Afghanistan is the real challenge: With the new thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations, thoughts turn to the next point of contention

THE meeting between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his new Pakistani counterpart Lt Gen (retd) Nasir Khan Janjua, marks the beginning of a thaw in India-Pakistan relations. 

This is likely to be followed by the participation of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in the Heart of Asia Conference in Islamabad on December 8. 

The meeting between the two NSAs, accompanied by their respective foreign secretaries, marks the resumption of a constructive discourse between the two countries, which had been derailed by needless controversy over the agenda in September this year. 

According to a joint statement, the NSA discussions covered all issues including Jammu & Kashmir. The carefully staged meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his counterpart Nawaz Sharif at the side lines of the Climate conference in Paris last week was the first indicator of the changing India-Pakistan scenario. 

Ties 

Parallel to this has been the improvement of New Delhi’s ties with President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan. Minus these developments, Modi would have found it difficult to meet his commitment to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad.

This will be the first prime ministerial visit by an Indian leader since 2004, when PM Vajpayee went to Pakistan for a similar purpose, but which led to a major bilateral process in its side lines. 

 It would also have damaged India’s efforts to play a significant role in Afghanistan which include hosting the 14-nation Heart of Asia Conference in New Delhi next year. Stabilising Afghanistan and peace with Pakistan form a continuum for Indian policy makers because failure in either country has the potential to destabilise the ties with the other. 

The challenge for India and the global community is to persuade Pakistan to deliver a ceasefire in Afghanistan by pressuring the Taliban. Kunduz attack in September showed that the Taliban had not changed. 

According to the Amnesty International, the short Taliban occupation resulted in mass murder, gang rapes and house-tohouse searches by Taliban death squads targeting women activists. While the US and NATO have extended their mission till the end of 2016, they cannot guarantee peace there. As it is, Taliban infighting is making the process difficult for Pakistan as well. India’s activities in Afghanistan, especially its development work has been under the security umbrella of the US-NATO-Afghan forces. 

India has committed $2 billion in aid to Kabul and its annual trade is around $680 million which can increase manifold if the Afghan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA) is worked out to permit India-Afghan trade through Pakistan. Improved ties with Islamabad can lead to a breakthrough here which has the potential of transforming the India-Pakistan- Afghanistan relationship. 

Wishlist

Before Kunduz, President Ghani reached out to Pakistan and there were reports of deep engagement between the two states at the cost of India. However, after Kunduz, there is a chill in Pakistan-Afghanistan ties. 

The NSA of Afghanistan Mohammed Hanif Atmar recently travelled to New Delhi and had extensive talks with Doval and also put up a wishlist that includes Kabul’s request for military supplies. 

Actually the Heart of Asia process does offer a window of convergence for India and Pakistan to work together. Likewise New Delhi and Islamabad may cooperate in combating terrorism and easing trade barrier through their new membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a China-led security initiative. 

There are things that Pakistan would be willing to do in a wider multilateral framework with India which it will resist doing bilaterally. One example of this is the TAPI project. 

Refugees 

Given its long land border, the existence of the Pakistani Taliban and the huge number of Afghan refugees it hosts, Pakistan has great stakes in the Afghan peace process. 

We need to recognise this, as well as understand that our stakes are comparatively smaller than those countries which have land borders with Afghanistan. 

This means Islamabad also has big responsibilities, principally in dealing with the Taliban and regaining the trust of the Afghans and letting the peace process be Afghan-led, and not manipulated by Islamabad. 

India’s principal interest is to ensure that Afghanistan does not resume its role as a staging area for groups like the LeT to stage attacks on India. 

Accompanying this is our desire for longer term peace and stability in the AfPak region which can only come through closer economic integration of SAARC states. 

The NSAs and foreign secretaries meeting in Bangkok signal a new direction for Indian policy which was getting needlessly securitised by privileging terrorism over all other issues. The Modi-Nawaz and the Bangkok meetings signal the return to a more balanced approach which will, no doubt, be challenged by forces who seek to disrupt India-Pakistan relations. This is something we must be prepared for at all times. 

Mail Today December 6, 2015

Modi versus Terror

What’s with Prime Minister Narendra Modi ? In the past two weeks, in various speeches, he has raised the standard of combating terrorism. True, this is the period in which horrific attacks were carried out in Paris, Bamako and Beirut, but nothing unusual has happened in India. Indeed, there has been no major development on the terrorism front in India since 2008 which saw the Mumbai attacks and the bombing campaign of the so-called Indian Mujahideen.

