India's continued growth is under threat but elsewhere 2017 could herald a new world order

Because time moves on, the world is always in a state of flux. But regions and countries move at a different pace.2016, however, was marked by several long term trends in key nations and regions coming to a head at the same time giving us that special sense of churn and dislocation.

The terror attacks in Belgium, France and Germany confirmed the beginning of a long and hard slog to contain Islamist radicalism in Europe. With Brexit, the unexpected British decision to leave the European Union, there are signals that the European Union itself was possibly under threat.

British PM May went to India at the head of a business delegation with the aim of bringing down barriers to commerce and paving the way for a free trade agreement following Brexit

Developments

In the United States the election victory of Donald Trump defied pollsters and pundits, and now threatens to upend the political order in the world's sole superpower and had portentous consequences for the world order which the US has shaped since World War II and which its incoming President threatens to disrupt.

Our own contribution - demonetization  - may not have shaken the world, but it has certainly rattled India.

Just what will be its consequences is something we will watch out for in 2017.

Prime Minister Modi's New Year Eve speech was supposed to give us some clarity on the issue, but it turned out to be a damp squib.

There are other events in the year gone by which have yet to take a definitive shape -the failed Turkish coup, the US-Iran rapprochement, the UNCLOS arbitration court's award in the South China Sea, the failure of the Trans Pacific Partnership - and which can have wider geopolitical consequences in the year to come.

There is little doubt that 2017's most momentous development will be the unfolding of the Trump presidency.

His rise, statements and his Cabinet appointments suggest that the US is determined to change the international rules of the game.

This could have huge implications for the global trading system of course, but more complicated could be his efforts to re-write the tenets of America's global political doctrine based on liberal internationalism.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Trump doctrine would push allies to spend more on defence, but the big question is whether the alliance system can survive the strain imposed on it by a Trump presidency.

For Europe 2017 could be a make or break year. There are many elements in this mix- a potential US rapprochement with Russia, the possible election upsets in its two principal nations, France and Germany, and the rise if Islamist radicalism.

Powerplay

In China, the event to watch is the 19th Communist Party Congress likely to be held in November.This is likely to involve much jockeying for power for it could decide the succession to Xi Jinping in 2022.It offers Xi the ability to shape the direction the party and the country will move because he will seek to put in place a Central Committee and politburo which will reflect his priorities.

In these circumstances, the Chinese approach to the US will be a cautious one, waiting to see how things play out before making any new moves.

For us in India, the UP election outcome is easily the most important political event of 2017.

With demonetisation kicking in and the Parliament still locked, the chances of significant reform that could accelerate economic growth is doubtful.

Perhaps this is as Modi has calculated, putting all efforts in the development arena in a back-burner till he consolidates himself politically, which means winning the UP elections and consequently the general elections of 2019.

Policies

Modi may be in a position to control the narrative domestically, but he will not have an easy ride abroad.

For one thing, the expected rise in oil prices will remove the cushion the Indian economy has enjoyed since he became Prime Minister.

For another, the consolidation of the China-Pakistan partnership and their entente with Russia have put India in a bad spot in relation to South Asian politics.

New Delhi has made a mess of its China policy and it will require some deft and realist diplomacy to set things on an even keel.

But the bigger headache could well come from the failure of Modi's Pakistan policy. 

The chances of any rapprochement now look bleak, at least through the rest of Nawaz Sharif's term which will end in 2018.

The situation in Kashmir and the Line of Control clashes bode ill for the coming year because such a situation can spin out of control at any time.

Whatever may be Modi's calculations, any war with anyone would spell disaster for the country.

The Modi team has invested a great deal on the United States, but, given Trump's inclinations, the US may not have much need for India in its international calculations.

Indeed, a too-quick an exit of the US from our region poses a challenge for India since it is simply not ready, economically, politically or militarily to play a greater role in regional affairs.

