental profiles, this is, perhaps, inevitable. But what we need is the diplomatic effort to create the space for things that join us together.

The US, as the global hegemon, needs to relearn what it knew so well in the 1950s and 1960s that relations between nations is as much about symbols and gestures as about FDI and trading rules.

This is something the Chinese know well with their agitprop background. Where the US comes up with the geopolitical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese articulate the same thing as the New Maritime Silk Route. China’s trade is expanding, they say; our interests are growing, we want you to be part of this prosperity and so we will help you build your ports, railways and highways and become part of a seamless link from China to Africa and Europe. For the US, the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be confined to the strategic community and foreign policy wonks. The Chinese, on the other hand, are speaking directly to the people and about self-interest not just in the realm of security, but development.

There is a new government in place in New Delhi, one that is the first since 1989 to function on its own majority in the Lok Sabha. In other words, not subject to the buffeting the UPA I got because of its coalition partners. But the administration in Washington DC has not changed and will not for another two years.

Whatever Modi may want to do in the coming years is circumscribed by the fact that India does not have too many cards in its hands. It is not an oil-rich country, or one with some ideology to export. It is a poor country whose primary goal is to transform the lives of its people. Within limits, everything else is subordinate to that.

In the case of the US, the limits are of a different kind. Unlike China or Japan, the US government does not have investible funds in its hands. That money is in the hands of US private players who India has to attract through its policies and by easing its horribly complicated rules of setting up business. What the US government can do, and it is actually committed to doing, is to ease technology restrictions that have been part of the old regime of sanctions. But beyond that, India and the US need a new vision for their relationship which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment, education, energy and climate change and people-to-people ties.

Mid Day September 30, 2014

It is not unnatural for world leaders to define their relationships with each other in grandiose terms strategic, indispensable or defining partnerships, which is the norm for American leaders looking at India. Indians are no slouches either. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described India’s relationship with the US as that of natural allies, and now Prime Minister Modi has declared that we are “natural global partners.”
Of course, the reality is somewhat different. Relations between India and America have not been good in the recent past. True, at the formal level, things are doing well. We have multiple dialogues and working groups in a range of subjects from counter-terrorism, international security, defence, science and technology, agriculture, health, energy and climate change, higher education, women’s empowerment and so on.
 
India and the US need a new vision for their relationship, which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment or education
The US has played a profound role in India, something that the ahistorical Indians themselves forget. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by the mid-1960s, the US government and foundations were often pumping as much money into Indian education as the UGC. Outdated syllabi of universities and schools were replaced with the help of exchange programmes that saw thousands of Indian teachers go to the US and American counterparts come here. The Americans helped us in not just improving science education, teacher training, enhancing the quality of regional engineering colleges across the country, but also placed subsidised modern science and technology text books in the hands of the students.
In recent times, Indo-US ties picked up, paradoxically, following their worst dip after the Indian nuclear weapons tests of 1998. The reason was geopolitical — the rise of China. The US saw, as indeed they did in the 1950s — that by virtue of its size, India is the only country that can offset China’s enormous pull. They also understood that India, after the Cold War, offered no geopolitical challenge to American interests.
Things were going swimmingly well till around 2008, culminating in the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. But it has been downhill since. Some people believe it has to do with the Obama administration, others say that the slow implosion of UPA II was responsible. It was probably a mix of the two.
One of the big problems in the India-US relationship is the asymmetry between the two of us. The US is rich and powerful, while over two-thirds of Indians live in abject poverty. This itself creates a divergence of goals. We often land up on the wrong side of trade, IPR and investment issues. Given our differing developmental profiles, this is, perhaps, inevitable. But what we need is the diplomatic effort to create the space for things that join us together.
The US, as the global hegemon, needs to relearn what it knew so well in the 1950s and 1960s that relations between nations is as much about symbols and gestures as about FDI and trading rules.
This is something the Chinese know well with their agitprop background. Where the US comes up with the geopolitical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese articulate the same thing as the New Maritime Silk Route. China’s trade is expanding, they say; our interests are growing, we want you to be part of this prosperity and so we will help you build your ports, railways and highways and become part of a seamless link from China to Africa and Europe. For the US, the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be confined to the strategic community and foreign policy wonks. The Chinese, on the other hand, are speaking directly to the people and about self-interest not just in the realm of security, but development.
There is a new government in place in New Delhi, one that is the first since 1989 to function on its own majority in the Lok Sabha. In other words, not subject to the buffeting the UPA I got because of its coalition partners. But the administration in Washington DC has not changed and will not for another two years.
Whatever Modi may want to do in the coming years is circumscribed by the fact that India does not have too many cards in its hands. It is not an oil-rich country, or one with some ideology to export. It is a poor country whose primary goal is to transform the lives of its people. Within limits, everything else is subordinate to that.
In the case of the US, the limits are of a different kind. Unlike China or Japan, the US government does not have investible funds in its hands. That money is in the hands of US private players who India has to attract through its policies and by easing its horribly complicated rules of setting up business. What the US government can do, and it is actually committed to doing, is to ease technology restrictions that have been part of the old regime of sanctions. But beyond that, India and the US need a new vision for their relationship which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment, education, energy and climate change and people-to-people ties.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/india-us-must-go-beyond-geopolitics/15645190#sthash.XyFpRpIB.dpuf