Wherever he goes, his emphasis, at least as reported in Indian  newspapers, seems to be on fighting terrorism. Speaking at the 18-member East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur on Sunday, he called for “a new global resolve and new strategies” to combat terrorism. Later addressing the diaspora, he termed terrorism as “the biggest threat to the world.”

Even before the Paris attack,  Modi had flagged the issue when he told British parliamentarians that “The world must speak in one voice and act in unison to combat this challenge of our times” and called for the adoption of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism at the United Nations “without delay.”

Following the Paris attack, the Prime Minister joined world leaders in condemning the attack and in an intervention during the G-20 working dinner on November 15, he spoke out emphatically against terrorism. Referring to the rise of the IS, he pointed out that “old structures of terrorism [read Lashkar-e-Tayyeba] remain” and that “there are countries that still use it as an instrument of state policy [read Pakistan]”.

This is  surprising because in the last seven years Pakistan-backed terrorism has actually declined sharply.  A look at the statistics in the South Asia Terrorism Portal show that the bulk of what passes off as terrorist violence in India is related to the Maoists in central India and the various insurgents of the North-east. In Jammu & Kashmir, violence aided by Pakistan is down sharply. As compared to 103 security personnel killed by Maoists and in the North-east, the total is 38 in J&K and 8 in other parts of the country.

 The story was similar the year before, in 2014. Some 110 security personnel were killed in central India and the North-east, as compared to 51 in J&K and zero in other parts of India. Those killed in other parts of India is an important category since this usually includes terrorists who operate under the direction of Pakistani parties. But the last time this category meant something was in 2008 when 337 people died in other parts of India, with 166 being killed in the Mumbai attacks and others in bombing campaigns in New Delhi, Jaipur and Ahmedabad.

Now, it is well known that the Maoist violence and North-east issues have domestic origins and are not quite connected to the global terrorism that the PM seems to be talking about. J&K is a category in itself, but it is just last week that K Rajindra, the Director General of police said at a press meet that both crime and terrorism were declining in the state and that the instances of Islamic State flags were more an attention grabbing stunt than any indication of the spread of the Daesh ideology.

So, what accounts for Modi’s over-the-top attempt to become a world leader  in  fighting the terrorist menace everywhere ? In all fairness, one part of it has to do with the events of the times, notably the Paris attack. But while it is one thing for New Delhi to condemn the attack, there is little India can do to assist France and the international community to fight the Daesh, since India is itself not affected by the Islamic State phenomenon. Modi’s prescription, made in the speech to the East Asia summit, that there was need to delink terrorism and religion is misleading, because the Daesh, indeed, has everything to do with Islam, or an interpretation of it. It is important to understand the challenge of Islamism, given the nature of Islam as a faith which adheres to a book which is considered the word of God and which does contain statements and declarations that have encouraged the Islamic State to enslave and behead people and visit all kinds of barbarity on them.

One answer that comes to mind is that terrorism is proving to be a convenient handle for Modi to bash Pakistan. Terrorism has clearly become the most important filter through which the Modi government views Pakistan.   As we have indicated that this seems a bit odd given the decline of Pakistan-backed violence. Indeed, this fact could have served to engage Islamabad, instead, a loud campaign has been launched which does not seem to be getting much traction anywhere.

The other is that it helps Modi to paper over his other failures, notably in carrying out the transformative reforms he had promised the country and the world. Given his outsize self-image, he therefore seems to be keen to use it to establish his standing as a global leader of consequence. But he is ploughing a path which has been well trod, especially on the issue of terrorism. The global convention on  terrorism that he has been raising time and again recently is a measure that India has been pushing in vain since 1996 and we are no nearer to it today, than we were then.

If Modi wants the attention and adulation he received in the past year to continue, he has to avoid the short-cuts of ringing declarations and slogans. He needs to buckle down to the self-same reforms that made India--and he Modi as its leader-- attractive to the global community in the first place. 