Mail Today January 1, 2017

The Modi Government Has Dismantled India’s Foreign Policy

One of the government’s biggest failures has been its handling of Kashmir, singularly blaming Pakistan for everything that went wrong without understanding the nature of civil violence in the state.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India arrives at the Hangzhou Exhibition Center to participate in the G20 Summit, in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, China, September 4, 2016. Credit: Reuters/Etienne Oliveau/Pool

As a kid in the 1950s, I remember my parents thrusting Meccano sets at me, with the fond belief that it would encourage their son to become an engineer. It turned out that I was good at taking things apart, but hopeless at putting them back together again. Something like that seems to be the case with the Narendra Modi government. It has proved to be a good at dismantling the old, but is finding it uncommonly difficult to construct something new. Maybe, as in my case as a budding engineer, Modi and company are simply incompetent.
The fiasco of demonetisation is just one of the things that comes to mind. Look at the once hallowed Planning Commission, which has given way to the Niti Ayog, whose CEO has decided that the way to push policy is to run lotteries. In the realm of foreign policy too, the Modi team has dismantled the older policies towards Pakistan and China, but nothing new seems to be on the horizon. All it has achieved is an increase in the truculence in our relations with our two big neighbours and potential adversaries. As for the management of various ministries, especially defence, the less said the better.
Where competence is the issue, the real big test has been the government’s Jammu and Kashmir policy. Sad to say, it is difficult to give it anything but a failing grade. Last week, militants ambushed an army convoy near Pampore, killing three jawans and injuring two. This was the fourth attack on an army convoy since August and is part of the uptick in violence in the Valley, which, according to the Indian Express, has led to 60 soldiers being killed in the state this year, double the annual toll in the last two years. The deaths of the soldiers can be attributed to two reasons – the Line of Control turning “active” (as much from Pakistani actions as our reactions) and the internal situation in the Valley deteriorating because of the inability of New Delhi to manage the fallout of Burhan Wani’s killing.
The government of India has taken a strange ideological position that the violent civil protests that hit the Valley in the wake of the killings are entirely directed by Pakistan. Indeed, in the wake of the demonetisation, there was a claim that the instances of stone pelting had declined because the Pakistani agents had run out of cash to distribute to the stone pelters. Needless to say that this crude narrative was entirely false. Anyone familiar with the cycle of violence that wracks Kashmir will know what is Pakistan-directed and what is spontaneous.
Last week, S.P. Vaid, special director general of the Jammu and Kashmir police, told Rising Kashmir in an interview that there was no proof that Pakistan was involved in the civil protests in the Valley or was directing the calendar of protest events. He noted that the number of militants active in the Valley had gone up to some 250-270, as against an earlier estimate (not by Vaid) of just 150 in 2015. (This item has since vanished from the newspaper website, but look hard enough and you will find its traces.)
Pakistan may not be involved in the violent civil protests in the Valley, but it is involved in other nefarious activity. One is the pushing of the so-called Border Action Teams to attack Indian army positions along the LoC. The other is the “special” violence, such as the burning of schools and attacks on police personnel. In any case, Pakistan doesn’t need to do much, all it has to do is to sit back and watch.
The big problem is the inability of the government, both in Srinagar and New Delhi, to understand the nature of the civil violence in the state. Blaming Pakistan is the simplest option. Actually one major reason for the violence is the disillusionment of the supporters of the PDP who were largely in South Kashmir with their party’s link up to the BJP. While electoral arithmetic indicated that there was little choice, the emotions of the people have been contrary. This is manifested also in the fact that while the Jammu and Kashmir police estimates that 80% of the militants in the north are not locals, while in the south, they comprise 80-90% of them.
Like it or not, the Jammu and Kashmir issue has two components – the domestic “dissidents” represented by elements ranging from the insurgents to the Hurriyat and the external factor, Pakistan, which continues to provide political, moral and material support to militancy in the Valley and conducts a proxy war against India through its jihadi armies. In the meantime, the National Conference which has stood as a steadfast as a rock with the Indian Union through the worst of the Kashmir disturbances, is making noises about azadi.
While military force is required to deal with armed rebels, there is need to simultaneously engage the political elements, whether they are the Hurriyat or the National Conference in a dialogue process aimed at restoring normality to the state. The government’s somewhat belated response has been to send a Track II delegation led by former finance minister and senior BJP leader Yashwant Sinha to the Valley. But just how much authority Sinha has with the heavily securitised  Modi setup in New Delhi is difficult to gauge.
The issue of Pakistan is more complex. After reaching out to Islamabad in 2014 and 2015, Modi found them a hard nut to crack. Following the Pathankot attack, he appears to have decided that Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif lacks the heft to deliver anything and India’s policy has since been to roundly denounce Pakistan at every international forum and call for its isolation through sanctions for supporting terrorists.
This one-dimensional policy is not yielding any results. Pakistan continues to give as much as it takes in the brutal cross-LoC boxing match. The so-called “surgical strikes” do not seem to have deterred them in any way and as the figures cited above show, all that has been achieved through the missteps in handling the domestic issues and Pakistan may be to put Jammu and Kashmir back in the ICU it was till 2005.
Far from being isolated, Pakistan is now being seen as a solution, rather than a problem on the issue of resolving the Afghanistan tangle. If anything, New Delhi seems to be isolated. On December 27, China, Russia and Pakistan will have their third meeting of their “trilateral working group” in Moscow. On the other hand, India’s friend Iran has expressed a desire to join the China Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