PM Modi spells out his vision

In the past month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sketched out the broad contours of his foreign and security policy vision, culminating in his official visit to the United States.

For most Americans, this would have been yet another visit by an important global leader. But for most Indians, both in the US and back home, there has been a palpable sense of excitement about it.

This is because of the understanding that Modi is the first prime minister since 1989, to have a majority of his own in the Lok Sabha. Most of us have lived with the frustration of coalition governments which were not able to take the decisive decisions that this country needs to get its act together to act as the economic and regional power that it already is.

In foreign policy, as in domestic, Modi has raised expectations sky high. As of now, however, what we are seeing in both domestic and foreign policy are broad brush-strokes, not the finished picture.

Consolidation

In Modi’s case, this has worked at two levels. First is the inspirational and global, delivered through public speeches such as those at the UN or Madison Square Garden.

The UN speech spelt out his world view: the importance of being a good neighbour, peace with Pakistan, the dangers of terrorism, the need for accommodative trading systems and a multipolar world order.

The second level is the behind-the-scenes realism which has been manifested by the stance India has taken with its interlocutors, whether they be Pakistan, China, US or Japan on issues ranging from the peace talks, border, climate change, and nuclear agreements. But what we are seeing are only the opening gambits of a longer game.

Foreign policy is a bit different from domestic. Within a country, you can influence, dictate or direct an outcome with relative ease. But in foreign affairs, it is not easy to shape things in the way you want. So far Modi has been careful in articulating his foreign and security policy. His primary political aim is consolidation.

As an outlier, he needs to ensure that he is now the BJP’s mainstream. He may be the “hriday samrat” (emperor of minds) of the public, but within the party he still faces opposition and resistance.

In these circumstances, he will make haste slowly and not undertake policy measures – foreign or domestic – which could give his enemies a handle. His initial strategy, much like that of Narasimha Rao, will be change through stealth. A lot of that is already visible in economic policy and administration.

In foreign and security policy, from the outset he has hewn close to the Vapayee mold. He may have been tough with Pakistan, but he has ignored fire-eaters who want him to do more. He has refused calls to change the nuclear doctrine, invoking Vajpayee. And, if Atalji termed the US as its “natural ally”, Modi modified it only slightly to term it as a “natural global partner.”

Articulation

But at some point, he needs to prepare for the day when his interlocutors will ask: What do you bring to the table ?

In another context, in August, President Obama put it bluntly when he commented that China has been a free rider on the international system for the last thirty years or so. The question also needs to be posed to India which often talks of “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy.”

Is India also free-riding on the world system where the US provides security to or oil sea lanes, or takes on the Islamist challenge in the Middle-East?

While India was poor and weak, we could always look away at some of these issues, but if India’s economy grows in the next decade, we may have to provide some answers to the questions, in our own self interest. So, beyond the broad geopolitical formulations, what many of these countries and China, are wondering, is: What is the role India intends to play in the coming decade – which politically is likely to be the Modi decade?

Actually they wonder what role is India capable of playing. Capability here, is a combination of capacity – military and economic – as well as intentions articulated through policy.

Potential

As of now, all that India brings to the table is its potential. In the present circumstances, this is a big plus. The global balance of power is inexorably shifting in favour of China. Under pressure in the East and South China Sea, the US and its allies want India to rise so as to counter some of China’s pull.

Given the asymmetry between Indian and Chinese military and economic power, India cannot do this by itself, but in combination with others it can. So Modi needs to unpack India’s new foreign and security policies in a world where the US is becoming more selective about its global role, while China is feeling its way around to see how it can shape regional and global policy using its still growing economic and military clout.

Modi is right to emphasise the fact that our destiny will be our neighbourhood, but it also lies in the reshaping and reform of our economic and national security structures to keep pace with what we hope will be a burgeoning economy. Given the ground realities – where China’s power exceeds ours by orders of magnitude – we need allies. That is where relationships with the US, Japan, ASEAN and Australia come in.
Mail Today September 30, 2014