Mid Day November 24 2015

The lesson from Bihar

Elections in India are always wondrous things. Almost everyone comes a cropper predicting outcomes. But there are some underlying lessons that no one, especially a politician, should never forget. The first among these is that the Indian voter has an infinite capacity to surprise.
Second, and equally important, he/she does not like to be intimidated. For the average Indian, voting is a form of empowerment. Election day is just about the only time he/she gets to tell off politicians who, otherwise, treat them cynically. Anyone who seeks to undermine this feels the voters’ wrath. Indira Gandhi learnt it the hard way when she lost every seat in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in 1977. Through some osmotic communication, electors decided that the Congress party’s tyranny,  was simply not acceptable. Something similar seems to have happened in Bihar, where within the space of a year, the National Democratic Alliance strategy of frightening the voter with a barely concealed anti-Muslim message.

The electorate has very clearly told the BJP was that they had elected the Modi government not to bring some version of Hindutva Raj, but to bring economic and governance changes that would enhance the quality of their economic and personal lives.  

A subtext of the outcome is that the electorate, especially the  majority Hindus,  will not accept violent religious extremists of their community  disrupting the unity of their country. There were several reports of attempts to fan communal violence in Bihar, with the typical stratagems of throwing body parts of cows and pigs into temple and mosque premises. The target district was Bhagalpur which had seen horrific communal violence in 1989. But this time around the people would have none of it, they refused to get provoked.

Hopefully some of the calmness shown by Biharis when confronted with efforts at communal provocation will also be visible in Uttar Pradesh. According to Home Ministry figures, there has been a sharp uptick in communal violence across the country in the first six months of this year. Most 68 of the 330 incidents  were in UP and 41 in Bihar, and it does not take a genius to figure out just why this is happening. The 2013  communal violence in Muzaffarnagar brought out the manner in which the BJP and its fellow Parivar—the Bajrang Dal, Vishwaa Hindu PArishad and RSS-- successfully used a combination of tactics  to deepen  Hindu-Muslim friction to polarize the electorate.

The very obvious consequence of the Bihar outcome is that the BJP and the Modi government are at a fork in the road. They can, if they wish pursue the path they have taken in the past year of trying to deepen divisions in the country, marginalizing minorities and stifling dissent. The RSS has long believed that their best opportunity lies in polarizing the Hindu community and thus providing the BJP the massed votes of the overwhelming majority of the country’s population. However their version of Hinduism is not the Sanatan Dharma as we know it, but a mirror of Pakistani Islam, where some self-appointed mullahs dictate what is kosher, and where violence is used to enforce their diktat (fatwas). Just as Pakistani mullahs are obsessed with India, so, too, are the advocates of Hindutva driven by Pakistan and Pakistanis.

It is not so hard for Modi to find his way because it has  been shown earlier by a leader much taller than him—Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Though both were products of the RSS machine, Vajpayee had a much longer period in which to carve out a distinct identity for himself which positioned him very cleverly at a place where the Sangh needed him more than he needed them. And when required, he simply ignored them. Unfortunately for Modi, his temperament is quite different from that of Vajpayee, and this becomes manifest in combative self-obsessed personality and inability to reach out and reassure minorities that he means what he says when he insists that his holy book is the Constitution of India.

He needs to understand that upholding the Constitution is not just some legal compulsion that he has, but also a practical one. Those who drafted the Constitution that has served us well for 65 years understood that this continental-sized country with numerous religious and ethno-linguistic divisions could only be kept together through the compact they devised. If the Indian Union is going to be about giving primacy to Hindus, why should states like Arunachal, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab remain in it ? And why should millions of other Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists and Christians accept this ?

Modi will have to work hard to reclaim his original mandate which is in danger of being pulled apart by his friends and enemies. This,  to repeat, was to bring about transformational changes in the country’s economy and governance. It was to attack corruption, reform ministries and provide the leadership to give the country  sustained and high rates of economic growth.

Setbacks are not unusual in politics. But what marks a successful politicians is what he makes of his defeats, rather than how he celebrates his success. This is testing time for Modi, but he alone holds the power to determine how he will fare. 

Mid Day November 10, 2015

Review of Bharat Karnad, Why India is not a great powerr (yet)

Book: Why India is not a Great Power (Yet)
Author: Bharat Karnad
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Pages: 552 
Price: 875

 

Among Indians writing on strategic affairs, Bharat Karnad occupies a distinct position, one that he has carved out for himself, by being an offensive realist. In his scheme of things, the international system is an anarchic entity where each state relentlessly pursues its national interests and big powers are locked in a struggle to be number one.