Pakistan is handling its Indian end skilfully, which is what cannot be said about the Modi team. Rawalpindi is ensuring that its attacks on India focus on military or police targets and do not get the kind of mileage that the Mumbai massacre of 2008 got. In any case, in an environment where terrorism is hitting closer home in  Turkey, Belgium, France and Germany, no one is particularly concerned about what is happening in our part of the world. In essence, Modi’s anti-terror campaign is barking up the wrong tree.
China is another issue. New Delhi has worked under the illusion that it is competing with China. The Modi government  has adopted a posture aimed at disconcerting Beijing – inviting the prime minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile for Modi’s swearing in, allowing the Karmapa and Dalai Lama to go to Tawang, sharply and publicly criticising China for not supporting India’s case in the NSG and demanding support for proscribing Masood Azhar. Baiting the dragon, especially on the issue of Tibet, is risky policy. It could lead to China encouraging Indian separatists in Kashmir, Punjab and elsewhere.
thewire.in December 23, 2016

In Bucking Army Seniority, Modi Takes a Leaf from Pakistani Playbook

So India has now decided to tail Pakistan. Following Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to go down the seniority list and appoint the officer fourth in the seniority list  as chief of army staff, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, too, has gone down the list to select the officer third in the Indian list of seniority as the army chief, Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat..
Sharif also simultaneously appointed the senior-most in the Pakistani list, Lt Gen Zubair Mehmood Hayat to the rank of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. In  keeping with the trend, we are hearing that Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi might be elevated to the position of chief of a tri-service defence staff.  As Mohan Guruswamy has pointed out in a Facebook post, this would entail Bakshi superseding Rawat, who has just superseded him.
Supersession at the apex level of the army has not been unusual in Pakistan. But the Indian decision to appoint  Rawat, the current vice-chief, as army chief  in succession to General Dalbir Singh Suhag has been met with controversy. The principle of seniority is a hallowed one in the Indian army, and each supersession is remembered as victimisation of a deserving officer like P.S. Bhagat or S.K. Sinha.
It is a bit difficult to accept the government’s claim that Rawat was chosen solely on the basis of his merit. When you reach the rank of an army commander, you have already gathered a life-time’s experience in soldiering. The army chief is not an operational commander who needs to be experienced in counter-insurgency. He is a supervisor – the battlefield commander is the regional army commander. Look at the 1965 war, where Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh commanded the western front, or the 1971 war where Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora commanded the eastern front. If we could push through reforms in our defence system, we would actually have theatre commands and the army chief, as is the case in China, the United States or other countries, would be merely responsible for provisioning and training the force.
Yet, for the present we cannot deny the government its reasoning process. Prime Minister Modi and his cabinet committee on security felt that Rawat had all the requirements they wanted. They may be wrong, but that doesn’t take away their prerogative to take a decision along lines they consider the most optimal.
In doing what the government did, it has followed a laid down procedure –  five army commanders and the serving vice-chief constituted a panel of names which were put up to the CCS for selection. There is no requirement that the senior-most officer be selected, hence the need for a panel. However, over the years, in a bid to avoid controversy over appointments, the governments of the day have gone with seniority. Actually, for no government appointment is strict seniority a good idea – not just for the army chief, but in other departments as well. Ideally, we should do away with the seniority system, provided it is done through a well-thought through design and understanding of the longer-term implications.
The army promotion ladder is steep and is already plagued with another problem—the “zero fault” syndrome, where any error can lead to losing your place in the queue.  As is well known, only people who actually do things are likely to make errors. So, the zero-fault approach leads to an over-cautious officer cadre, which is not good when you want a war-winning military.
Another factor that deserves consideration is the need to give the incumbent of a top office in the military a term of at least four to five years. The current two-year tenure is simply inadequate, with the incumbent taking six months to sit firmly in the saddle and the last six months in planning his retirement. But if longer terms are to become the norm, so will larger scale supersession.
It is true that all this sounds nice in theory, but we live in a deeply divided society where caste, religion and even sub-caste affiliations colour a person’s view. This is evident in the army itself, where chiefs are accused of promoting personnel from their own respective arm and regiment. V.K. Singh was accused of promoting Rajput regiment officers and now Dalbir Singh Suhag is charged with promoting officers from the Gurkha regiments. In such an environment, biases are not just imagined, but real. Besides such biases are the human ones where sycophancy and a desire to please the bosses can be passed off as capability.  An unflinching look at our politics and society would suggest that, perhaps, it is a good idea to go by seniority alone till we become more complete “Indians” and our approach to government and governance is more professional.
That said, there is a problem in appointing Bakshi as CDS after Rawat has been named army chief. Whether it is the Arun Singh committee in 1990, the Group of Ministers recommendations in 2001 or the Naresh Chandra committee in 2012, they have all seen the CDS/permanent chairman chiefs of staff committee as the primus inter pares – or first among equals. He is meant to be the principal and single-point military adviser to the government. In view of that, the Naresh Chandra committee suggested that he be selected from among the serving army, navy or air force chiefs. Hopefully the government will not just make a token appointment. The country desperately needs a CDS figure – not a decorative figurehead – whose office must be fully empowered; just what powers the CDS must enjoy have been listed out by various official committees in great detail. Announcing a CDS without those powers, as some in government have mooted, is to rob a serious recommendation of its substance.
thewire.in December 20, 2016