Karnad wants India to be number one, but as the title of the book suggests, we are some way from getting there. The purpose of this book is to explore the reasons for India’s weaknesses and suggest ways it can become a truly great power. In the first stage, Karnad wants India to become the great disruptor of the international system, much in the way China has been in the last two decades. Whether his remedies will be worse than the disease, of course, only history will tell, but first I would advise you to read this important and cogently argued book.

India has never known Napoleons and Alexanders, though it has been the object of their desire. The reason is that the famous diversity of the Indian people has ensured that anyone who established his empire in this country had to constantly fight to preserve his gains, rather than export military power. The British, of course, were an exception, but don’t forget when they left, the country was divided into two. Consistent with his analysis, Karnad argues that India must follow a policy of trying to co-opt Pakistan into its subcontinental strategy and focus on the real adversary — China.

The book provides a pitiless analysis of how things have gone wrong with independent India. Karnad’s analysis of Nehru’s long era is more subtle than the crude critiques we are used to these days. But he is quite unforgiving of Indira Gandhi who hobbled the country through her economic policies and undermined Nehru’s clever non-alignment. His principal villains are bureaucrats and policymakers, several of whom he cites and has interviewed.

At the heart of the problem, and he states it repeatedly, is the lack of an Indian “great power” vision and the strategy to achieve it. I would argue that along with this, there is an acute lack of political leadership which can outline this vision, as contrasted with the fantastic ways it is being articulated by Narendra Modi and his acolytes. Hindutva politicians who have come to power with Modi are functionally literate, but uneducated and probably uneducatable.

Sure, they have views on the greatness of Bharatvarsha and its stupendous achievements, but their problem is that they cannot separate myth from reality. They have a steady eye on the half-mythical past which reduces their vision of the future to crude assertion rather than analytical fact.

Looking back is not the answer, looking ahead is. Many of Karnad’s nostrums such as a more focused strategic policy, a more expansive and intensive Indian Ocean posture, uniting the subcontinent under Indian economic leadership, are well taken, though trying to undo the failed thermonuclear test could be a costly distraction. Karnad has his point of view and he has articulated it with great vigour. He has for long swum against the tide in the Indian context and deserves credit for the intellectual rigour of his writings.

A checklist he provides seems to suggest that India’s path to being a great power will be overly militaristic — the assertion of an Indian Monroe doctrine, the resumption of thermonuclear testing, establishing military bases abroad, arming Vietnam, building a military-industrial complex, enhancing cooperation with the US and its allies and so on. He believes that India has the resources to be an outward thrusting power, but this is questionable. Whether it is Central or South-east Asia or Africa, India’s investment and trade volume is a fraction of that of China.

Then, there is the challenge in demanding the attention of all the resources we have. The 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) revealed the shocking extent of poverty in India. In nearly 75 per cent of the rural households, the main earning member earns less than Rs 5,000 a month; over half of the rural households’ main income is from casual manual labour and a third of rural India remains illiterate. Military power must always be a function of national economic power, not the other way around. Not for nothing was military modernisation the last of the “Four Modernisations” in China.

Before India becomes a great power, it must be a nation of Indians. Even now, the politics of the country revolves around religious, ethnic, caste and linguistic identities, which may be natural but are also dangerously divisive. It is not just communal or caste violence: states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka war over water, and Telangana and Andhra over history. Without an emphatic national identity, asserting a greater Indian vision and strategy will not be easy.

The basic premise of Karnad’s book is that Modi is the leader who can lead the transformation. But some of Modi’s confused policy lines are no different from those of his predecessors whom Karnad so harshly criticises. Take China, Modi has led India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, even as he has articulated a common Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean vision with Japan and the US.

Karnad’s bottom line is that India’s policies are correctable and he is probably right. But they cannot be corrected by a set of bureaucrats. For that the country requires not just an inspired prime minister, but a dozen good ministers and chief ministers who will systematically transform their respective ministries and states. The first big weaknesses of the Modi system is its reliance on the bureaucracy, which is good for carrying out the tasks it has been set, but is not capable of leading a transformation. Besides, there is the question of national stamina. We need at least three decades of sustained transformative effort, and given our challenges, things do not look easy. But, at least, we could make a beginning.

Indian Express November 21 2015

Book: Why India is not a Great Power (Yet)
Author: Bharat Karnad
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Pages: 552 
Price: 875
Among Indians writing on strategic affairs, Bharat Karnad occupies a distinct position, one that he has carved out for himself, by being an offensive realist. In his scheme of things, the international system is an anarchic entity where each state relentlessly pursues its national interests and big powers are locked in a struggle to be number one.

Karnad wants India to be number one, but as the title of the book suggests, we are some way from getting there. The purpose of this book is to explore the reasons for India’s weaknesses and suggest ways it can become a truly great power. In the first stage, Karnad wants India to become the great disruptor of the international system, much in the way China has been in the last two decades. Whether his remedies will be worse than the disease, of course, only history will tell, but first I would advise you to read this important and cogently argued book.
India has never known Napoleons and Alexanders, though it has been the object of their desire. The reason is that the famous diversity of the Indian people has ensured that anyone who established his empire in this country had to constantly fight to preserve his gains, rather than export military power. The British, of course, were an exception, but don’t forget when they left, the country was divided into two. Consistent with his analysis, Karnad argues that India must follow a policy of trying to co-opt Pakistan into its subcontinental strategy and focus on the real adversary — China.
The book provides a pitiless analysis of how things have gone wrong with independent India. Karnad’s analysis of Nehru’s long era is more subtle than the crude critiques we are used to these days. But he is quite unforgiving of Indira Gandhi who hobbled the country through her economic policies and undermined Nehru’s clever non-alignment. His principal villains are bureaucrats and policymakers, several of whom he cites and has interviewed.
At the heart of the problem, and he states it repeatedly, is the lack of an Indian “great power” vision and the strategy to achieve it. I would argue that along with this, there is an acute lack of political leadership which can outline this vision, as contrasted with the fantastic ways it is being articulated by Narendra Modi and his acolytes. Hindutva politicians who have come to power with Modi are functionally literate, but uneducated and probably uneducatable.
Sure, they have views on the greatness of Bharatvarsha and its stupendous achievements, but their problem is that they cannot separate myth from reality. They have a steady eye on the half-mythical past which reduces their vision of the future to crude assertion rather than analytical fact.
Looking back is not the answer, looking ahead is. Many of Karnad’s nostrums such as a more focused strategic policy, a more expansive and intensive Indian Ocean posture, uniting the subcontinent under Indian economic leadership, are well taken, though trying to undo the failed thermonuclear test could be a costly distraction. Karnad has his point of view and he has articulated it with great vigour. He has for long swum against the tide in the Indian context and deserves credit for the intellectual rigour of his writings.
A checklist he provides seems to suggest that India’s path to being a great power will be overly militaristic — the assertion of an Indian Monroe doctrine, the resumption of thermonuclear testing, establishing military bases abroad, arming Vietnam, building a military-industrial complex, enhancing cooperation with the US and its allies and so on. He believes that India has the resources to be an outward thrusting power, but this is questionable. Whether it is Central or South-east Asia or Africa, India’s investment and trade volume is a fraction of that of China.
Then, there is the challenge in demanding the attention of all the resources we have. The 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) revealed the shocking extent of poverty in India. In nearly 75 per cent of the rural households, the main earning member earns less than Rs 5,000 a month; over half of the rural households’ main income is from casual manual labour and a third of rural India remains illiterate. Military power must always be a function of national economic power, not the other way around. Not for nothing was military modernisation the last of the “Four Modernisations” in China.
Before India becomes a great power, it must be a nation of Indians. Even now, the politics of the country revolves around religious, ethnic, caste and linguistic identities, which may be natural but are also dangerously divisive. It is not just communal or caste violence: states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka war over water, and Telangana and Andhra over history. Without an emphatic national identity, asserting a greater Indian vision and strategy will not be easy.
The basic premise of Karnad’s book is that Modi is the leader who can lead the transformation. But some of Modi’s confused policy lines are no different from those of his predecessors whom Karnad so harshly criticises. Take China, Modi has led India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, even as he has articulated a common Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean vision with Japan and the US.
Karnad’s bottom line is that India’s policies are correctable and he is probably right. But they cannot be corrected by a set of bureaucrats. For that the country requires not just an inspired prime minister, but a dozen good ministers and chief ministers who will systematically transform their respective ministries and states. The first big weaknesses of the Modi system is its reliance on the bureaucracy, which is good for carrying out the tasks it has been set, but is not capable of leading a transformation. Besides, there is the question of national stamina. We need at least three decades of sustained transformative effort, and given our challenges, things do not look easy. But, at least, we could make a beginning.
- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/lifestyle/books/the-case-for-greatness/#sthash.ENHYX3Xe.dpuf

Book: Why India is not a Great Power (Yet)
Author: Bharat Karnad
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Pages: 552 
Price: 875
Among Indians writing on strategic affairs, Bharat Karnad occupies a distinct position, one that he has carved out for himself, by being an offensive realist. In his scheme of things, the international system is an anarchic entity where each state relentlessly pursues its national interests and big powers are locked in a struggle to be number one.