China's looking at its Trump card

The unusual run-in that President-elect Donald Trump has had with China is a matter of great concern and should not be ignored. It began with a phone call to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen on December 2, breaking the protocol that had operated for 37 years, when no US president had spoken to his Taiwanese counterpart.
US scholar Oriana Mastro notes in a blog post that the call could well have been unintentional, but typical of Trump, he resorted to bluster in defending the call, asking whether China had asked the US “if it was OK to devalue their currency, heavily tax our products going into their country or to build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea? I don’t think so.”
On Saturday and Sunday, the world watched bemused as Trump las­h­ed out at China for seizing an American drone that was doing some hydrographic/surveillance work on the high seas off China. After criticising China for stealing the drone, Tru­mp raised the ante by declaring that China could keep it, thus, blocking an easy resolution to the issue. Trump’s signaling on China is unpredictable. Earlier in the month, he appointed Terry Branstead, the governor of Iowa as the Ambassador to China. Branstead has excellent ties in China reaching up to Xi Jinping.
Speaking at the Halifax Security Forum several weeks ago, US Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris observed that “Capability x Resolve = deterrence”. The element of resolve seems to be missing in the US responses to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Obama admin’s weak response is underscored by the fact that the drone was captured in Philippine’s exclusive economic zone and outside even the so-called nine-dash line that China claims as a maritime border. With the TPP dead in the water, a key weapon in the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia appears to have lost steam. Its policy seems confined to rotating F-22 fighters through the region.
China is not unaware that it was the period in the wake of Nine Ele­ven, when the US was focused on Iraq and then Afghanistan, that it had an unchallenged rise in the South-east Asian region. It was aided by the 2008 economic melt-down which the Chinese handled well with their massive stimulus to enhance their relative standing in the world system. Even so, as a country that is simultaneously a great power and a rising one, it needs to ensure that the old super-power is not hostile to it.
The Trump presidency could offer a period of opportunity. An erratic president, with a poor grasp of policy could stumble in a range of areas, giving Beijing a free run not only in South-east Asia, but Central and West Asia as well. On the other hand, notwithstanding the rhetoric, it could be that Trump is softening Beijing for a deal.
China is not the kind of country to get into a deal due to pressure or in a hurry. It is quite capable of pushing its interest in a long-term framework and battening down the hatches while waiting out the Trump era. On the other hand, it could cause considerable trouble for the US through its linkages in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran. But with a slowing economy, there are domestic compulsions for Xi Jinping not to get locked into a confrontation with the US.
Dealing with China is an extremely complex issue. The Chinese world view is very different from that of the US and its allies, and its policy-making process quite opaque. The Trump style disdains complexity, but unless Trump reveals some of the genius of Ronald Reagan, simplistic answers to complex issues will pose great danger to the global order.
As outlined in his campaign, it would appear that hostility to Islamist radicalism, rather than China, forms his core belief. In this, he sees Israel as his close ally and the battle to come in civilisational terms. In line with this, Russia is part of the solution, rather than a problem. There are other indicators suggesting that his focus will remain in the Middle-East — the nomination of retired generals like Mike Flynn as NSA and James Mattis, former Centcom chief, as Secretary of Defense.
If this is so, don’t be surprised if Trump is willing to cut a deal with China along the lines of the “New Type of Great Power Relations” mooted by Xi Jinping in his first meeting with Obama in Sunnylands in 2013. Xi’s view involved (1) no conflict or confrontation, and treating each other’s strategic intentions objectively; (2) mutual respect, including for each other’s core interests and major concerns; and (3) mutually beneficial cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest.
In geopolitical terms, this could mean Trump reverting to the American position on Taiwan and accepting Chinese primacy in the South China Sea. The problem is trying to understand what the Chinese would be willing to offer the US in exchange. Let’s be clear, Trump the businessman, is unlikely to offer a free lunch.
December 20, 2016