Karnad wants India to be number one, but as the title of the book suggests, we are some way from getting there. The purpose of this book is to explore the reasons for India’s weaknesses and suggest ways it can become a truly great power. In the first stage, Karnad wants India to become the great disruptor of the international system, much in the way China has been in the last two decades. Whether his remedies will be worse than the disease, of course, only history will tell, but first I would advise you to read this important and cogently argued book.
India has never known Napoleons and Alexanders, though it has been the object of their desire. The reason is that the famous diversity of the Indian people has ensured that anyone who established his empire in this country had to constantly fight to preserve his gains, rather than export military power. The British, of course, were an exception, but don’t forget when they left, the country was divided into two. Consistent with his analysis, Karnad argues that India must follow a policy of trying to co-opt Pakistan into its subcontinental strategy and focus on the real adversary — China.
The book provides a pitiless analysis of how things have gone wrong with independent India. Karnad’s analysis of Nehru’s long era is more subtle than the crude critiques we are used to these days. But he is quite unforgiving of Indira Gandhi who hobbled the country through her economic policies and undermined Nehru’s clever non-alignment. His principal villains are bureaucrats and policymakers, several of whom he cites and has interviewed.
At the heart of the problem, and he states it repeatedly, is the lack of an Indian “great power” vision and the strategy to achieve it. I would argue that along with this, there is an acute lack of political leadership which can outline this vision, as contrasted with the fantastic ways it is being articulated by Narendra Modi and his acolytes. Hindutva politicians who have come to power with Modi are functionally literate, but uneducated and probably uneducatable.
Sure, they have views on the greatness of Bharatvarsha and its stupendous achievements, but their problem is that they cannot separate myth from reality. They have a steady eye on the half-mythical past which reduces their vision of the future to crude assertion rather than analytical fact.
Looking back is not the answer, looking ahead is. Many of Karnad’s nostrums such as a more focused strategic policy, a more expansive and intensive Indian Ocean posture, uniting the subcontinent under Indian economic leadership, are well taken, though trying to undo the failed thermonuclear test could be a costly distraction. Karnad has his point of view and he has articulated it with great vigour. He has for long swum against the tide in the Indian context and deserves credit for the intellectual rigour of his writings.
A checklist he provides seems to suggest that India’s path to being a great power will be overly militaristic — the assertion of an Indian Monroe doctrine, the resumption of thermonuclear testing, establishing military bases abroad, arming Vietnam, building a military-industrial complex, enhancing cooperation with the US and its allies and so on. He believes that India has the resources to be an outward thrusting power, but this is questionable. Whether it is Central or South-east Asia or Africa, India’s investment and trade volume is a fraction of that of China.
Then, there is the challenge in demanding the attention of all the resources we have. The 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) revealed the shocking extent of poverty in India. In nearly 75 per cent of the rural households, the main earning member earns less than Rs 5,000 a month; over half of the rural households’ main income is from casual manual labour and a third of rural India remains illiterate. Military power must always be a function of national economic power, not the other way around. Not for nothing was military modernisation the last of the “Four Modernisations” in China.
Before India becomes a great power, it must be a nation of Indians. Even now, the politics of the country revolves around religious, ethnic, caste and linguistic identities, which may be natural but are also dangerously divisive. It is not just communal or caste violence: states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka war over water, and Telangana and Andhra over history. Without an emphatic national identity, asserting a greater Indian vision and strategy will not be easy.
The basic premise of Karnad’s book is that Modi is the leader who can lead the transformation. But some of Modi’s confused policy lines are no different from those of his predecessors whom Karnad so harshly criticises. Take China, Modi has led India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, even as he has articulated a common Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean vision with Japan and the US.
Karnad’s bottom line is that India’s policies are correctable and he is probably right. But they cannot be corrected by a set of bureaucrats. For that the country requires not just an inspired prime minister, but a dozen good ministers and chief ministers who will systematically transform their respective ministries and states. The first big weaknesses of the Modi system is its reliance on the bureaucracy, which is good for carrying out the tasks it has been set, but is not capable of leading a transformation. Besides, there is the question of national stamina. We need at least three decades of sustained transformative effort, and given our challenges, things do not look easy. But, at least, we could make a beginning.
- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/lifestyle/books/the-case-for-greatness/#sthash.ENHYX3Xe.dpuf

Dealing with Daesh

The Paris attack has focused the attention of the world on the Daesh. 

Earlier, the impact of the outfit, also known as the Islamic State or the ISIS, was confined to the geographical region it controls - eastern Syria and northern Iraq. Now it seems to be everywhere.

Every day Indian newspapers are giving us details of the organisation’s alleged Indian adherents and our intelligence agencies, through deep background briefings, warn darkly about the IS threat.

Focus 

Just why Daesh decided to change its focus from the “near enemy” - Syrian and Iraqi forces, the Kurdish and Iranian militias - for the “far enemy” is difficult to determine. Perhaps Paris, as well as the Russian airliner, were targets of opportunity. 

However, as Bernard Haykel pointed out in a recent article, it has to do with the adverse ground situation in Syria and Iraq where the Daesh has lost ground, and the punishment it is receiving from the aerial bombardment. It now faces a hardening of the Turkish stand since the bombing of the Opposition rally in Ankara in October, resulting in a choking of foreign recruits. 

 

This should not lead to any slackening of effort to destroy this monstrosity - a medieval state functioning in the 21st century. 

There are four steps that need to be taken to that end. First, containing the ISIS in the badlands of Syria and Iraq. Invading these areas would be counter-productive. Daesh would actually welcome a western attack because as per their theology, the end of days battle will begin from Dabiq and will actually see the “crusaders” victorious in the beginning, followed by their final destruction. 

Using Shia on non-Sunni forces would harden the resistance in the Sunni-dominated ISIS areas. Instead, a tight cordon sanitaire should be maintained by the Kurds, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi forces aided by western surveillance systems. 

The second effort needs to be made to choke the ISIS finances. It is well known that even now oil continues to be smuggled out of areas under ISIS control. Obviously some influential parties are involved in this. 

Actually it was only last week that for the first time US warplanes attacked an oil convoy coming out of the ISIS area, this was followed by attacks by the Russian Air Force as well. The question to be asked is why this was not done earlier, since these convoys are several kilometres long. However, indiscriminate bombing should be avoided because it will kill non-combatants. 

The big issue to be thrashed out here is the future of Bashar al Assad, as well as the attitude of countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, which have backed rebels against the Syrian regime. The Americans remain insistent on his removal, but so far, their efforts have led to the strengthening of ISIS, rather than weakening it. 

Complex 

The third is a more complex, longer-term task, though it does not brook much delay. This is to undermine the Daesh’s ideological appeal. This appeal arises from its claim that life in the Caliphate is lived as it was in the time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 

The enslavement of non-believers, beheading of defeated enemies, and other such medieval measures are indeed mentioned in the Muslim holy book which is considered as the word of God, but which was written up in the medieval times. 

The Old Testament of the Christians and the holy books of the Jews, too, say that God’s law demands death for, say, cursing your parents, pre-marital sex, and adultery. Slaughtering enemies and massacring the defeated is also sanctioned by divine law. But the practice of the application of the scriptures has changed, and in Christian lands no one seriously argues that practices which may have been the norm in Biblical times should be reinstituted today. 

Most Muslims, too, do not believe that it is a good idea to enslave non-believers or to stone adulterers. But many remain in the thrall of preachers who say that “innovation” or bidaa is the path to apostasy, which itself is punishable by death. 

In such circumstances, reformation or modernisation of the message of the Quran becomes moot. 

But clearly this is something that only the Muslims can work out. The one positive outcome of the Daesh literalism is that it is compelling Muslims to think and debate these issues. 

Traction 

As for India, the good news remains that the ISIS phenomenon has very little traction here. If a couple of people have been in ISIS-related chatrooms or have been trying to travel to Syria, it means little. 

As of now Indian Muslims have their feet on the ground and show no signs of being attracted to the Daesh ideology. However, we should not lower our guard, because as the Paris incident has shown, that with its back to the wall, the Daesh is striking out wherever it can. 