How Trump will whitewash the White House

Through tweets, statements and misstatements, the nature of the forthcoming Trump presidency is slowly revealing itself.But perhaps the best way of assessing the next US administration as of now, is to look at the selections that Trump has made for the Cabinet and the White House. 

Disruptors

So far he has appointed 22 people and it is no surprise that of 17 of them are white males, some of them older like himself; while the women in the team have relatively unimportant portfolios.

The other feature is that they are mainly rich executives and businessmen with little or no experience in the portfolios they will handle.

Among these are Rex Tillerson the former boss of Exxon Mobil, now Secretary of State designate, or Steven Mnuchin, the nominee for the Department of Treasury who is a former Goldman Sachs executive, Commerce Secretary nominee Wilbur Ross who is a billionaire investor or Dr Ben Carson, Secretary for Housing and Urban Development designate, who is a neurosurgeon. 

Just what kind of a government Trump intends to run is evident from the fact that many of the appointees are known critics of the very departments they have now been chosen to head.Of course, there is still the matter of Senate confirmations in the coming year.

The New York Times has categorised the cabinet as comprising of disruptors like Scott Prutt, Oklahoma state attorney and climate change denier who has been chosen to head the Environmental Protection Agency.

Or former Texas governor Rick Perry who once wanted to abolish the Department of Energy, the outfit he has been asked to head. In choosing them, Trump wants them to change things, not run them as they were.

In other words, disruption is expected from them, though just how much disruption the huge and complex bureaucracy can take is a matter of conjecture.

The next category are deal makers like Tillerson and Mnuchin, who have never worked with government before, but are leaders in their respective field and have proven executive ability and should, over a period of time, master their respective departments.

With business and finance backgrounds, they know how to cut a deal in a complex environment and understand the importance of gain and loss.

Variables

Whether this presages a period in which the US reaches out to potential opponents like Russia, China and Iran and works out ways of getting along with them, or not, is something that remains to be seen.

In foreign policy there is only so much that is under your control - some variables are under the control of your adversaries, existing and potential.

In any case given the present situation, deals will not be easy for everyone to stomach.

Western Europe will not be particularly happy with a deal that get Putin off their backs, in exchange for accepting that Ukraine, Belarus and Syria are part of his sphere of influence.

Then, there are loyalists like former Republican party head Reince Priebus and the incoming NSA, Lt General Michael Flynn who stuck with Trump through the thick and thin.

There is the category of establishment persons who are close to the right-wing of the Republicans and have ties with the US Congress.

+3

President-elect Donald Trump speaks during a thank you rally in Ladd-Peebles Stadium

Among these are Nikki Haley, Michael Pompeo the incoming CIA chief and Elaine Chao, the wife of Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell.

Finally, there is the category of former military personnel who can prove to problematic - Flynn, defence secretary designate, Lt General James Mattis and Marine General John Kelly to head Homeland Security.

As it is, the generals who are well-known figures will tend to overshadow the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff who is the principal military adviser to the President. 

Establishment

Presidents in the past often sought out technocrats or people with substantive experience in the field they were dealing with, but now we have retired generals, top executives and leaders in the world of finance.

Such people also have notoriously big egos and you can be sure that they will clash. 

To some extent this is by design as it will enable Trump to control them.

Further, we need to pay attention as well to sub-cabinet appointees who will run the powerful divisions of the various departments.

Trump has put in transition or 'landing' teams into the departments which clearly indicate that his goal is to live up to his promise of providing an administration which in is opinion will not be influenced by the 'special interests' in Washington.

In other words, a combination of disruptors, deal-makers, loyalists and establishment personnel.However, many of these figures will come from a very different pool of people i.e. not the Washington establishment which Trump shuns, but further afield. 

Mail Today December 19, 2016

'Bordering' on inadequacy

The attack that killed seven military personnel in Nagrota has been a serious breach. At one level, it may be dismissed as part of a pattern of attacks we have witnessed since 2013. At another, there should be concern that in this case, the penetration has taken place in an area that houses the headquarters of one of the biggest corps of Indian Army. It is a far more serious than the Uri event, and yet we are hearing nothing from the fire-eaters who celebrated the 'surgical strikes' to avenge it."
To say that this is a wake-up call for the Army would be futile because the wake-up calls have been coming since the strikes on Pathankot and Uri. The government's response has been to promote deterrent counter strikes. It is necessary but insuffici­ent. What is also needed is a revision of standard operating pro­c­e­dures for perimeter security in the hundreds of camps, pickets, cantonments and bases that are strung out along the border in J&K. Both the components of Indian counter-militant strategy — deterrence and defence — must be robust and innovative, just as the attackers are.
The Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, which claimed 166 civilians, caused a wave of revulsion across the world. Uncomfortably for Pakistan, it also revealed how the tentacles of the jihadis were entangled with the Pakistani deep state. Names of various Pak military officials like Sajid Mir surfaced, Islamabad brushed it away by arresting some of the LeT functionaries involved and slow-tracking their trial. The US obtained information through its own channel through Daood Gilani, aka David Coleman Headley. So, the ISI took recourse to a new technique to keep up the pressure on India — avoid mass-casualty civilian attacks which would bring huge pressure on India to launch a military strike, and carry out a succession of low impact attacks on Indian military or police targets and confine them to the J&K area.
These unfolded after 2012 across the International Border (termed wo­r­king boundary in Pakistan) in Jam­mu, parallel to National Highway 1A. The pattern was roughly similar — small groups of men would cross the border, which is guarded by BSF, don military fatigues, hijack a passing vehicle and hit a target, usually a police station or a military post and die in the process. However, the attack on Nagrota is more serious.
For one, it is further inland and for another, it should have been better protected, considering it is the location of the headquarters of India's largest corps. On September 26, 2013, a few days ahead of the Manmohan Singh-Nawaz Sharif meeting in New York, militants dressed in army fatigues struck a police station at Hiranagar, near Kathua, killing several policemen. Later they attacked an army camp before being gunned down.
On November 27, 2014, just as PM Modi was meeting his Pak counterpart at Dhulikhel, Nepal, four gunmen who had come across the border clashed with an army patrol in the Arnia sector of Jammu leaving three soldiers and five civilians dead.
On March 28, 2014, two days after a Modi election rally near Jammu, three militants hijacked a vehicle and attacked an Army camp at Janglore and killed a jawan, before getting killed. On July 27, 2015, three gunmen dressed in army fatigues who crossed the border, turned south to Punjab and fired on a bus near Dinanagar, near Gurdaspur. They hijacked a car and attacked a police station killing three civilians and four policemen. For the first time, the militants came in from Jammu and deliberately
str­uck a target in Punjab.
This pattern was repeated on January 1-3, 2016; gunmen crossed the border in Jammu, hijacked a police officer's vehicle to reach the Patha­n­kot Air Force base to launch an attack. Despite advanced intelligence, the perimeter was breached and two army personnel were killed. The repeated penetrations of the border do raise the question about the efficiency of India's border manag­ement and perimeter security practices, even as they roil efforts to normalise relations between the two neighbours. Officials usually come up with various explanations and promise high-tech solutions, like automated machine guns and laser curtains to foil attackers. The pro­blem is the serrated nature of the terrain, which is cut by rivers and nallahs leading out of the mountains and flowing towards Pakistan. They provide several channels of ingress which are familiar to smugglers.
But the problem is often with the quality of equipment and the forces, namely the BSF, being used to guard the border. As for perimeter security, the government should understand that this involves substantial costs and be ready to provide money to build walls not only around the bases and cantonments, but within them to foil easy movement of militants who might get through. There is also need to come up with a standardised concrete guardhouse which is sufficien­tly protected and provides easy line of sight for the guarding forces. The DRDO, which focuses on futuristic projects, should consider designing taut-wire sensors and physical barriers which are rugged and reliable.
Mid Day December 6, 2016