Mail Today November 22, 2015

To Be Not Talking is Dumb:  India's fixation on Pak terrorism is odd at a time when it's at its lowest

What are we to make of India-Pakistan rela tions? On one side of the ledger we have the elevating story of how Geeta, an abandoned deaf-and-mute girl who had strayed into Pakistan and was brought up by the Edhi Foundation of Karachi, returned this week to India after 13 years, triggering an India-Pakistan love-fest. On the other side is the continuing stand-off in official relations accompanied by bouts of sabre-rattling and gunfire across the Jammu border. The icing on this unsavoury cake this week was of former President Pervez Musharraf acknowledging in a Pakistani television interview that terrorists like Osama bin Laden and Hafiz Saeed were honed by the Pakistani military .
With this backdrop, the Narendra Modi government appears to have abandoned the multi-pronged policy of its predecessor of simultaneously engaging Islamabad and dealing with cross-border terrorism. This government made a surprise beginning with the idea of promoting South Asian unity . But since then it has been fixated on countering terrorism at the cost of everything else.
 This is somewhat puzzling because, by any count, Pakistani covert activity in India has seen a sharp decline since 2008, even as Kashmir alone has seen a slight rise in recent years. The home ministry figures speak for themselves. Over 20032005, 314, 281 and 189 security force personnel died in J&K, and 1,494, 976 and 917 terrorists were killed. In the last three years, 2012-2014, the corresponding figures have been 38, 53 and 47 security personnel and 50, 67 and 110 terrorists, respectively .

Unaffordable War
Delivering the Nagendra Singh Memorial Lecture recently , National Security Advisor Ajit Doval spoke of the importance of convincing Pakistan that “covert action is not a cost effective option.“ He went on to add that Islamabad would soon realise that the “cost involved is much heavier and that will be unaffordable“.
 The warning seems to be quite reasonable. But the subtext seems to suggest that India could take steps, possibly covert, to convince Islamabad of the “unaffordable“ price.Were that to happen, we could well see the situation in South Asia deteriorate further as any covert war is likely to spill over into Nepal and Bangladesh, as it has in the past.
It is not clear why the Modi government sees terrorism as its main enemy today when its high-point was in the early-mid 2000s, and is a declining trend today . One reason could be that New Delhi is worried about another 26/11-scale attack, which could seriously dent the government's image. Or, more likely , it feels that attacking terrorism and Pakistan plays well with its constituency . But let's be clear, terrorist strikes by themselves are hardly an existential threat to this country .
The Modi government's one-dimensional approach will not work and could actually deteriorate the South Asian situation. Wars and campaigns are won as much by skill ful diplomacy as by the military force.
Pakistan may be a failing state, but it is a tough nut and unlikely to succumb to Indian covert ops or military pressure. It has a growing nuclear arsenal and has a well-trained and equipped military . Contrary to what Doval has argued, its covert war against India has proved to be quite cost-effective. Indeed, if anything, Indian efforts to coerce Islamabad are likely to unite people behind the hardliners.

Pak's Importance
India also cannot ignore Islamabad's ability to win friends and influence big powers. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 's visit to Washington last week has shown that, despite evidence of its past duplicity, Pakistan retains its importance there. It is simply too well situated in relation to Afghanistan and Iran to be punished, let alone abandoned.
 In recent times, we have seen our old friend Russia soften towards Islamabad. And as for China, it is actually strengthening its commitment to Pakistan by putting down serious money under the rubric of the Belt Road Initiative.
The biggest strategic threat India confronts is the hostile China-Pakistan proto-alliance. Yet we have been able to do little to dent it. But 2004-2007 experience has shown that it was possible to change things through deft diplomacy . Unfortunately , that opportunity was missed and is no longer being sought again.
But the course that we are undertaking now -seeking to `convince' Pakistan about the high price it will have to pay for its covert war against India -is fraught with danger. Given the numerous faultlines in Pakistan, it is not difficult to turn up the heat there. The question is whether that is the best course to take. It is easy to begin a war, but very difficult to predict the course it will take.
India's agenda with Pakistan goes beyond terrorism. Yes, it includes Kashmir . It also includes the need to manage the dangerous nuclear competition between the two countries. Beyond this, is the need to promote the development agenda, which cannot happen without acting on the above problems.
The Economic Times October 31, 2015